Shadley v. Grand Lodge of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
| Decision Date | 10 July 1923 |
| Citation | 254 S.W. 363,212 Mo.App. 653 |
| Parties | HARRY E. SHADLEY, Respondent, v. GRAND LODGE OF THE BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis.--Hon. Moses Hartmann, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Judgment affirmed.
Edward J. McCullen for appellant.
(1) The court erred in sustaining respondent's (plaintiff's) demurrer to appellant's (defendant's) amended answer. (a) Appellant association having pleaded in its amended answer facts showing the nature and character of the association, its objects, purposes and methods of carrying on its affairs, is exempt from the general insurance laws of the State. R. S. 1919, secs. 6398 et seq. Newland v. Modern Woodmen of America, 168 Mo.App. 311, 153 S.W. 1097; Gilmore v. Modern Brotherhood of America, 186 Mo.App. 445, 171 S.W. 629. (b) Appellant's membership being limited to "one hazardous occupation, to-wit Railroad Trainmen," appellant is exempt even from the provisions of the fraternal beneficiary insurance statutes of the State. R. S. 1919, sec. 6429. (c) The contract of insurance in this case will, therefore, be construed, not more strongly against appellant, but in accordance with the fair and reasonable meaning and intention of the parties as expressed by themselves in the contract itself, to-wit: The application beneficiary certificate, the Constitution, Laws and General Rules of appellant association. Claudy v Royal League, 259 Mo. 92, 168 S.W. 593; Brittenham v. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of The World, 180 Mo.App 523, 167 S.W. 587. (2) The laws of appellant association giving the president of the Grand Lodge supreme power, in an emergency caused by an "unauthorized strike," were made by delegates chosen directly by the members themselves from amongst their own number, in their respective subordinate lodges, and neither the president of the Grand Lodge, nor any other Grand Lodge officer, had any vote in the making thereof. Organizations of the character of appellant association have a right to prescribe reasonable grounds and methods for expulsion, and courts will not examine into the technical practices of either the proceedings prescribed or followed, unless clearly subversive of personal or property rights. Callahan v. Order of Railway Conductors of America, 169 Wis. 43; 29 Cyc. 201. (3) Plaintiff violated the laws of his association; he violated a solemn agreement which his association had made with his employer and which he was bound to respect and observe; he willfully and deliberately took part in and persisted in an unlawful and unauthorized strike; his conduct called for and warranted expulsion from the association under General Rule No. 11. The refusal of the lodge to place charges against him brought into operation the supreme emergency power given to the president of the Grand Lodge to protect the order from disaster and the charter was revoked. Had plaintiff attempted to be reinstated by mandamus no court on such facts would have ordered his reinstatement. State ex rel. Young v. Temperance Society, 42 Mo.App. 485; State ex rel. Mayfield v. St. Louis Medical Society, 91 Mo.App. 76; Bosse v. Knights and Ladies of Security, 204 Mo.App. 18, 220 S.W. 993; State ex rel. v. Martin, 195 Mo.App. 366, 191 S.W. 1064. (4) The rights of a member of such an association as appellant must be settled in accordance with the provisions of the laws of the association and every available remedy within the order must be exhausted before the aid of courts can be invoked. By the action of the president the lodge became a "defunct lodge." By his refusal to take advantage of the simple remedy of applying for a dispensation and transfer when directed so to do by the president of the Grand Lodge, and furnished a blank form for that purpose, plaintiff refused to avail himself of the means which the rules of the association afforded him to protect his rights. Correia v. Supreme Lodge of Portuguese Fraternity of United States of America, 218 Mass. 305, 105 N.E. 977; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Swearingen, 161 Ky. 665, 171 S.W. 455; Bonhan v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 146 Ark. 117, 225 S.W. 335; Easter v. Brotherhood of American Yeoman, 172 Mo.App. 292, 157 S.W. 992. (5) (a) Section 42 of Grand Lodge Constitution, enumerated the several reasons for which the charter of a subordinate lodge might be revoked upon charges against, notice to, and a trial of the lodge itself. In this section 42 an "unauthorized strike" is not named at all. Section 42, therefore, did not apply. General Rule No. 22 of equal authority and equally binding upon all officers and all members emanating from the same source of power, to-wit: The Grand Lodge Convention made up of member delegates of the subordinate lodges, specifically named "an unauthorized strike" as a separate and supremely important matter to be dealt with separately, promptly and effectively as an emergency by the president of the Grand Lodge. Solari v. Italian Society of Columbus, 211 Mass. 382, 97 N.E. 765; Callahan v. Order of Railway Conductors of America, 169 Wis. 43, 171 N.W. 653. (b) No trial of the offending member, or members, who were engaged in the unauthorized strike was possible. The subordinate lodge which, under General Rule No. 11 was required to prefer charges and try and, if found guilty, expel the member, or members, was itself, officers and members together, in open rebellion against the association. The subordinate lodge refused to perform its plain duty. The individual members could not be tried until the lodge made charges against them. This the lodge refused to do. The decisions and interpretations of the president of the Grand Lodge, under sections 9 and 85, Grand Lodge Constitution and General Rule No. 11 as ratified, confirmed and approved by the Grand Lodge "whose enactments and decisions upon all questions are the supreme law of the Brotherhood" and acquiesced in by the membership and subordinate lodges as the correct practice, custom and usage of the association made it the plain duty of the president to revoke the charter of the subordinate lodge in the manner he did. Callahan v. Order of Railway Conductors of America, 169 Wis. 43, 171 N.W. 653. (6) In view of the provisions of Section 1, Grand Lodge Constitution and the allegation that "membership in defendant association was and is obtained and held only through membership in a subordinate lodge holding a legal and unreclaimed charter" plaintiff abandoned and forfeited his membership, his beneficiary certificate and all benefits thereunder when he refused to avail himself of the simple and plain remedy offered him by the president of the Grand Lodge, to-wit: To make application for dispensation and transfer to another lodge, a remedy involving not the slightest hardship on him, since blanks were furnished to him for that purpose. Easter v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 172 Mo.App. 292, 157 S.W. 992; Pavlick v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias, 198 Mo.App. 184, 199 S.W. 445. (7) The president of the Grand Lodge, in revoking the charter of the subordinate lodge, acted in accordance with the plain meaning and the established and approved interpretation of the Constitution and General Rules of the Association with respect to an "unauthorized strike." Plaintiff and the other striking and rebellious members justly merited expulsion under General Rule No. 11, in view of the fundamental purpose of appellant association--"harmonious relations"--with employers of railroad trainmen. Having willfully violated the laws of his own making, he cannot complain of the penalty. Schulz v. Supreme Tent Knights of Maccabees of the World, 236 S.W. 903; Brittenham v. Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World, 180 Mo.App. 523, 167 S.W. 587.
F. H. Bacon and J. J. O'Donohoe, for respondent.
(1) The appellant has a dual nature; it is a trade union and a life insurance company, and this fact must necessarily be kept in view because the governing principles of law may apply to the appellant in its character as an insurance company which would not be applied were it simply a trade union and vice versa. (a) The appellant is a trade union, uniting under one governing authority a certain class of railroad employees for whom it assumes to act, making contracts with railroad companies for labor as for a commodity. The individual has nothing to say concerning conditions of employment or wages. He must work or quit work, as ordered. True, every four years the lodges send a representative to a convention, supposed to enact laws and rules, but that is dominated by a few. In recess it is claimed, as in this case, that the president has distatorial powers and can expel a member whenever he thinks expulsion is dedeserved, without regard to the formalities of a trial. No one can obtain employment as a switchman unless he is a member of the union. In this respect the society falls under the ban declared by this court in Froelich v Musicians Union, 93 Mo.App. 391. (b) The society is, however, engaged in a lawful and useful business, namely, that of issuing to its members policies of life insurance, and the rights of its policyholders will be protected by the courts. The principles of law applicable to life insurance contracts apply to the policies of this organization as in the case of other associations doing a life insurance business. (2) The measure of damages for an unlawful refusal by a life insurance company to accept assessments, or premiums, is the amount paid to the company, with interest thereon. McKee v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 28 Mo. 383, 386; Tutt v. Covenant Mutual Life Ins. Co., 19 Mo.App. 677; Suess v. Life Insurance Company, 64 Mo.App. 1-12. (3) The contract between the plaintiff and defendant is found in the certificate...
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