Shadrick v. Bledsoe

• Decision Date: 22 June 1938
• Docket Number: 12367,12365.
• Citation: 198 S.E. 535,186 Ga. 345
• Parties: SHADRICK et al. v. BLEDSOE, Ordinary. MAYES et al. v. DANIEL, Ordinary.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

198 S.E. 535

186 Ga. 345

SHADRICK et al. v. BLEDSOE, Ordinary.

MAYES et al. v. DANIEL, Ordinary.

Nos. 12367, 12365.

Supreme Court of Georgia

June 22, 1938

Error from Superior Court, Cobb County; J. H. Hawkins, Judge.

Error from Superior Court, Quitman County; C. W. Worrill, Judge.

Consolidated suits by E. L. Shadrick and others against W. B. Bledsoe Ordinary, and by A. N. Mayes and others against J. J. Daniel Ordinary, to determine the constitutionality of an act, Laws 1937-38, Ex.Sess., p. 103. To review a judgment in the first described case refusing an interlocutory injunction, and a judgment in the second described case sustaining a general demurrer and dismissing the petition, plaintiffs bring error.

Affirmed.

HUTCHESON J., dissenting.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. All presumptions being in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature, it cannot be lawfully set aside by the courts unless the alleged conflict with the constitution is plain and palpable.

2. The 'act to be known as the 'revenue tax act to legalize and control alcoholic beverages and liquors;' to provide for the taxation, legalization, control, manufacture importation, distribution, sale, and storage of alcoholic beverages and liquors, and to amend the present laws of Georgia in reference to same; to provide the method and manner of collecting said taxes; to authorize the revenue commissioner to make rules and regulations for the collecting of said taxes and for the legalizing and controlling of the manufacture, sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages and liquors; to provide that this act may be placed in operation in any county by a local-option referendum in said county; to authorize counties and municipalities to levy license fees upon manufacturers, dealers, and distributors in alcoholic beverages and liquors, and to exercise police powers in the regulation thereof; to provide a separability clause; to provide for the enforcement of this act; to provide for repeal of laws in conflict herewith; to prohibit the manufacture, sale, or shipment of alcoholic beverages and liquors described in this act into counties failing to adopt local option; to provide for the confiscation of all alcoholic beverages and liquors on which the taxes herein provided for have not been paid, and the vehicles used in transporting same; to provide the method and manner of issuing licenses to manufacturers, dealers, and distributors of intoxicating beverages and liquors; to provide penalties and punishment for the violation of the terms of this act; to provide certain exceptions to the provisions of this act; to prohibit certain forms of display and advertisement of spirituous liquors; to define the term 'liquor' and other definitions coming under the terms of this act; and for other purposes,' Laws 1937-38, Ex.Sess. p. 103, comes clearly within the call of the Governor summoning the meeting of the legislature in extra session; and consequently it is not, as contended, violative of the requirement of art. 5, sec. 1, par. 13, of the constitution of Georgia. Code, § 2-2613.

3. Nor is the act violative of art. 3, sec. 7, par. 8, of the constitution (Code, § 2-1808), declaring that 'No law or ordinance shall pass which refers to more than one subject-matter, or contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof.'

4. Nor is the act violative of art. 3, sec. 7, par. 17, of the constitution (Code, § 2-1817), which declares that 'No law, or section of the Code, shall be amended or repealed by mere reference to its title, or to the number of the section of the Code, but the amending, or repealing act, shall distinctly describe the law to be amended or repealed, as well as the alteration to be made.'

5. The so-called liquor law is a general law, which any or all counties of the State may adopt if they so desire; and consequently it is not a local or special law, and therefore is not violative of art. 1, sec. 4, par. 1, of the constitution (Code, § 2-401), as contended, because 'Said act is in violation of the above provision of the constitution, because it contains 31 sections, each of which is to be considered a separate enactment according to section 23 thereof [p. 122], and each of which constitutes a special law in regard to legalizing alcoholic beverages, in conflict with the laws of a general nature now in force throughout the State, prohibiting manufacture, possession, and sale of such alcoholic beverages. Section 2, 3, and 27 [pp. 104, 123] each definitely provide that it is a special law in conflict with laws of a general nature now in force.'

6. The act under consideration does not violate art. 3, sec. 7, par. 10 (Code, § 2-1810), for the constitutional requirement that all bills for raising revenue or appropriating money shall originate in the House of Representatives also provides, 'But the Senate may propose or concur in amendments, as in other bills,' and a substitute is a recognized method of amendment.

7. The court did not err in refusing an injunction in case 12,367, or in sustaining the general demurrer to the petition in case 12,365.

These two cases were argued together, and are so nearly identical that a statement and decision in one of them will be sufficient. In Mayes v. Daniel the exception is to a judgment sustaining a general demurrer and dismissing the petition, while in Shadrick v. Bledsoe, the exception is to a judgment refusing an interlocutory injunction. We will state and decide the questions involved in the Shadrick case, the rulings therein being made to apply to both cases. Certain persons, as citizens and taxpayers of Quitman County, filed a petition against Bledsoe, as ordinary, praying that an act of the General Assembly approved February 3, 1938 (Ga.L.Ex.Sess. 1937-38, pp. 103-124) be declared void because in violation of the requirement of art. 5, sec. 1, par. 13, of the constitution of Georgia, which provides that 'No law shall be enacted at called sessions of the General Assembly, except such as shall relate to the object stated in his [the Governor's] proclamation convening them;' and that the defendant be enjoined from holding an election which had been called in said county under the provisions of the act attacked, and from paying any money from the county treasury for defraying the expenses of such election. This act is entitled 'An Act to be known as the 'Revenue Tax Act to Legalize and Control Alcoholic Beverages and Liquors;' to provide for the taxation, legalization, control, manufacture, importation, distribution, sale and storage of alcoholic beverages and liquors, and to amend the present laws of Georgia in reference to same; to provide the method and manner of collecting said taxes; to authorize the Revenue Commissioner to make rules and regulations for the collecting of said taxes and for the legalizing and controlling of the manufacture, sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages and liquors; to provide that this Act may be placed in operation in any county by a local option referendum in said county; to authorize counties and municipalities to levy license fees upon manufacturers, dealers and distributors in alcoholic beverages and liquors and to exercise police powers in the regulation thereof; to provide a separability clause; to provide for the enforcement of this Act; to provide for repeal of laws in conflict herewith; to prohibit the manufacture, sale or shipment of alcoholic beverages and liquors described in this Act into counties failing to adopt local option; to provide for the confiscation of all alcoholic beverages and liquors on which the taxes herein provided for have not been paid and the vehicles used in transporting same; to provide the method and manner of issuing licenses to manufacturers, dealers and distributors of intoxicating beverages and liquors; to provide penalties and punishment for the violation of the terms of this act; to provide certain exceptions to the provisions of this Act; to prohibit certain forms of display and advertisement of spirituous liquors; to define the term 'liquor' and other definitions coming under the terms of this Act; and for other purposes.'

It is stated in the proclamation convening the extraordinary session of the General Assembly at which the act now attacked was passed: 'I, E. D. Rivers, Governor of Georgia, do hereby convoke and call a meeting of the General Assembly of this State in extraordinary session * * * for the purpose of considering and enacting laws and resolutions, by revision, repeal, amendment, or otherwise, relating to all of the following subjects, which are considered by the executive of sufficient importance to make the necessity for such extraordinary session, to wit: Taxation for all State, county, municipal, school district, or other public purposes or objects, including all kinds of revenue that is or may be raised for public purposes by any manner of taxation whatever, including excise, license, franchise or privilege taxes, regulations or penalties. * * * Laws pertaining to the right of the State in contraband or outlawed goods, authorizing the State to acquire title and possession thereof, and providing for their confiscation, destruction, sale or distribution. * * * Laws pertaining to nuisances and the practice of professions, businesses, and trades. * * * Penal laws respecting any of the objects and matters included in this call.'

By amendment to the petition said act was attacked as being in violation of the following constitutional provisions: art. 3 sec. 7, par. 8, which declares: 'No law or ordinance shall pass which refers to more than one subject-matter or contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof.' Art. 3, sec. 7, par. 17, which declares: 'No law, or ...