Shafer v. Bowersox
| Decision Date | 03 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:98-CV-1881.,4:98-CV-1881. |
| Parties | Robert A. SHAFER, Petitioner, v. Michael BOWERSOX, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Charles M. Rogers, Cheryl A. Pilate, Wyrsch, Hobbs, Mirakian & Lee, P.C., Kansas City, MO, for plaintiffs.
Robert A. Shafer, PCC, Mineral Point, MO, pro se.
Frank A. Jung, Attorney General of Missouri, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for defendants.
Robert A. Shafer filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking relief from a Missouri state trial court's1 imposition of the death penalty for the April 29, 1990 murders of Keith Dennis Young and Ford Jerry Parker. Following a direct appeal and post-conviction proceedings, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of the death penalty. For the reasons explained below, the Court rejects Shafer's claims that his confessions violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel; he received ineffective assistance of counsel; his death sentence is disproportionate; the aggravating circumstances found by the trial court were invalid; and he was denied a fair trial due to ex parte communications between the trial court and the prosecutor. The petition, however, is granted on Shafer's claims that his waiver of counsel for the guilty plea and sentencing phases, his guilty plea, and his waiver of the right to present mitigating evidence were not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily and on Shafer's claim that the trial court failed to consider mitigating circumstances in sentencing him to the death penalty.2
Robert Shafer pled guilty to two counts of murder in the first degree and two counts of armed criminal action and was sentenced to death on the murder counts and life imprisonment on the armed criminal actions counts, without the assistance of counsel. Shafer was 22 years old at the time he pled guilty and was sentenced. The factual basis for the uncounselled guilty plea entered by Shafer consisted of a written confession and a videotaped confession given to law enforcement officers in July 1992. Shafer's co-defendant, David Steinmeyer, was sentenced on October 21, 1992, to 12 years and 6 months' imprisonment pursuant to a plea agreement with the State. (App. at 2151-52.)
The confessions given to law enforcement officers in July 1992 conflict with several other versions of the crimes Shafer gave to mental health professionals and with the co-defendant's version.3 Shafer, however, confirmed during the change of plea hearing that the July 1992 confessions were the true and correct versions of the crimes.
Shafer's confessions reveal that on April 29, 1990, he and his friend David Steinmeyer talked about robbing some homosexuals and beating them up. After consuming drugs and alcohol, Shafer retrieved a .22 revolver and five shells from his sister's home where he was living. Around 8:45 p.m. Shafer and Steinmeyer went to a popular hang-out and approached two men, Young and Parker, as they were kissing and hugging. Young and Parker agreed to give Shafer and Steinmeyer a ride to a nearby town. During the ride, Shafer and Steinmeyer agreed they would rob Young and Parker. Shafer took control of the vehicle by force and Steinmeyer held Young and Parker at gun point until they arrived in a secluded area. Steinmeyer struggled with Parker and Shafer struggled with Young until both Parker and Young were in a ditch. As Parker was attempting to flee, Shafer fired two shots from the .22 revolver he had taken from his sister's house. At least one shot hit Parker in the face. Shafer then returned to Young's location in the ditch. Young pleaded for his life and started to flee. Shafer fired one shot at Young, hitting him in the back. Shafer loaded the remaining two shells in the .22 revolver and fired two more shots at Young, at least one of which was at Young's head.
Shafer and Steinmeyer retrieved the car and drove near Young's body. Young was unconscious and bleeding when Shafer took a lighter out of Young's pocket. Shafer then drove to Parker's body. Parker was not breathing. Shafer took approximately $100 and cigarettes out of Parker's pockets. Shafer drove the car away from the scene and discussed with Steinmeyer where to leave the car. They arrived in St. Charles around 10:30 p.m. They removed items from the car that might have their fingerprints on them and left the car at a gas station. They took the car stereo, speakers, cassette tapes and the .22 revolver to Shafer's sister's house. Shafer returned the .22 revolver to his sister's room and placed the five shell casings in his bedroom closet.
The next day, the police discovered Young and Parker's bodies and found their car. Shafer and Steinmeyer talked about the shooting and Steinmeyer said he talked to somebody at school about the shooting. Shafer called his mother and told her he might have shot two people and then he and Steinmeyer went to confession. After confession, they told several people they were leaving town. Shafer told his brother, Michael, he had shot two people the night before. When they stopped for gas on their way to Texas, Shafer and Steinmeyer agreed to turn themselves into the police in St. Charles. While driving back to St. Charles to turn themselves in, they talked about what to tell the police. Steinmeyer agreed to let Shafer write a statement saying that Shafer shot Young and Steinmeyer shot Parker. Shafer and Steinmeyer turned themselves into the police and were arrested. The police retrieved the .22 revolver from Shafer's sister's house, but later returned it to Shafer's brother-in-law.
Shafer was charged with two counts of first degree murder and two counts of armed criminal action. From April 30, 1990 to the date of his change of plea hearing on January 4, 1993, Shafer was detained at the St. Charles County Jail. During this two-and-one-half years, Shafer was represented by seven different attorneys. Shafer wrote numerous letters to several individuals and organizations during his incarceration at the St. Charles County Jail. (See App. at 2549-747.) The letters express Shafer's conflicting thoughts about whether he was guilty of murder; whether he wanted to be represented by an attorney or waive such representation; suppressing his confessions; having a mental evaluation; and whether to go to trial or plead guilty. (Id.) Shafer wrote several letters complaining that his attorneys were not working on his case or doing anything to help him. (Id.) On August 8, 1991, fifteen months after his arrest, Shafer first suggested he may want to waive his right to counsel because he felt his attorney, Mr. Paul Madison, was rendering ineffective assistance of counsel. (App. at 2596-97.) Mr. Madison was eventually removed as Shafer's court-appointed counsel and several other attorneys were thereafter appointed as various times. Shafer's competency was questioned and the trial court ordered a mental health examination. Shafer eventually filed a motion to proceed pro se and the trial court conducted a hearing on this motion on July 27, 1992. The trial court took the motion under advisement and later ordered a second mental health examination.
Throughout his confinement at the St. Charles County Jail, Shafer repeatedly complained orally and wrote several letters complaining about the conditions of his confinement. (See App. at 2549-747.) Less than one month before Shafer's change of plea hearing, a state circuit court4 conducted a hearing on Shafer's motion to transfer to a new jail. Ruling from the bench on December 12, 1992, the state court denied Shafer's motion to transfer. (JT at 197-202.)
On January 4, 1993, the trial court conducted a second hearing on Shafer's motion to proceed pro se. During this hearing, the trial court granted Shafer's motion to waive his right to counsel, but ordered his court-appointed counsel to remain in the courtroom as a resource for Shafer. (GPT at 13.) In the same proceeding, the trial court accepted Shafer's uncounselled guilty plea and sentenced Shafer to death on each of the murder counts and to life imprisonment on the armed criminal action counts. (GPT at 13, 48-49.)
Shafer filed a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence with the Missouri Supreme Court. Shafer also filed a Missouri Rule 24.035 postconviction motion. Following a three-day evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court held that Shafer's guilty plea and resulting conviction were valid, but that Shafer must be re-sentenced. (App. at 3896, 3899, 3910.) Both Shafer and the State appealed the post-conviction court's decision. Shafer's direct appeal and the appeal of the post-conviction court's decision were consolidated. See State v. Shafer, 969 S.W.2d 719(Mo.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 969, 119 S.Ct. 419, 142 L.Ed.2d 340 (1998). On May 26, 1998, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed Shafer's conviction, reversed the post-conviction court's order to re-sentence Shafer, and affirmed the death sentence on the murder charges. Id. at 742. Following the United States Supreme Court's denial of his Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Shafer v. Missouri, 525 U.S. 969, 119 S.Ct. 419, 142 L.Ed.2d 340 (1998), Shafer filed the present petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The Supreme Court explained the standard for granting habeas relief to a state prisoner under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"):
[Section] 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied — the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Cowans v. Bagley
...F.3d 658, 682 (10th Cir.2002) (Lucero, J., concurring); Thomas v. Beard, 388 F.Supp.2d 489, 513-14 (E.D.Pa.2005); Shafer v. Bowersox, 168 F.Supp.2d 1055, 1087 (E.D.Mo.2001). Some courts have also placed an emphasis, in determining the validity of a waiver of mitigation, on whether or to wha......
-
Shafer v. Bowersox
...clearly established federal law in ruling that his waivers and pleas had been knowing, voluntary and intelligent. See Shafer v. Bowersox, 168 F.Supp.2d 1055 (E.D.Mo.2001). It also concluded that the supreme court had unreasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence when it found t......
-
Spires v. Hurley
...it represents a "voluntary and intelligent" choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." Shafer v. Bowersox, 168 F.Supp.2d 1055, 1079 (E.D. Mo. 2001). A plea is a waiver of right to trial before a jury or a judge; "constitutional rights not only must be voluntary b......