Shaffer v. Acs Government Services, Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A.AW-03-2138.,Civ.A.AW-03-2138.
• Citation: 321 F.Supp.2d 682
• Parties: Richard M. SHAFFER, Plaintiff, v. ACS GOVERNMENT SERVICES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

321 F.Supp.2d 682

Richard M. SHAFFER, Plaintiff, v. ACS GOVERNMENT SERVICES, INC., Defendant.

No. Civ.A.AW-03-2138.

United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division.

June 15, 2004.

Robert Scott Oswald, Employment Law Group PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Nikki Michelle Tinker, James Mason Loots, Ford and Harrison LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAMS, District Judge.

Plaintiff Richard M. Shaffer has filed suit against Defendant ACS Government Services, Inc. ("ACS") alleging violations of 28 U.S.C. § 1875(a), also known as the Jury System Improvement Act and Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 8-105 (2003) ("Jury System Improvement Act"). Pending before this Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Or, Alternatively, To Stay Action And Compel Arbitration [8]. The Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for review. No hearing is necessary. See D. Md. R. 105.6. Upon consideration of the arguments made in support of, and in opposition to, the motion, the Court makes the following determinations.

I. Background

For the purposes of this motion, the relevant background facts are minimal. Plaintiff began working at ACS on September 10, 2001. On or about March 7, 2002, Plaintiff received a summons to report to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for potential service on a grand jury. In or about April 2002, Plaintiff appeared for grand jury selection proceedings, and was subsequently called to active grand jury service starting on November 20, 2002. Plaintiff alerted his supervisors to this fact, and advised them that his service would be continuing in nature through at least October 23, 2003. On or about November 20, 2002, Plaintiff began his term on the grand jury. On or about January 30, 2003, Plaintiff's employment with ACS was terminated.

Plaintiff filed suit in this Court alleging that Defendant violated the Jury System Improvement Act by unlawfully terminating his employment as a result of Plaintiff's participation in a grand jury.

Defendant has moved this Court to dismiss the Complaint, or, in the alternative, to stay the action and compel arbitration.

II. Standard of Review

A. Motion To Compel Arbitration

The Court recognizes that motions to compel arbitration exist in the netherworld between a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. In order to effectively assess the merits of this motion, however, the court must consider documents outside the pleadings. As such, the Court will treat Defendant's motion as a motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c);¹ see, e.g., Mastercraft Interiors, Ltd. v. ABF Freight Systems, Inc., 284 F.Supp.2d 284, 288-89 (D.Md.2003).

B. Rule 56

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment will be granted when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Haavistola v. Comty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211, 214 (4th Cir.1993); Etefia v. East Baltimore Comm. Corp., 2 F.Supp.2d 751, 756 (D.Md.1998). "Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 477 U.S. 317, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1). The court must "draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, including questions of credibility and of the weight to be accorded to particular evidence." Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 520, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991) (citations omitted). While the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences drawn in his or her favor, a party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculation or compilation of inferences. See Deans v. CSX Transp., Inc., 152 F.3d 326, 330-31 (4th Cir.1998); Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir.1985).

In responding to a proper motion for summary judgment, the party opposing summary judgment must present evidence of specific facts from which the finder of fact could reasonably find for him or her. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2729.1 (3d. ed.1998). The non-movant must show that he has access to admissible evidence for presentation at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In the absence of contradictory evidence showing a genuine dispute as to a material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id. at 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548. For the purposes of summary judgment, a genuine dispute exists if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. While the non-moving party must do more than merely raise some doubt as to the existence of a fact, the moving party ultimately bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of all genuine issues of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

III. Analysis

Defendant contends that Plaintiff's claim is covered by a mandatory ACS Arbitration Policy instituted by Defendant in April of 2002. According to Defendant, after Plaintiff commenced his employment, ACS circulated via email and written memorandum an announcement that ACS was instituting a mandatory dispute resolution program ("DRP"). Defendant contends that it alerted employees that their continued employment past April 12, 2002 would constitute acceptance of the DRP, and forfeiture of their rights to pursue relief in the courts for any employment disputes. Defendant also argues that, on or about June 4, 2002, Plaintiff signed a document acknowledging receipt of an employee manual which included a short section on the DRP. Finally, Defendant contends that Plaintiff was aware of the DRP and the agreement to submit employment disputes to arbitration because Plaintiff participated in an ethics training program, a component of which covered the DRP. In response, Plaintiff maintains that he has no recollection of receiving the emails and memoranda on these issues. In addition, he argues that he at no time forfeited his right to a trial by his peers. Plaintiff further contends that continued employment cannot constitute acceptance of, or consideration for, an arbitration agreement.

A. Federal Arbitration Act

The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") applies to contracts "evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2, Federal policy strongly favors arbitration. See O'Neil v. Hilton Head Hospital, 115 F.3d 272, 273 (4th Cir.1997) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)). In accordance with that policy, "any doubts concerning the scope of the arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration...." Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927. As a result, in a "close-call" on arbitrability, the Court must decide in favor of sending the parties to arbitration. See Long v. Silver, 248 F.3d 309, 316 (4th Cir.2001) (citing Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 809, 812 (4th Cir.1989)).

While federal policy favors arbitration, a court must first determine whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate. This determination is a matter of contract law and "`a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.'" AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986) (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed. 1409 (1960)). Whether parties have contracted to arbitrate is a matter of state contract law, and the court must apply "`ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts....'" Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 148 F.3d 373, 377 (4th Cir.1998) (quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995)). Accordingly, the Court must apply state-law principles governing contracts when analyzing formation and federal substantive law in analyzing arbitrability. See Int'l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411, 417 n. 4 (4th Cir.2000).

As a preliminary matter, this Court agrees with the Eastern District of New York's determination that claims under the Jury System Improvement Act are subject to arbitration under the FAA. See McNulty v. Prudential-Bache Securities, 871 F.Supp. 567 (E.D.N.Y.1994). As that Court concluded, "[t]here is no evidence in the statute's text or legislative history that Congress intended to remove claims under the Jurors' Act from arbitration; nor is there an inherent conflict between arbitration and the purposes of the Act." Id. at 569.

A. Contract Formation

It is axiomatic that formation of a valid contract includes an offer, acceptance, and consideration. The latter two elements are at issue here.

1. Consideration

The Court finds it necessary to begin its analysis by addressing two of Defendant's arguments regarding the existence of consideration for the arbitration agreement. "Consideration is established by a showing of either detriment to the promisee or benefit to the promisor." Nat'l Mortgage Warehouse, LLC v. Bankers First, 190 F.Supp.2d 774, 784 (D.Md.2002). Defendant has argued that by remaining employed by ACS after April 12, 2002, Plaintiff's continued employment constituted sufficient...