Shakir v. Derby Police Dep't

• Decision Date: 05 January 2018
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11–CV–1940 (JCH)
• Citation: 284 F.Supp.3d 165
• Parties: Anwar SHAKIR, Sr., Plaintiff, v. DERBY POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

284 F.Supp.3d 165

Anwar SHAKIR, Sr., Plaintiff,

v.DERBY POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11–CV–1940 (JCH)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed January 5, 2018

Tracy Alan Saxe, Saxe Doernberger and Vita, P.C., Trumbull, CT, for Plaintiff.

James Newhall Tallberg, Karsten & Tallberg, LLC, West Hartford, CT, Patrick D. Allen, Karsten & Tallberg LLC, Rocky Hill, CT, Joseph A. Jordano, Nicole Demers, Attorney General's Office, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS FRATTA AND MAROTTA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. NO. 198) AND DEFENDANT STANKYE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. NO. 201)

Janet C. Hall, United States District Judge

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION...173

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND...174

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW...174

IV. FACTS...175

V. DISCUSSION...180

A. Personal Involvement (Marotta)...181

B. Procedural Due Process (Fratta and Stankye)...185

1. Applicable Law...186

2. Removal of A.S. from Shakir's Home...187

3. Interview of A.S. at Derby Police Department...190

4. Release of A.S. to Gandy...192

5. Conspiracy...194

C. Substantive Due Process (Fratta and Stankye)...197

D. Fourth Amendment Unlawful Seizure (Stankye)...198

E. Fourth Amendment Unlawful Search (Stankye)...199

F. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement (Stankye)...204

G. Declaratory Relief (Stankye)...211

VI. CONCLUSION...213

I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff, Anwar Shakir, Sr., ("Shakir"), is currently incarcerated at Corrigan–Radgowski Correctional Institution, in Uncasville, Connecticut. He brings this civil rights action pro se pursuant to section 1915 of title 28 of the United States Code against Derby Police Detective Charles Stankye, Department of Children and Families ("DCF") Supervisor Kathie Marotta, and DCF Social Worker Michele Fratta. See Amended Complaint ("Am. Compl.") (Doc. No. 106).

Before the court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Fratta and Marotta and a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Stankye. See Fratta and Marotta Motion for Summary Judgment ("Fratta MFSJ") (Doc. No. 198); Stankye Motion for Summary Judgment ("Stankye MFSJ") (Doc. No. 201). For the reasons below, Fratta and Marotta's Motion is granted, and Stankye's Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 15, 2011, Shakir filed a Complaint against Stankye, Marotta, Fratta, the Derby Police Department, and Assistant State's Attorney Charles Stango. See Complaint ("Compl.") (Doc. No. 1). On March 31, 2015, the court granted a Motion to Dismiss all claims against Stango. See Ruling Granting Stango's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 101). On April 27, 2015, Shakir filed an Amended Complaint naming only Stankye, Marotta, and Fratta as defendants. See Am. Compl. The court then denied Shakir's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint to clarify some of the allegations in his first Amended Complaint and to add additional claims. See Ruling (Doc. No. 175). Thus, the first Amended Complaint remains the operative complaint.

On March 31, 2016, the court granted in part and denied in part a Motion to Dismiss filed by Stankye and a separate Motion to Dismiss filed by Fratta and Marotta. See Ruling on Stankye's Motion to Dismiss ("Ruling on Stankye MTD") (Doc. No. 176); Ruling on Fratta and Marotta's Motion to Dismiss ("Ruling on Fratta MTD") (Doc. No. 177). Following these Rulings, Shakir's federal conspiracy claim, his Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims, his Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process claims, and his Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim remain pending against Stankye in his individual capacity, and Shakir's claim for declaratory relief remains pending against Stankye in his official capacity. See Ruling on Stankye MTD. Against Fratta and Marotta, the claims that remain pending are Shakir's Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process claims and his federal conspiracy claim. See Ruling on Fratta MTD.

On September 26, 2016, Stankye filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, and Fratta and Marotta filed a separate Motion for Summary Judgment. See Stankye MFSJ; Fratta MFSJ. The court addresses both Motions together in this Ruling.

On May 5, 2017, the court appointed pro bono counsel for Shakir. See Order Appointing Pro Bono Counsel (Doc. No. 303). The court granted Shakir's Oral Motion to Reopen Discovery (Doc. No. 314) to give counsel an opportunity to conduct and file supplemental briefs on behalf of Shakir. See Minute Entry (Doc. No. 315). After the reopened discovery period expired, Shakir filed a Declaration of additional evidence, but counsel did not file any supplemental briefings on his behalf. See Declaration by Plaintiff to Provide Court with Additional Evidence ("Pl.'s Suppl. Decl.") (Doc. No. 320). Having received no supplemental briefings, the court decides the Motions for Summary Judgment based on Shakir's initial pro se filings. See Order (Doc. No. 324).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment may be granted only where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Redd v. N. Y. Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 173–74 (2d Cir. 2012). The moving party bears the burden of "showing—that is pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca–Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Once a party moving for summary judgment has made the requisite showing that there is no factual dispute, the nonmoving party bears the burden of presenting evidence to show that there is, indeed, a genuine issue for trial." Santos v. Murdock, 243 F.3d 681, 683 (2d Cir. 2001). The nonmoving party cannot "rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation," but "must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact." Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

In reviewing the record, the court must "construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor." Gary Friedrich Enters., L.L.C. v. Marvel Characters, Inc., 716 F.3d 302, 312 (2d Cir. 2013).

The function of the district court in considering the motion for summary judgment is not to resolve disputed questions of fact but only to determine whether, as to any material issue, a genuine factual dispute exists.... Summary judgment is inappropriate when the admissible materials in the record make it arguable that the claim has merit, for the court in considering such a motion must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.

Rogoz v. City of Hartford, 796 F.3d 236, 245–46 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted).

Where one party is proceeding pro se, the court must read that party's papers liberally and interpret them "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Despite this liberal interpretation, "unsupported allegations do not create a material issue of fact" and cannot overcome a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000). Additionally, "only admissible evidence need be considered by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Raskin v. Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d 55, 66 (2d Cir. 1997).

IV. FACTS¹

At all relevant times, Stankye was employed by the Derby Police Department,² and Fratta and Marotta were employed by DCF. See Stankye's Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement of Facts ("Stankye L.R. 56(a)1") (Doc. No. 201–2) at 1 ¶ 1; Fratta and Marotta's Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement of Facts ("Fratta L.R. 56(a)1") (Doc. No. 214–2). Shakir and Starquonda Gandy have one child together, Anwar Shakir, Jr. ("A.S."). See Stankye L.R. 56(a)1, Ex. B (Doc. No. 201–5) at 2; Fratta L.R. 56(a)1 at 2 ¶ 7. Gandy also has another child, Taeja Gandy ("T.G."), of whom Shakir is not the father. See id.

In 2008, Gandy left the home she shared with Shakir in Connecticut and moved with T.G. first to Kansas and then eventually to California. See Fratta L.R. 56(a)1 at 2 ¶ 7; Plaintiff's Opposition to Fratta and Marotta's MFSJ ("Opp. to Fratta's MSFJ"), Ex. G7 ("Pl.'s Aff. (Fratta)") (Doc. No. 214–3) at 3 ¶ 9. Gandy left A.S. to reside with Shakir in Connecticut. See Fratta L.R. 56(a)1 at 2 ¶ 7; Pl.'s Aff. (Fratta) at 3 ¶ 10. In December of 2008, Gandy returned temporarily to Connecticut and, on January 5, 2009, she reported to Stankye that Shakir had sexually assaulted T.G. when they had lived together. See Fratta L.R. 56(a)1 at 3 ¶ 7; Stankye L.R. 56(a)1 at 1 ¶ 2; Plaintiff's Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement of Facts in Response to Stankye's MFSJ ("Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 to Stankye") (Doc. No. 215–2) at 3 ¶ 2. Stankye reported Gandy's allegations to DCF, and Marotta assigned Fratta to investigate the allegations. See Stankye L.R. 56(a)1 at 1 ¶ 3; Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 to Stankye at 3 ¶ 3; Fratta L.R. 56(a)1 at 1 ¶ 3. On January 12, 2009, Stankye observed T.G. undergo a forensic interview at the Child Sexual Abuse Clinic at Yale New Haven Hospital ("Yale Clinic"). See Stankye L.R. 56(a)1 at 2 ¶ 4; Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 to Stankye at 4 ¶ 4.

On January 13, 2009, Fratta, Marotta, and DCF Program Manager Karen Grayson concluded that DCF had probable cause to believe that A.S. was in imminent risk of physical harm because he was living with Shakir and therefore similarly situated to T.G. at the time of her alleged sexual assault. See Fratta L.R. 56(a)1 at 4 ¶ 14; Plaintiff's Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement of Facts to Fratta's MFSJ ("Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 to Fratta") (Doc. No. 214–2) at 6 ¶ 14.e.³ On January 14, Fratta visited Shakir's home and conducted a minimal facts interview...