Shamblin v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 14 September 1984
• Docket Number: No. 1112,D,No. 83-3299,1112,83-3299
• Citation: 743 F.2d 436
• Parties: 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2289, 101 Lab.Cas. P 11,181 Roscoe SHAMBLIN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America; and United Automobile Workers Localefendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 436

743 F.2d 436

117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2289, 101 Lab.Cas. P 11,181

Roscoe SHAMBLIN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America; and United Automobile Workers Local No.

1112, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 83-3299.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued Aug. 2, 1984.

Decided Sept. 14, 1984.

John F. Shultz, John J. Dixon, argued, Youngstown, Ohio, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Kathleen Burke, argued, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Cleveland, Ohio, Anthony P. Sgambati, II, Youngstown, Ohio, Jordan Rossen, Ralph O. Jones, argued, Detroit, Mich., for defendants-appellees.

Before EDWARDS, Circuit Judge, BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge, and SILER, District Judge. ^*

GEORGE CLIFTON EDWARDS, Jr., Circuit Judge.

Thirty-three employees at the General Motors Lordstown, Ohio plant filed this suit against General Motors and their collective bargaining agent, the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) and its Local 1112. The suit was brought under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 141-187 (1982) (Act). Plaintiffs specifically rely upon two sections of the Act, Sections 8(b) and 9(a), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 158(b), 159(a). Jurisdiction is predicated on Sec. 301 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a).

Plaintiffs claim the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants based on its conclusion that jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185 had not been pled. They further claim the District Court erred in finding that appellants were barred from maintaining their cause of action for failure to exhaust contractual and intra-union remedies.

After consideration of the briefs, record and oral arguments on these issues, we find that the District Court was correct in both conclusions and we affirm its judgment.

All of the plaintiffs-appellants were employees at the Lordstown, Ohio plant of General Motors and members of the UAW Local Union at said plant. All except one of them were also originally hired by General Motors as unskilled production workers. ¹ Under the General Motors/UAW contract in force at the Lordstown plant, most General Motors workers acquired plant-wide seniority on a one-for-one basis. There was, however, a separate seniority list for skilled employees, and one-for-one skilled trades seniority was acquired only when an employee was actually working in a trade. ² Such seniority was issued for purposes of lay-off and recall within the skilled trades classification.

Prior to the origin of this dispute, it is a matter of record that an unskilled employee who sought to enter the General Motors skilled trades training program would be required to work for four years before he acquired any seniority rights in the skilled trades classification. Thereafter, he would continue to work under supervision for an additional four years, after which, on successful completion of the training program, he would be reclassified as a skilled trades journeyman and afforded four years of seniority within that skilled trades classification for his eight year training period. In effect, EIT program participants, before December 13, 1976, received one-for-two seniority.

Effective December 13, 1976, General Motors and the UAW, through collective bargaining, amended the seniority provisions applicable to employees in training for skilled classifications. The amendment provided that participants in training for skilled trades would prospectively be afforded seniority on a one-for-one basis within the skilled trades classification.

This provision, which was obviously advantageous to unskilled workers entering the training program, was not retroactively applied and particularly, as far as this lawsuit was concerned, was not retroactively applied to our instant plaintiffs who were then in the skilled trades training program. Although this suit is filed against both General Motors and the UAW, in fact, it is primarily a suit against the UAW and its Local Union at Lordstown, Ohio.

Examination of the record in this case indicates clearly that plaintiffs do not plead facts which, if proved, would establish a breach of the collective bargaining agreement. They do allege that the union breached its duty of fair representation, as set out in such cases as Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 564, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 1056, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976) and Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 73 S.Ct. 681, 97 L.Ed. 1048 (1953).

The essence of plaintiffs' claims appears to this court to be that the UAW should have secured in collective bargaining with General Motors a seniority agreement which would have provided them retroactive one-for-one seniority for their skilled trades training. In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338-39, 73 S.Ct. 681, 686-87, 97 L.Ed. 1048 (1953), the Supreme Court said concerning very similar contentions:

Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees and classes of employees. The mere existence of such...