Shane v. State, 47200

Decision Date03 April 1974
Docket NumberNo. 47200,47200
Citation513 S.W.2d 579
PartiesKoni SHANE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Criminal Appeals

Ronald A. Monshaugen, Houston, for appellant.

Carol S. Vance, Dist. Atty., James Brough and Mike Schneider, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, Jim D. Vollers, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

ODOM, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of a violation of the liquor laws (Art. 667--19B(b), Vernon's Ann.P.C.), and was assessed a fine of one hundred dollars.

Article 667--19B, supra, in relevant part, provides:

'For the purposes contemplated by this Act, conduct by any person at a place of business where the sale of beer at retail is authorized that is lewd, immoral, or offensive to public decency is hereby declared to include but not be limited to the following prohibited acts; and it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in the sale of beer at retail, or any agent, servant or employee of said person, to engage in or to permit such conduct On the premises of the Retailer:

'(b). The exposure of person or permitting any person to expose his person.' (Emphasis added.)

The complaint and information in the record and upon which the instant prosecution was based, in relevant part, charged:

'. . . that in said County of Harris and State of Texas, heretofore on or about the 26th day of April, A.D., 1972, JUDITH ANNETTE REED 1 being the agent, servant and employee of George William Courtemanche, the said George William Courtemanche being then and there the holder of a wine and beer permit theretofore issued by the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission for the premises located at 4656 Telephone, Houston, Harris County, Texas, and the said defendant as such agent, servant and employee of said licensee did then and there expose her person publicly in a way that was then and there offensive to public decency.'

It will be observed that the information contains no allegation that the appellant engaged in such conduct On the premises of the Retailer. The allegation that she exposed her person in her capacity 'as agent, servant and employee of said licensee' is not sufficient, since the element of the offense as to location is a separate and independent element of any offense alleged under Article 667--19B, supra.

Nevarez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 503 S.W.2d 767, cited in the dissenting opinion, is instructive. The indictment therein specifically charged that the defendant carried a pistol 'while in a premise covered by a permit and license under the provisions of the Texas Liquor Control Act where the public is invited and alcoholic beverages are openly sold, served, and consumed.' This charge was held sufficient against a claim that the indictment failed to allege with sufficient particularity the place where the offense was committed. It was pointed out that when an offense may only be committed in a certain type or class of place, it is necessary to allege that the offense was committed in such type or class of place. In the instant case the allegation was only that the act was done 'publicly', and was done 'then and there,' which clearly is shorthand form for 'in the aforesaid county and on the aforesaid date.' It was not alleged that the alleged conduct ws engaged in 'on the premises of the Retailer.' Thus, the opinion cited by the dissent supports reversal of the instant case.

The information as worded would...

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11 cases
  • Hodge v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • September 17, 1975
    ...been issued for the premises is an element of the offense. See Nevarez v. State, 503 S.W.2d 767 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), and Shane v. State, 513 S.W.2d 579 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). Also, if a court has less than countywide jurisdiction, it is necessary to allege a place within the jurisdiction of that ......
  • Standley v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • January 15, 1975
    ...of the value of the property merely a question of notice, the defect would have been waived. But as we stated in Shane v. State, 513 S.W.2d 579 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), involved is not merely a question of notice, but rather, an essential element of the offense alleged. If the charging instrument......
  • Ward v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • March 12, 1975
    ...Corporation v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598, at 603, and authorities there cited; Stadley v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 517 S.W.2d 538; Shane v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 513 S.W.2d 579. Since a conviction in a trial based on a fatally defective indictment is a nullity, the court would have been justified on t......
  • Clark v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • September 17, 1975
    ...v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 527 S.W.2d 289 (1975). However, when no such allegation is made, the charging instrument is insufficient. Shane v. State, 513 S.W.2d 579; Adams v. State, 524 S.W.2d 67 The only allegation connecting appellant's conduct to the premises appearing in the indictment upon ......
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