Shanks v. District Court of Jefferson County In First Judicial Dist., 20919
Decision Date | 21 October 1963 |
Docket Number | No. 20919,20919 |
Parties | Sam SHANKS, Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT OF the COUNTY OF JEFFERSON IN the FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, State of Colorado, and the Honorable Christian D. Stoner, one of the Judges Thereof, Respondents. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
W. H. Erickson, Charles F. Brega, Denver, for petitioner.
Ronald J. Hardesty, Dist. Atty., First Judicial Dist., F. Richard Hite, Asst. Dist. Atty., Robert G. Pierce, Deputy Dist. Atty., Denver, for respondents.
This is an original proceeding upon the petition of Sam Shanks in which it is alleged that the 'Defendant Court and the Defendant Judge * * * exceeded the jurisdiction of the court and abused the discretion of the court' in refusing to admit him to bail in an action pending in said court.
Shanks was named defendant in an information filed in the district court of Jefferson county, which accused him of the murder of one Robin R. Roberts. Counsel for Shanks filed a 'Motion for Bail' following his arrest, in which it was alleged, inter alia:
'3. That there is no evidence which would in anywise implicate or involve the Defendant with the crime charged, other than limited circumstantial evidence, and the Defendant is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
'4. That an Information was filed on August 14, 1963, charging the Defendant with murder and declaring that the crime was not bailable.
'5. That the Defendant has not confessed to any crime and alleges on information and belief that no eye witness exists which would permit the Court to impose a death penalty.
'6. That the case charged is not a capital case where the proof is evident and the presumption great.
This motion came on to be heard August 19, 1963.
It is admitted that no evidence was taken at that 'hearing'; that the district attorney who was under subpoena to testify admitted in open court that he had no evidence that Shanks had confessed the crime; that he had no 'direct' evidence, and that the case was one in which only circumstantial evidence was available. Following these admissions by the district attorney the trial court entered the following order:
'1. That the District Attorney was subpoenaed and admitted in Open Court that the case against Sam Shanks was wholly circumstantial and that there was no direct evidence or a confession or any eyewitness to the crime charged against Sam Shanks at the present time.
'2. That the District Attorney has opposed the granting of bail.
'3. That the filing of an Information is sufficient basis for the denial of bail, since it creates a presumption that the proof is evident and the presumption great of the Defendant's guilt of a capital offense.
'THEREFORE, IT IS THE ORDER OF THE COURT that bail be denied.'
Thereafter a second application for release on bond was made by Shanks on substantially the same grounds as those urged in the first motion. On September 10, 1963, the trial court entered the following order:
'That the circumstances have not changed and that bail is denied; and
'IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any petition for rehearing on the issue of bail if filed, would be denied.'
Thereupon these proceedings were instituted, our rule to show cause issued, and the respondents, appearing by the district attorney, have filed their answer in which they assert that they refused to admit Shanks to bail for the reason 'that the said Sam Shanks for the purpose of proving himself qualified for bail has failed to overcome the presumption of guilt cast upon him by the filing of the information in the trial Court charging the crime of first degree murder.' It is further asserted that the admission of a person to bail under the circumstances here present is 'a matter within the sound discretion of the trial Court' and, it is said, 'in view of the fact that no evidence has been presented to the respondent Judge and Court, there can be no valid claim of the exercise of arbitrary and capricious discretion herein.'
The case of In re Losasso, 15 Colo. 163, 24 P. 1080, 10 L.R.A. 847, is relied upon by the district attorney and no other authority is cited by him. The opinion in that case clearly indicates that the trial court is under a duty to determine, from evidence presented, whether with reference to the charge against the accused, '* * * the proof is evident or the presumption great.' We think that the admissions of the district attorney were sufficient to require that the court make findings based upon evidence on the question as to whether the proof is evident or the presumption great.
While it is true that in the Losasso case, supra, the court stated that:
* * *'
we must harmonize that statement with other pertinent parts of the opinion, from which we quote the following:
* * *
* * *
In the recent case of People v. Spinuzzi, 149 Colo. 391, 369 P.2d 427, we considered the question of the right of an accused to bail in a murder case. We said:
'The People assign as error the trial court's action admitting the defendant to bail pending the trial. Article II, Sec. 19 of the Colorado Constitution provides:
"All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for capital offenses, when the proof is evident or the presumption great.'
The trial court did nothing more than 'summarily sustain' the objections of the district attorney to the request for bail. It did not 'determine for itself' from any competent evidence that, 'the proof is evident or the presumption great' that the accused was guilty of the crime charged. The opinions of this court in the Losasso case and the Spinuzzi case contain ample guidance for proper action and the directions therein contained have not been followed in the instant case.
The cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate the order denying the Motion for Bail. It is further ordered that the trial court forthwith conduct a hearing on the question of whether, with reference to the guilt of the accused, 'the proof is evident or the presumption great.' It is further directed that the evidence taken at said hearing be recorded and that findings based thereon be made--all to the end that this court may have before it a full record of proceedings in the event that the matter is again presented to us for review by any party who may feel aggrieved by the trial court's determination.
HALL and McWILLIAMS, JJ., dissent. HALL, J., desires that the record express his view that the rule to show cause should not have been issued, and that said rule should now be discharged.
Article II of the Constitution of Colorado is the Bill of Rights. Section 19 of the Bill of Rights provides that:
'All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for capital offenses, when the proof of is evident or the presumption great.'
It is to be noted that all persons are bailable with...
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