Shannon's Estate, In re
| Decision Date | 27 January 1965 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In the Matter of the ESTATE of Katherine H. SHANNON, Deceased. Margaret ROBINSON et al., Claimants and Appellants, v. Elise HALL, Claimant and Respondent. Civ. 7680. |
Block & Greer and David A. Block, San Diego, for claimants and appellants.
Deane Haskins, La Jolla, for claimant and respondent.
*
This is an appeal by the daughter and two granddaughters of Katherine H. Shannon, deceased, who are income beneficiaries of a trust created under her will. The appeal is form a judgment construing portions of the will. The parties involved stipulated to all pertinent facts. There was no oral testimony so the appeal is based on the judgment roll alone.
The matter came before the trial court upon a petition of the executor, First National Bank of San Diego, to construe the will. The trust under which appellants are beneficiaries is delineated in paragraph first of the will. Respondent claims under paragraph fourth. These two paragraphs read as follows:
'FIRST: I give and bequeath to FIRST NATIONAL TRUST & SAVINGS BANK OF SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, and its successors by merger, consolidation or otherwise, 1000 shares of the common stock of St Regis Paper Company, 100 shares of the common stock of American Telephone & Telegraph Company, and 200 shares of common stock of General Motors Corporation, together with all shares of said stocks which may be issued after my death as the result of stock dividends or stock splits by said companies by reason of my ownership of said shares at the time of my death, IN TRUST, to hold, administer and distribute as follows:
'(a) The entire net cash income from said trust shall be paid to, or applied for the benefit of, my daughter, MARGARET ROBINSON, in quarterly or other convenient installements, during her lifetime.
'(b) After the death of my daughter Margaret, the entire cash income from said trust shall be paid in equal shares to, or for the benefit of, each of my two granddaughters, CAROLYN ROSS ROBINSON and MARGARET LEE ROBINSON, or the survivor of them, in quarterly or other convenient installments as long as they or either of them live. Upon the death of the survivor, the corpus of the trust estate shall be distributed in equal shares to the children of my daughter, ELISE HALL, or if any of them have died, leaving lawful issue him or her surviving, to such issue on the principle of representation. In the event there are no such children or issue, then to The Salvation Army, San Diego, California.
'(c) No part of the income or the corpus of the trust estate is to be paid to my grandson ELBERT W. ROBINSON, JR., or his issue.
Between October 17, 1955, the date the will was executed, and January 17, 1963, the date of decedent's death, two of the stocks enumerated in paragraph first of the will were split as follows:
1. November 7, 1955: General Motors stock was split three to one.
2. April 24, 1959: American Telephone and Telegraph stock was split three to one.
On May 13, 1960, Katherine H. Shannon executed a codicil to her will. In this codicil, after bequeathing certain personal effects to a friend, she revised paragraph second of her original will, wherein the trustee of the trust created in paragraph first is given certain directions in connection with its management of the trust. The changes made in paragraph second of this codicil are not material here. It is of interest to note however that in both paragraph second of the original will and in the codicil revision of this paragraph, the last sentence reads exactly the same, as follows:
'Where the trustee shall have the option of receiving a dividend either in cash or shares, it shall elect to take the shares.' [Emphasis added.]
Paragraph third of the codicil then reads:
'Third: Except as above provided, I hereby ratify, confirm and republish my said will executed October 17, 1955.'
The trial court, in its judgment interpreting the will, which of course includes the codicil, came to the following conclusion:
Respondent states in her brief that in this state there appear to be two lines of cases dealing with the question of the scope of review of a trial court's interpretation of a written instrument. On the one hand are cases such as Estate of Helfman, 193 Cal.App.2d 652, 14 Cal.Rptr. 482, which assert that where no extrinsic evidence has been introduced in connection with the instrument, the court on appeal can and should apply its own interpretation de novo notwithstanding the trial court's interpretation. Witness such cases as Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 131 P.2d 825 and Estate of Wunderle, 30 Cal.2d 274, 181 P.2d 874. On the other hand, witness such cases as Estate of Northcutt, 16 Cal.2d 683, 107 P.2d 607; Lundin v. Hallmark Productions, Inc., 161 Cal.App.2d 698, 327 P.2d 166, and Estate of Cuneo, 60 Cal.2d 196, 32 Cal.Rptr. 409, 384 P.2d 1 in which latter case, quoting from Estate of Northcutt, supra, appears this statement:
'* * * [T]he rule is well settled that where the construction given to an instrument by a trial court is reasonable and appears to be consistent with the intent of the party making it, courts of appellate jurisdiction will not substitute another interpretation, even though it may seem equally tenable with that accorded by the trial court.' (Estate of Northcutt, 16 Cal.2d 683, 690, 107 P.2d 607, 611.)
Respondent suggests that 'Some resolution of this problem is needed, both in the future guidance of would-be appellants and the harmonizing of decisions within California.'
Unquestionably, this would be a most desirable state of affairs in all cases of conflicting authority if it could be accomplished. But a hard and fast stereotyped rule applicable to all situations would be most difficult to accurately formulate and the result would perhaps promote more unjust than just results. Harmonizing conflicting decisions is of course a function of the Supreme Court. But since we must follow one horn of the suggested dilemma in deciding the present case, it will be in order to state our reasons for following the horn that we do follow and our reasoning in arriving at our conclusion.
The rationale of the cases cited in support of the rule giving preference to the findings of the trial court seems to be generally that where any extrinsic evidence is introduced, particularly oral evidence, which legally can and should be considered by the trial court, the trial judge is in a better position to analyze this evidence and declare the truth than is an appellate court which can only review a lifeless...
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