Shannon v. Prall

• Decision Date: 23 March 1921
• Docket Number: 16075.
• Citation: 115 Wash. 106,196 P. 635
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: SHANNON v. PRALL et ux.

196 P. 635

115 Wash. 106

SHANNON v. PRALL et ux.

No. 16075.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 23, 1921

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Bruce Blake, Judge.

Action by Flora Parks Shannon against J. W. Prall and wife. Judgment of dismissal, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Robertson, Miller & Robertson, of Spokane, for appellant.

Henry Madigan and Cunningham & Cunningham, all of Spokane, for respondents.

MAIN J.

This acion is based upon a written contract for services rendered. The defendants denied liability and pleaded a release. The trial resulted in findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a judgment dismissing the action. From this judgment the plaintiff appeals.

On the 14th day of February, 1919, the appellant and the respondent J. W. Prall entered into a contract in writing as follows:

'This agreement made and entered into this 14th day of February, A. D. 1919, between J. W. Prall, party of the first part, and Flora Parks Shannon, party of the second part witnesseth:

'That whereas, since May 1st, 1911, the said party of the second part has been performing divers services of value to the said J. W. Prall, party of the first part, which services were highly appreciated by him, such services consisting of confidential work as secretary and helper about his business and

'Whereas, while there has been an understanding that the party of the second part was to receive compensation for this, no amount has been fixed, and- 'Whereas, owing to the uncertainty of life, it is regarded by both parties as essential that there should be a specific understanding, it being the intention of both parties that said services should continue as long as desirable by said parties:

'Now therefore, in consideration of the premises, the party of the first part, said J. W. Prall, does agree to pay to the party of the second part the sum of seven hundred ($700.00) dollars per year, beginning May 1, 1911, and including each year between that date and this, and continuing in the future as long as said relation exists. Payment for these services shall not be enforced, however until the party of the second part ceases to perform services for the party of the first part.

'In Witness Whereof, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands the day and year in this instrument first above written.

'J. W. Prall.

'Flora Parks Shannon.'

It will be noted that this contract recites that since May 1, 1911, the appellant rendered services for J. W. Prall, who will hereafter be referred to as though he were the only respondent, in the capacity of a confidential secretary and helper. The contract further recites that it shall not be enforced until the appellant ceases to perform services for the respondent. About a month after the contract was executed, the performance of services ceased, and the present action was soon thereafter instituted. For a number of years prior to the execution of the contract, the respondent, with her husband and children, resided upon a tract of land owned by the respondent. The appellant and her husband having concluded to move to another location, a settlement of accounts between Mr. Shannon and the respondent was undertaken and resulted in a conclusion that the respondent owed to Mr. Shannon the sum of $466.66. On March 19, 1919, the appellant signed a writing individually and for her husband by herself as follows:

'Received of J. W. Prall, through Joseph R. Roberson, the sum of four hundred sixty-six dollars and sixty-five cents ($466.65), said amount being balance in full due as shown on statement bearing even date herewith also received.

'As a further consideration of the delivery to us of two (2) certain promissory notes of five hundred dollars each, one bearing date of October 29, 1913, due October 29, 1914, made by J. W. Shannon, in favor of J. W. Prall, and one bearing date November 20, 1913, due November 20, 1914, made by J. W. Shannon and Flora Shannon, in favor of J. W. Prall, we hereby acknowledge the receipt in full, and waive all demands of every kind and nature for further consideration up to this 19th day of March, A. D. 1919.

'Flora Shannon.

'J. W. Shannon;

'By Flora Shannon.'

At the time this writing was signed, the respondent was represented by an agent, and Mr. Shannon was not present. It will be noted that the second paragraph of this writing relates to two promissory notes for $500 each, one of which was signed by Mr. Shannon alone and the other by him and his wife, the appellant. It was after this writing was signed that the present action was instituted. The appellant contends that since the parties at that time were adjusting the rights which were of a community nature, the writing would not release any rights of the appellant which were here separate and individual property. For the purpose of releasing all obligations to the community, it was not necessary that the appellant sign the writing individually. The signature of the husband alone was sufficient. In Northern Bank & Trust Co. v. Graves, 79 Wash. 411, 140 P. 328, the wives of two parties had signed notes, and when action was brought they attempted to show that they signed merely as members of their respective communities. It was there said:

'This was, of course, unnecessary, since the signature of the husband alone to a note given for a community debt or in prosecution of a community enterprise is all that is necessary to bind the husband personally and the community, and to subject the community property to the judgment thereon. The signatures of the wives for this purpose would be an idle thing and without effect. The wives, in signing this instrument, must have intended that act to have some effect rather than none. Toon v. McCaw, 74 Wash. 335, 133 P. 469. Such also much have been the intention of the appellant in requiring their signatures. The fact that the wives made themselves parties to the note by signing it raises a presumption, not rebuttable by parol evidence, that they intended to bind themselves personally.'

So here, when the appellant signed the writing individually, it must have been intended that the act should have some effect. It cannot be shown by parol evidence that she did not at that time intend to bind her separate estate. The writing having been signed in such form that it would cover the individual rights of the appellant as well as the community rights of herself and husband, the question then arises as to...