Shapley v. Diehl

• Decision Date: 13 October 1902
• Docket Number: 136
• Citation: 203 Pa. 566,53 A. 374
• Parties: Shapley, Appellant, v. Diehl
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

53 A. 374

203 Pa. 566

Shapley, Appellant, v. Diehl

No. 136

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

October 13, 1902

Argued April 29, 1902

Appeal, No. 136, Jan. T., 1902, by plaintiff from judgment of C.P. Cumberland Co., on case stated in suit of Joseph S Shapley v. I. C. Diehl, John L. Martin and William Hykes Trustees of the Church of God of Shippensburg. Reversed.

Case stated to determine the marketable title to real estate. Before E. W. BIDDLE, P.J.

From the case stated it appeared that Joel Shapley, the plaintiff's father, wrote on the back of a deed which conveyed to him the real estate in controversy, the following words:

"For value received, I hereby convey and transfer all my right, title and interest to the property within mentioned, to Joseph S. Shapley for the term of his natural life and at his death to his children or heirs."

Subsequently Joel Shapley executed and delivered to Joseph S. Shapley a paper, as follows:

"Whereas, by certain conveyances dated December 15, 1896, . . . it was my intention and desire to convey the property therein mentioned to Joseph S. Shapley, his heirs and assigns; and whereas the words used in said conveyance do not seem to clearly effectuate such intention, therefore, for the purpose of removing all doubt as to the nature of the estate intended to be passed, and for the purpose of carrying such intention into effect, I hereby declare such to have been my intention and desire the same to go on record as such."

The plaintiff contracted to sell the property to the defendants.

The defendants objected to plaintiff's title on the ground that he had a life estate only. The court held that the rule in Shelley's Case did not apply, and that plaintiff had merely a life estate, and accordingly entered judgment for the defendants on the case stated.

Error assigned was in entering judgment for defendants.

Judgment reversed and judgment directed to be entered for the plaintiff according to the stipulation of the case stated.

J. M. Weakley, with him Joseph S. Shapley, for appellant. -- Plaintiff took a fee: Sheely v. Neidhammer, 182 Pa. 163; Guthrie's App., 37 Pa. 12; McKee v. McKinley, 33 Pa. 93; Dodson v. Ball, 60 Pa. 500; Potts's Appeal, 30 Pa. 170; Yarnall's Appeal, 70 Pa. 341; Carson v. Fuhs, 131 Pa. 260; Dodson v. Ball, 60 Pa. 500.

J. S. Omwake, for appellee. -- In the deed in question the word "heirs" means "children:" Guthrie's App., 37 Pa. 9; Chew's App., 37 Pa. 23; Huss v. Stephens, 51 Pa. 282; Warn v. Brown, 102 Pa. 347; Criswell v. Grumbling, 107 Pa. 408.

Before McCOLLUM, C.J., MITCHELL, DEAN, FELL and POTTER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE MITCHELL:

In determining whether the rule in Shelley's case is applicable the test is how the donees in remainder are to take. If as purchasers under the donor then the particular estate is limited by the literal words of the deed and the rule in Shelley's case has no application. But if the remainder-men are to take as heirs to the donee of the particular estate, then what has been called the superior intent as declared in Shelley's case operates and the first donee takes a fee, whatever words may be used in describing the estate given to him. "The inheritance in remainder must be given to the heirs of the grantee of the estate for life, as heirs, or the rule has no applicability to the case. . . . It is always therefore, a precedent question in any case to which it is supposed the rule is applicable whether the limitation of the remainder is made to the heirs in fee or in tail as such, and in solving this question the rule itself renders no assistance. It is silent until the intention of the grantor is ascertained:" Guthrie's Appeal, 37 Pa. 9.

In construing the deed here we must of course be governed entirely by the language of the instrument itself. If by it a life estate only passed to appellant with a remainder in fee to his son, the latter cannot be divested in this proceeding by any subsequent declaration of the grantor however formal.

The words of the grant are "to Joseph S. Shapley for the term of his natural life, and at his death to his children or heirs." Prima facie, the word "children" is a word of purchase and not of limitation, and must be so construed unless it is clear that the grantor used it in the other sense. That it may be so used has been held in many cases which it would be tedious and unprofitable to review here in detail. A number of them are referred to in Yarnall's Appeal, 70 Pa. 335, 341. The question for us is the sense in which the words were used in this instrument that is, what was the intent of the grantor in the phrase "children or heirs?" If he had omitted the word "children" and said "heirs" only, the precise case for the rule would have been presented and the life estate would have been enlarged to a fee, yet the meaning would have been exactly the same and...