Shaporov v. New Jersey
| Decision Date | 11 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22cv1150 (EP) (LDW) |
| Parties | ALEXANDER SHAPOROV, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff Alexander Shaporov (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against the State of New Jersey, Palisades Interstate Parkway Commission (“Commission”), Palisades Interstate Parkway Police Department (“Palisades PD”), Sergeant Gregory D. Kimbro Jr. (“Sergeant Kimbro”), Palisades PD Officers Matthew Levine (“PO Levine”), Timothy Conboy (“PO Conboy”), Peter Wojcik (“PO Wojcik”), and Scott Bilotti (“PO Bilotti”),[1] Palisades PD Doe Police Officers # 1-10 (“PO Doe #1-10”), and Palisades PD Supervisor Doe Police Officers #1 (“Supervisor #1”) (collectively “Defendants”), following a March 2020 incident on the Palisades Interstate Parkway that resulted in Plaintiff's arrest. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's 10-count Complaint. D.E. 17. The Court decides the motion without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b); L.Civ.R.78(b). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion will be GRANTED.
Plaintiff is a 38-year-old male with a disabled left hand. D.E. 1 “Compl.” ¶ 17. He is a United States citizen, who resides in Kings County, New York. Id. He is employed as a New York State investigator. See ¶ 23.
On March 3, 2020, Plaintiff, was travelling northbound in a New York State government-issued vehicle on the Palisades Interstate Parkway in Alpine, New Jersey. ¶¶ 19-20. He was enroute to a training in Albany, New York, associated with his job as a New York State investigator. ¶ 19. At approximately 11:00 a.m., PO Levine pulled Plaintiff over. ¶ 20.
PO Levine told Plaintiff that he had pulled him over for having tinted windows in violation of N.J.S.A. § 39:3-75.1. ¶ 22. But Plaintiff alleges that this reason was pretextual because Plaintiff's New York State government-issued vehicle was compliant with lawful levels of tint. Id. Plaintiff explained to PO Levine that: he was driving an official New York State government-issued vehicle; he was a New York State investigator; and he was driving to Albany, New York, for training. ¶¶ 22-23. Plaintiff also provided PO Levine with a copy of his official New York State employee identification. ¶ 23.
PO Levine observed that Plaintiff had a disabled left hand and told him that he did not believe that Plaintiff was a New York State investigator. ¶ 25. PO Levine took Plaintiff's New York State investigator credentials and called for additional police units. ¶ 26.
Sergeant Kimbro, PO Conboy, PO Wojcik, PO Bilotti, and Doe Officers arrived on the scene. ¶27. Plaintiff complied with PO Levine's instruction to step out of the vehicle. ¶ 28. PO Levine patted Plaintiff down. ¶ 29.
Plaintiff was subsequently arrested, handcuffed, and placed in the back of an unventilated, “very hot” patrol car for an extended period of time. ¶¶ 32-33. Without being properly secured by a seatbelt, Plaintiff was taken to the Palisades Interstate Park Police Department for processing where he was charged with violating N.J.S.A. § 2C:28-8B, Impersonating a Law Enforcement Officer. ¶¶ 34-37.
Plaintiff alleges that despite his credible and true claim of being a New York State investigator, as well as having access to Plaintiffs New York State official badge and identification, Defendants conspired to falsely complete official documentation and filed fabricated charges against Plaintiff. ¶¶ 40-45.
On March 23, 2020, Plaintiff was required to make a mandatory appearance at the Court of the Palisades Interstate Park, where an official criminal complaint against Plaintiff was presented charging Plaintiff with various crimes, including impersonating a law enforcement officer. ¶ 47. These charges were ultimately dismissed in Plaintiff's favor on October 20, 2020. ¶¶ 49, 51. The same day, Plaintiff was charged with a new traffic violation-a lane changing offense. ¶ 52.
Pursuant to the New Jersey Tort claims Act, Plaintiff served Notices of Claim upon New Jersey and Palisades PD for personal injuries, false arrest, negligence, recklessness, unlawful search and seizure, failure to protect, deliberate indifference, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, harassment, and gross negligence. ¶ 55.
Based on these facts, Plaintiff filed a 10-count Complaint alleging various claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest (Count One), false imprisonment (Count Two), unreasonable and excessive force (Count Three), malicious prosecution (Count Four), failure to supervise (Count Five), substantive and procedural due process violations (Counts Seven and Eight), failure to intervene (Count Nine), and a Monell claim (Count Six). ¶¶ 57-138. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges state law claims under the New Jersey State Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”) for malicious abuse of process and malicious prosecution (Count Ten). ¶¶ 139-157. Based on Plaintiff's collective use of the term “Defendants” in each count of the Complaint, the Court can only glean that Plaintiff intends to assert each claim against every defendant. As relief, Plaintiff seeks: a declaratory judgment; an injunction against Defendants; compensatory damages; punitive damages; and pre-and post-judgment interest, costs, and expenses, as well as attorneys' and expert fees. ¶¶ A.-F.
Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims asserted against Commission, Palisades PD, and Officer Defendants, at least to the extent that these claims are asserted against them in their official capacities. See D.E. 17 “Mot.” Defendants do not move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims to the extent that they are asserted against Officer Defendants in their individual capacities, and neither do Defendants move to dismiss New Jersey as a defendant.
Defendants' motion to dismiss is brought pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The Court considers the jurisdictional issues first, because a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction renders all other claims moot. Ruhrgas A.G. v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“Article III generally requires o federal court to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject matter before it considers the merits of a case.”).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the court that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991). In resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a court must first determine whether the motion presents a “facial” or “factual” attack because the distinction determines how the pleading is reviewed. See Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Saint-Jean v. Cty. of Bergen, 509 F.Supp.3d 87, 97 (D.N.J. 2020) (citation omitted). The basis of a facial attack is that a claim on its face “is insufficient to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the court” and “does not dispute the facts alleged in the complaint.” Id. at 358; Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016).
When a defendant asserts Eleventh Amendment immunity, he raises a facial attack. SaintJean, 509 F.Supp.3d at 97 Garcia v. Knapp, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93871, at *11 ). The reason for this is that “[t]he Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction[.]” See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996).
A court reviewing a facial attack pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) must “consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Constitution Party of Pa., 757 F.3d at 358; see also Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & facm Ass'ci. 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977) (). Ultimately, the complaint may only be dismissed if it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff will not be able to demonstrate a colorable claim of jurisdiction. Cardio-Med. Assoc., Ltd. v. Crozer-Chester med. Ctr., 721 F.2d 68, 75 (3d Cir. 1983) (quotation marks omitted).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court accepts all well-pled facts as true, construes the complaint in the plaintiffs favor, and determines “whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Cnty. Of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, the plaintiffs claims must be facially plausible, meaning that the well-pled facts “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The allegations must be “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Finally, “[i]n deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based up on these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).
Defendants raise four arguments as to why Plaintiffs claims should be dismissed: (1) claims brought against Defendants in their official capacities are barred by Eleventh Amendment...
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