Shareef v. O'Donnell
| Decision Date | 14 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 20-426 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | HASAN SHAREEF, Plaintiff, v. JUDGE WILLIAM O'DONNELL, OFFICER BRIAN PALKO, DA TERRY SCHULTZ, CO WALTEMIRE, CAPTAIN MOORE, SGT. BLUMMING, WARDEN SNEDEN, MICHAEL SCUILLO, JEFFRETY KENGERSKI, MARK BOWMAN, MARK BATISER, STATE POLICE IN BUTLER, CAPTAIN ZENTS, SGT. WAGNER, SGT. WATIMERE, WARDEN DEMORE, ASST. WARDEN FEMALE, Defendants. |
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF Nos. 4, 4-1 & 4-2) be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & (iii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).
Plaintiff Hasan Shareef ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner currently in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and confined at SCI-Forest. He initiated this action by filing a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, which was granted on April 3, 2020. (ECF Nos. 1 & 3.) His Complaint, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was docketed that same day. (ECF No. 4.) On April 30, 2020, Plaintiff moved to voluntarily withdraw this case. (ECF No. 10.) As a result, the case was closed by Order dated May 1, 2020. (ECF No. 11.) On May 13, 2020, however, Plaintiff moved to reopen this case. (EF No. 12.) Said motion was granted and the case was reopened on May 15, 2020. (ECF No. 13.) Upon review, the undersigned now recommends that this case be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the screening provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)) or seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity (28 U.S.C. § 1915A). The Court is required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis and seeking redress from governmental officers or employees.
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) or § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Tourscher v.McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, a court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 113-14 (3d Cir. 2002).
In reviewing a pro se plaintiff's complaint, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to the pro se plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008). A complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above a speculative level." Id. at 555. The court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Additionally, a civil rights claim "must contain specific allegations of fact which indicate a deprivation of constitutional rights; allegations which are nothing more than broad, simple and conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983." Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987).
Finally, a court must employ less stringent standards when considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally anddraw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a section 1983 action, the court must "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name." Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) () (citing Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993)). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996).
The allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint are difficult to comprehend, but it appears that Plaintiff complains primarily of four things: (1) that he was not brought in front of the same magistrate judge who issued the warrant for his arrest in May 2016, (2) that he was subjected to a false arrest on May 27, 2016,1 (3) that he was subjected to a malicious prosecution by the ButlerCounty District Attorney's Office, and (4) that his property was confiscated and destroyed when he was processed into the Butler County Prison on August 20, 2018. See, generally, (ECF Nos. 4, 4-1 & 4-2.)
Plaintiff has previously filed cases in this Court complaining of issues identical to those complained of in his current Complaint. "Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those parties who have contested an issue be bound by the result of the contest; and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties." Baldwin v. Traveling Men's Assn., 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931). In this regard, "[a] fundamental precept of common-law adjudication, embodied in the related doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, is that a 'right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies.'" Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (quoting Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897)). "To preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions." Id., 440 U.S. at 153-54; see also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
Pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action. Id. at 153 (citing Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1877)). Additionally, "res judicata bars not only claims that were brought in a previous action, but also claims that could have been brought." In reMullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Parkview Assocs. P'ship v. City of Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 329 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000) () It applies where there is "(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action." In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d at 225. Although res judicata is an affirmative defense for a defendant to plead, "dismissal for failure to state a claim may be appropriate when it is obvious, either from the face of the pleading or from other court records, that an affirmative defense such as res judicata will necessarily defeat the claim." Taylor v. Visinsky, 534 F. App'x 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)).
This suit is not Plaintiff's first complaining about the confiscation and destruction of his property when he was processed into the Butler County Prison. In Civil Action No. 18-1494, Plaintiff alleged that certain officers and employees at the Butler County Prison, including Defendants Capt. Moore, Warden Demore, Assistant Warden Female, Sgt. Blumming, Capt. Zents, Sgt. Wagner, Warden Sneden, Michael Scuillo, Jeffrey Kengerski, Mark Bowman and Maj. Batiser, confiscated and destroyed his property when he was processed into the Butler County Prison on August 20, 2018. The Court construed Plaintiff's allegations concerning his property as attempting to assert a claim for the denial of due process and access to courts, found that he had failed to state...
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