Sharp v. Stoughton Trailers, LLC, 15-cv-598-jdp
| Decision Date | 02 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | 15-cv-598-jdp |
| Parties | DAVID J. SHARP, Plaintiff, v. STOUGHTON TRAILERS, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin |
Plaintiff David J. Sharp brings this employment discrimination suit against his former employer, defendant Stoughton Trailers, LLC, alleging disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (ADA), and the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, Wis. Stat. §§ 111.31-111.395 (WFEA).
Now defendant has moved to dismiss counts II and III of plaintiff's complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. 7. The court will grant defendant's motion to dismiss count II but will deny the motion to dismiss count III.
In July 2012, Dr. Jeffery P. Staab diagnosed plaintiff with chronic subjective dizziness (CSD). Plaintiff took prescribed medication to treat his symptoms from September 2012 to September 2013; at that time, doctors started tapering the medication regimen. Plaintiff's symptoms were largely under control at that time.
On October 28, 2013, defendant hired plaintiff as a value stream manager. But in January 2014, plaintiff's symptoms resurfaced; he had trouble walking and standing, making it dangerous for him to drive or to be around moving equipment. Plaintiff told his supervisor, Dale Einerson, about his CSD at that time, and Einerson accommodated plaintiff by allowing him to come into work later on some mornings or to work from home as needed.
On March 4, 2014, plaintiff told his production managers and Kate Shieldt, defendant's vice president of human resources, about his CSD. On March 13, 2014, Robert Wahlin, defendant's president, informed plaintiff that Einerson no longer worked for the company and that Mike Doverspike would be plaintiff's new supervisor. Although Doverspike knew about plaintiff's CSD, he refused to continue Einerson's accommodations. In response, plaintiff produced a letter from his physician requesting a flexible schedule to accommodate his CSD. Defendant requested additional information from plaintiff's physician. Plaintiff informed human resources and Doverspike that he would request an updated letter when his physician returned from vacation.
Plaintiff obtained a supplemental letter from his physician on April 1, 2014, and he brought it with him to work that day. On his way to work, Doverspike called plaintiff and told him to report to his office when he arrived. Plaintiff dropped the letter at Ms. Shieldt's desk on his way to Doverspike's office. There, plaintiff met with Doverspike and Shieldt, who promptly terminated plaintiff for alleged performance issues. Plaintiff did not find another job until September 2015.
Plaintiff filed a complaint with the State of Wisconsin Equal Rights Division and with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. On June 19, 2015, the EEOC notified plaintiff of his right to sue. Plaintiff alleges disability discrimination in violation of the ADA and the WFEA, and intentional discrimination that entitles plaintiff to punitive damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
The court has subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's ADA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because it arises under federal law. To the extent that plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted under the WFEA, the court would have supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), because that claim is so related to plaintiff's ADA claim that it forms part of the same case or controversy.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint's legal sufficiency. To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must provide a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint must contain Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Defendant moves to dismiss counts II and III of plaintiff's complaint. Defendant contends that the WFEA does not provide a private right of action and that plaintiff cannot maintain an independent claim for punitive damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
The WFEA provides that "no employer . . . may engage in any act of employment discrimination . . . against any individual on the basis of . . . disability[.]" Wis. Stat.§ 111.321. The Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development's Equal Rights Division receives, investigates, and holds hearings on complaints charging discrimination in violation of the WFEA. Id. § 111.39; see also Staats v. County of Sawyer, 220 F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 2000) (); Bachand v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 101 Wis. 2d 617, 305 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Ct. App. 1981) .
In 2006, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin determined that Wisconsin state courts had been somewhat divided on whether the WFEA creates a private right of action. Martin v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 05-cv-209, 2006 WL 897751, at *3-*4 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 31, 2006) (citing cases). The court ultimately concluded that Wisconsin recognized a private right of action under the WFEA only in limited circumstances—namely, when a plaintiff seeks a remedy that was unavailable during the administrative proceedings. Id. at *4 ().1
The federal district courts in Wisconsin have, in the past, resolved this issue differently. Velyov v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., No. 14-cv-71, 2014 WL 5312656, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 16, 2014) (). But since then, legislative retooling has confirmed that the WFEA does not provide a general private right of action. A 2009 amendment allowed individuals who prevailed on an administrative claim to bring a private suit for compensatory and punitive damages. The legislature repealed the amendment a short time later. Although a private right of action under the WFEA existed in that limited window between 2009 and 2012, the window has since closed. Velyov, 2014 WL 5312656, at *3 (). This brief interlude effectively codified Martin's take on Wisconsin law: the existence of the amendment itself confirmed that prior to its enactment, individuals did not have a general private right of action under the WFEA. See, e.g., Jones v. Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Structural Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron Workers, 864 F. Supp. 2d 760, 767 (E.D. Wis. 2012) ( ).
And so that brings us to plaintiff's claim here. The WFEA does not afford plaintiff a general private right of action, unless plaintiff brings a claim for discrimination occurring between July 1, 2009, and April 19, 2012. He does not. As a result, plaintiff cannot bring a disability discrimination claim under the WFEA, and the court will grant defendant's motion to dismiss count II of plaintiff's complaint.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, a...
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