Sharpe v. Sharpe
Decision Date | 10 October 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 71--1050,71--1050 |
Citation | 267 So.2d 665 |
Parties | Rebia Gladys SHARPE, Appellant, v. Alex Gainor SHARPE, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Edward P. Swan and Charnelle H. Summers, Jr., Miami, for appellant.
Morrow & Morrow and Steve G. Morrow, Jr., Miami, for appellee.
Before PEARSON and CHARLES A. CARROLL, JJ., and HOWELL, CHARLES COOK, Jr., Associate Judge.
This is a domestic relations case.
As sequelae of the parties' inability to perpetuate their once blissful life together, a suit for dissolution of the marriage eventuated; the judgment providing that the marital home should --and the judgment likewise providing that 'there will be no alimony granted to either of the parties as a result of the dissolution of this marriage.'
Assigning both of the above stated provisions of the judgment as error, the wife appealed.
With professional sympathy we validate the appeal in each of its aspects.
Concerning the partition of the marital home we observe in limine that the complaint merely prays for 'an equitable division of the property and other relief as is proper.' Other courts than ours have 'held that in the absence of an agreement of the parties or appropriate pleadings a chancellor is without authority to effect what might amount to a property settlement between parties to a divorce action and cannot dispose of the property belonging to the parties as an incident to the divorce.' Rankin v. Rankin, Fla.App. 2, 1972, 258 So.2d 489, 490; continuing (p. 492) 'that the chancellor . . . erred in that part of the decree dividing the real and personal property held as tenants by the entireties'--it having already been observed that there was 'a counterclaim asking for a partition of all the real and personal property held as an estate by the entireties'. As recently as July 11, 1972, this Court, in Harder v. Harder, Fla.App. 3, 1972, 264 So.2d 476--477, approved and cited Rankin; observing that a
Deploring the conscientiously inspired necessity of being out of judicial rapport in this particular instance with such an outstanding chancellor as the one below, it is consequently with no light heart at all that we similarly are unable to agree, insofar as the wife is concerned, with his decision that 'there will be no alimony 1 granted to either of the parties as a result of the dissolution of this marriage.' Because still it is, and not withstanding the new dissolution of marriage, or 'no-fault divorce' act (Sec. 61.001, F.S.A., et seq.), and the significant changes it has wrought, that, 'in general . . . the primary criteria to be used in establishing the amount of alimony is the husband's ability to pay as above described, and the needs of the wife, taking into consideration the standard of living shared by the parties to the marriage.' Firestone v. Firestone, Fla., 1972, 263 So.2d 223, 226.
This husband is fortunately able to pay. From a gross of $880.00 per month he nets as take home pay $596.62 monthly. Adding to this amount his $275.00 pension received each month, we find him possessed of total monthly monies at his disposal of $871.62. Taking from this the $515.00 of his required monthly living and other expenditures leaves him $356.62 to apply to the support of his wife, if she needs it. We think that she does, to the approximate extent of $25.00 weekly, or $108.00 each month. 2 That sum, subtracted from the $356.62 aforesaid, still leaves the husband a margin of $248.62 every thirty days to spend as he wishes; save; or invest.
Now to the needs of the wife. They are said by her to be $550.00 monthly; an amount admittedly in excess of the husband's like requirements, but probably so because of the poor health from which the wife is suffering in the guise of 'an infection of the urine tract' for which she is apparently constantly 'taking medication'.
Nor can we bind ourselves to the realities of the broad, overall equitable picture. For almost a quarter of a century, for 24 years to be exact, this couple had lived together as man and wife; and the picture, then, 'is not to be confused with the 'marry in June and sue the following September' situation which would require an entirely different analysis . . .', Firestone, 263 So.2d 228. 'In this cause', as in Posner v. Posner, Fla.1972, 257 So.2d 530, 537, 'the parties had been married for a substantial period of time and she had borne him 2 children'. Since the wife filed the instant suit, and the record is otherwise silent on the point, we must presume that the wife, again as in Posner, was 'dutiful and faithful . . . and, therefore, this case is not to be confused with a situation oftimes appearing where there is a short courtship, short marriage and an effort to obtain a lifetime of independence from a shipwrecked marriage.'
No. Eight years before the marriage dissolution the wife had held not one, but two, part time jobs, although it is extemely doubtful that either was a very remunerative post. However it was the husband that Thus it is that, now, it would not be easy for this one-time Juliet to obtain employment, the returns from which would wholly meet her unavoidable expenses of simply living. She didn't finish even the seventh grade in grammar school; and small wonder is it, therefore, that she had such scant business acumen and economic grasp of practical realities, that between March 23, 1971, when the husband moved out of their house, and the August 24, 1971, taking of testimony in her instant divorce action, she had expended about $3,000.00 ($600.00 a month) of the savings and certificates jointly owned by her husband and her but which, presumably 'pursuant to the court's order', were 'in her care, custody, and control', and for which she kept 'a monthly account of all monies expended . . . during this period of time, from the time of the temporary hearing until today's date.' As it was, and with the single exception of having neglected to apply to Florida State Employment Service because, 'to be truthful,' she , the wife has exerted all reasonable efforts to secure employment subsequent to the separation. She took a typing course which she 'just didn't finish' because she could manage only 12 words a minute. Then she unsuccessfully applied for work at a bank in Hialeah, another in Miami Springs; and she tried to gain employment at such stores as Jackson's and K--Mart, together with 'an insurance company' of unknown name. She has responded without success to the want ads. Such work as she has been able...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Pfohl v. Pfohl
...parties to the marriage. Sisson v. Sisson, 336 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1976); Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So.2d 223 (Fla.1972); Sharpe v. Sharpe, 267 So.2d 665 (Fla.3d DCA 1972); Carmel v. Carmel, 282 So.2d 6 (Fla.3d DCA Quite properly, these are criteria of the broadest nature, not susceptible to ......
-
Krieger v. Krieger, CC--64
...Fugassi v. Fugassi, 332 So.2d 695 (Fla.4th DCA 1976); Calligarich v. Calligarich, 256 So.2d 60 (Fla.4th DCA 1971); Sharpe v. Sharpe, 267 So.2d 665 (Fla.3rd DCA 1972); Palmer v. Palmer, 338 So.2d 86 (Fla.1st DCA Additional factors to be considered in awarding alimony include, as stated by th......
-
McAllister v. McAllister
...v. Dash, 284 So.2d 407 (Fla.3rd DCA 1973); Suter v. Suter, 279 So.2d 325 (Fla.1st DCA 1973), cert. den. 284 So.2d 396; Sharpe v. Sharpe, 267 So.2d 665 (Fla.3rd DCA 1972); Calligarich v. Calligarich, 256 So.2d 60 (Fla.4th DCA 1971). We refer the reader to Florida Dissolution of Marriage (197......
-
Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 76-1628
...parties to the marriage. Sisson v. Sisson, 336 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1976); Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So.2d 223 (Fla.1972); Sharpe v. Sharpe, 267 So.2d 665 (Fla.3d DCA 1972); Carmel v. Carmel, 282 So.2d 6 (Fla.3d DCA Quite properly, these are criteria of the broadest nature, not susceptible to ......