Sharplin v. Sharplin, 55430

Decision Date13 March 1985
Docket NumberNo. 55430,55430
PartiesPamela Lee SHARPLIN v. James Michael SHARPLIN.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

T. Frank Collins, Jackson, for appellant.

E. Michael Marks, Jackson, for appellee.

Before PATTERSON, C.J., and HAWKINS and PRATHER, JJ.

HAWKINS, Justice, for the Court.

Pamela Lee Sharplin appeals from a decree of the Chancery Court of Rankin County holding that her remarriage terminated her husband's obligation to continue monthly alimony. She argues the alimony award was a "lump sum" award and therefore her husband's obligation did not terminate upon her remarriage. We agree with the chancellor and affirm.

During the year 1982 Mrs. Sharplin separated from her husband James Michael Sharplin. She was represented by an attorney who prepared an "Agreement Respecting Child Custody and Property," which was signed by both parties October 7, 1982. Mr. Sharplin had no attorney representing him.

This agreement stated the following concerning alimony to Mrs. Sharplin:

7. Husband shall pay to Wife the sum of $100.00 per month as alimony at the rate of $50.00 on the 1st and 15th day of each and every month beginning October 15, 1982, for 36 months.

On December 14, 1982, the chancellor rendered a final decree of divorce, which stated:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the attached property agreement is made a part of this decree as though fully copied herein and each of the parties are hereby ordered to abide by the terms thereof.

Following the divorce Mrs. Sharplin remarried on December 31, 1983. Her husband filed a petition to relieve him of alimony payments, which he had stopped, and Mrs. Sharplin filed a motion to cite him for contempt. The chancellor heard both the petition and the motion and found that Mr. Sharplin's obligation to pay Mrs. Sharplin alimony terminated upon her remarriage.

LAW

In Wray v. Wray, 394 So.2d 1341 (Miss.1981), we examined a property settlement agreement incorporated into a divorce decree which stated the following:

a. The complainant is hereby awarded alimony in the amount of $400 per month for the next 24 months, the first payment being due on the 1st day of September, 1979. At the expiration of the aforesaid 24 months, the complainant shall be awarded alimony until her remarriage at the rate of $200 per month.

This case is controlled by Wray, in which we stated:

... We also hold that because lump sum alimony, or alimony in gross, as a general rule is awarded in special...

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13 cases
  • Hubbard v. Hubbard, 92-CA-01031-SCT
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • June 1, 1995
    ...from the record what sort of award is given that we will construe any ambiguity as being periodic and not lump sum. Sharplin v. Sharplin, 465 So.2d 1072, 1073 (Miss.1985). We do not disturb our holding in which this Court has stated that "[a] fixed and certain sum of money which is due and ......
  • Armstrong v. Armstrong
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • May 13, 1993
    ...tell whether the award is periodic or lump sum alimony, we will consider that the award is for periodic alimony. See Sharplin v. Sharplin, 465 So.2d 1072, 1073 (Miss.1985). Nevertheless, our inquiry is directed to the substance of the provision and not the label. Maxcy, 485 So.2d at The tim......
  • Cunningham v. Lanier
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • November 6, 1991
    ...(Miss.1990); Holleman v. Holleman, 527 So.2d 90, 92 (Miss.1988); Skinner v. Skinner, 509 So.2d 867, 869 (Miss.1987); Sharplin v. Sharplin, 465 So.2d 1072, 1073 (Miss.1985). In finding a good faith dispute of a material fact, we need look no further than the face of the pleadings wherein Cun......
  • Bowe v. Bowe, 07-CA-58921
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • February 21, 1990
    ...we cannot tell which it is, we will consider that the award is for periodic alimony and not lump sum alimony. See Sharplin v. Sharplin, 465 So.2d 1072, 1073 (Miss.1985). Nevertheless, we look to the substance of what has been provided, and not the label. We inquire not what the court enteri......
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