Shaw Project v. D.C. Com'n On Human Rights

Decision Date04 November 1985
Docket NumberNo. 83-1347.,83-1347.
Citation500 A.2d 251
PartiesSHAW PROJECT AREA COMMITTEE, INC., Petitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Respondent.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Paris A. Artis, Hyattsville, Md., was on brief for petitioner.

Michele Giuliani, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., with whom Inez Smith Reid, Corp. Counsel, John H. Suda, Principal Deputy Corp. Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., were on brief, for respondent.

Before NEBEKER, NEWMAN and BELSON, Associate Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner seeks review of a decision of the District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights. The Commission held that petitioner discriminated against its employee Joyce Chesnut on the basis of sex in violation of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C.Code 1-2501 et seq. (1981),1 by failing to award her payment for accrued annual leave.2 At issue is the Commission's determination that petitioner's reason for denying Ms. Chesnut the requested payment was a pretext for discrimination. We conclude that this determination is not supported by substantial evidence of record, considered as a whole.3 Accordingly, we reverse.

Petitioner, a private employer funded solely by the Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD), assesses the housing needs and concerns of residents of the Shaw area and disseminates information to citizens in the community concerning housing programs. During the time period relevant to this caseOctober 1976 through October 1978petitioner employed seven employees, one male and six female. Among them were three community organizers: Mildred Edwards, Albert Paul, and Joyce Chesnut (complainant). Each of these community organizers accumulated 1 day of annual leave for each completed month of service, that is 12 days, or 96 hours, per year. In addition, each employee was eligible to receive compensatory time for working extra hours, subject to the limitations set forth in petitioner's personnel and policy procedure manual.

In February 1978, a new Board of Directors was elected to govern petitioner. The new Chairperson, Charles Richardson, directed Carol Caldwell, the new Treasurer, to construct annual leave records for all employees. While endeavoring to construct leave records, Ms. Caldwell consulted a book containing employee leave records for the 1977 fiscal year (October 1, 1976 through September 30, 1977), but that book disappeared before she had an opportunity to compute or record the leave balances for each employee during that period. Consequently, there were no written records of the annual leave balances of petitioner's employees for the 1977 fiscal year.

Between April and June, 1978, each of the three community organizers — complainant, Ms. Edwards, and Mr. Paul — requested credit for annual leave accrued during the 1977 fiscal year. In June 1978, time sheets were prepared for, and signed by, each of them, crediting Ms. Edwards with 96 hours of annual leave accrued during the 1977 fiscal year, Mr. Paul with 64 hours, and complainant with none.

By a letter dated June 16, 1978, Mr. Paul resigned from petitioner's employment effective July 14, 1978. He subsequently wrote a letter to DHCD to express his concerns that petitioner was having a negative impact on the community. After petitioner's Board of Directors became aware of Mr. Paul's letter of criticism to DHCD, petitioner sent him a letter stating that, because there were no records of his accrued annual leave for the 1977 contract year, petitioner would not compensate him for annual leave time accrued during that time period pending a personnel committee meeting. The Personnel Committee later acted favorably on Mr. Paul's request, and he was paid for his annual leave accrued during the 1977 fiscal year.

By a letter dated September 4, 1978, complainant gave 2 weeks notice of her resignation. In this letter she stated she was resigning because she felt there was "gross discrimination, constant intimidation, cronyism, withholding of my salary and annual leave, while other employees receive theirs and undermining me as an employee of the Shaw PAC." By a second letter dated October 5, 1978, complainant advised Lorenzo Jacobs, Director of DHCD, that petitioner was engaging in unethical practices which included discrimination and the withholding of pay checks and leave; that she was resigning to avoid retaliatory measures by petitioner; and that she planned to file appropriate grievances with local agencies.

Petitioner held several meetings during October 1978, to discuss the issues raised in complainant's letters, including the matter of annual leave accrued during the 1977 fiscal year. At a Personnel Committee meeting on October 10, 1978, Chairperson Milton Nicholas stated that "in September of last year, the previous Executive Director, Bill Street, had affirmed that during the previous (year) contract every other employee except himself and Millie Edwards had taken Annual Leave." It was noted that on September 7, the Committee had approved payment to Mr. Paul for annual leave accrued during the 1977 fiscal year. It was then moved and seconded that complainant be paid for 10 days annual leave during the 1977 fiscal year. The motion carried.

On October 25, 1978, the Personnel Committee again met and discussed complainant's request for annual leave credit. The minutes of that meeting state that Mr. Nicholas "re-iterated the statement of the former Executive Director, Mr. Street, affirming that Ms. Chesnut had, in fact, taken all leave due her from the previous year."

On October 26, 1978, Mr. Nicholas reported to the Board that the Personnel Committee's recommendation was that complainant be paid for 10 days accrued prior to October 1, 1977. After it was moved and seconded that this recommendation be approved, there was further discussion and a review of complainant's October 5 letter of complaint to the director of DHCD. Mr. Nicholas then advised the board that "Mr. William Street, the PAC Executive Director during the period in question, has confirmed that Ms. Chesnut did, in fact, use her Annual Leave." The minutes of the Board's meeting state that "[s]everal Board Members present recalled the same." A majority of the Board then agreed that Ms. Chesnut was not due any annual leave, and the motion to adopt the Personnel Committee's recommendation in favor of paying her for annual leave failed.

On November 9, 1978, Ms. Chesnut filed a complaint with the Office of Human Rights alleging that petitioner discriminated against her on the basis of sex by not awarding her payment, as it had Mr. Paul, for accrued annual leave. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the Commission ruled in favor of complainant and awarded her damages.

On reviewing a case of employment discrimination where disparate treatment is alleged this court generally adopts the approach of the Supreme Court with respect to allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof for a claim of disparate treatment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1982). Miller v. American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities, 485 A.2d 186, 189 (D.C.1984); RAP, Inc. v. District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights, 485 A.2d 173, 176 (D.C.1984). "The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The proof proceeds by alternate shiftings of intermediate evidentiary burdens.4

The employee bears the initial burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53, 101 S.Ct. at 1093; Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). This burden is not onerous. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093. Establishment of the prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1481, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094; see Furnco, 438 U.S. at 576, 577, 579-80, 98 S.Ct. 2949, 2950-51.

The burden of production then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action at issue. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094; Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 99 S.Ct. 295, 58 L.Ed.2d 216 (1978) (per curiam); Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577-78, 98 S.Ct. at 2949-50; McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. The employer need not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it was actually motivated by the proffered justification. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 259-60, 101 S.Ct. at 1094, 1096-97; Sweeney, 439 U.S. at 25, 99 S.Ct. at 295. Rather, it may satisfy its burden by producing admissible evidence from which the trier of fact could rationally conclude that the employment action had not been motivated by discriminatory animus. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55, 257, 101 S.Ct. at 1094, 1095.

Finally, the employee must be afforded a fair opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's stated reason for its action was not its true reason but was in fact merely a pretext for discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 255-56, 101 S.Ct. at 1093, 1094-95; Furnco, 438 U.S. at 578, 98 S.Ct. at 2950; McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 804, 807, 93 S.Ct. at 1825, 1826. This burden merges with the ultimate burden of persuasion on the question of intentional discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1095. The...

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  • ARTHUR YOUNG & CO. v. SUTHERLAND
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    ...presumption arises that the employer's conduct amounted to unlawful discrimination. E.g., Shaw Project Area Committee v. District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights, 500 A.2d 251, 254 (D.C. 1985) (citing cases). The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut this presumption "by articu......
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    ...evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' " Shaw Project Area Comm., Inc. v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Human Rights, 500 A.2d 251, 255 (D.C. 1985) (per curiam) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed......
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