Shaw v. Kemper

• Docket Number: 21-3265
• Decision Date: 25 October 2022
• Parties: Terrance SHAW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul KEMPER, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

52 F.4th 331

Terrance SHAW, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Paul KEMPER, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 21-3265

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued October 4, 2022

Decided October 25, 2022

Amaris Montes, Samuel Weiss, Attorneys, Rights Behind Bars, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Before Scudder, St. Eve, and Jackson-Akiwumi, Circuit Judges.

Scudder, Circuit Judge.

Terrance Shaw, a former Wisconsin inmate, is confined to a wheelchair and incontinent. Three times in 2018 he defecated on himself after being unable to access the handicapped toilet within the Racine Correctional Institution. Each time the bathroom was occupied by a non-disabled inmate, and each time Shaw complained about the lack of access, his grievances resulted in nothing changing, with the prison staff saying that they could neither reserve restroom time nor control the actions of other inmates. Shaw then brought suit alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. But the district court, in screening the complaint, concluded that Shaw failed to state a claim and dismissed the action. Having taken our own look at Shaw's complaint, we believe that he alleged enough to survive screening and therefore return the case to the district court for further proceedings.

I

Shaw's complaint supplies the operative factual allegations, which we accept as true. See Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007).

Prepared on a prison typewriter, and without the benefit of counsel, Shaw's complaint stands out for its clarity and precision. He alleged that three times in 2018 he needed to use the handicapped bathroom but was unable to because non-disabled prisoners occupied it. Each instance ended with Shaw defecating on himself. After the first two incidents, Shaw alerted prison staff, who asserted that they could not control what toilets other inmates used or reserve the handicapped stall solely for his use. On the third occasion, Shaw sought to find another bathroom by painfully dragging himself along the ground for about 180 feet before finally giving up and (again) defecating on himself.

Shaw's complaint alleged violations of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and various constitutional rights. Before allowing the defendants to be served and fulfilling the screening obligation imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the district court addressed the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims and concluded that Shaw, while unquestionably a qualified person with a disability, failed to allege a denial of access to any prison service and instead complained only about an "inconvenience" of prison life.

Shaw appeals, now represented—indeed, well represented—by lawyers from the non-profit organization Rights Behind Bars.

II

The district court should have permitted Shaw's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims to survive dismissal at screening.

A

District courts have a duty to screen civil lawsuits from prisoners and to dismiss any complaint that "is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). To survive dismissal, a prisoner plaintiff need only plead sufficient facts to suggest a plausible claim for relief. See Smith v. Dart , 803 F.3d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "Plausibility is not an exacting standard." Jaros v. Illinois Dep't of Corr. , 684 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2012). And we liberally construe prisoner complaints, like Shaw's, filed without the assistance of a lawyer. See Perez v. Fenoglio , 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015).

To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, Shaw's allegations must suggest that he is a "qualified individual with a disability" who was "denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities" from the prison "by reason of such disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The enactment's implementing regulations also require the prison to make reasonable modifications to its policies or practices to avoid denying Shaw a service on account of his disability. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) ; see also Lacy v. Cook County , 897 F.3d 847, 853 (7th Cir. 2018) (explaining that Title II's reasonable modification requirement parallels Title I and III's reasonable accommodation mandate).

The Rehabilitation Act likewise provides that no "qualified individual with a disability" shall "be denied the benefits of ... any program" "solely by reason of her or his disability." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). It also requires reasonable modifications of the prison's policies or practices to avoid discrimination. See 28 C.F.R. § 41.53. For all practical purposes here, the two statutes are the same. See Jaros , 684 F.3d at 671–72 (comparing the acts).

With Shaw no longer incarcerated, he seeks only money damages. To recover damages, Shaw must identify intentional conduct (and not mere negligence) by a named defendant. See Barnes v. Gorman , 536 U.S. 181, 187–89, 122 S.Ct. 2097, 153 L.Ed.2d 230 (2002) (analyzing § 202 of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act). We have interpreted that obligation as one requiring Shaw to plausibly allege that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to rights conferred by the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. See Lacy , 897 F.3d at 862–63.

With this general framework in mind, we turn to Shaw's complaint.

B

All agree that Shaw's confinement to a wheelchair and incontinence render him disabled within the meanings of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Shaw also plausibly alleged that the defendants intentionally denied him access to a service or program—a handicapped-accessible toilet. Under the Rehabilitation Act, a "program" includes "all of the operations" of the prison. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A). And Title II of the ADA applies to "anything a public entity does." 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. B. We have no difficulty concluding that a handicapped-accessible toilet for disabled prisoners amounts to a service, the denial of which could establish a claim under either statute. See United States v. Georgia , 546 U.S. 151, 157, 126 S.Ct. 877, 163 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) (observing that the refusal to accommodate disability-related needs for "hygiene" could constitute the denial of a service).

Finally, Shaw plausibly alleges that the defendants breached their obligation of accommodating his disability by ensuring reasonable access to a handicapped toilet. See Wisconsin Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee , 465 F.3d 737, 753 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that a plaintiff may state a Title II claim by showing the...