Shaw v. Robinson

• Citation: 42 S.C. 342,20 S.E. 161
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 24 September 1894
• Parties: SHAW. v. ROBINSON et al.

20 S.E. 161

42 S.C. 342

SHAW.

v.ROBINSON et al.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Sept. 24, 1894.

Deed—Construction—Rulb in Shelley's Case.

A conveyance in trust for the use of H. and the heirs of her body during her life, and then to her heirs, creates a life estate in H. and her children, with remainder in the heirs of H, the rule in Shelley's Case being inapplicable because the remainder is not limited to the heirs of the same persons to whom the life estate is given.

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Anderson county; I. D. Witherspoon, Judge. Action by Louvinia E. Shaw against R. B.

A. Robinson and others for the construction of a trust deed, and to recover the lands described in such deed. There was a judgment for defendants, from which plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Tribblo & Prince, for appellant.

Murray & Watkins, for respondents.

McTVER, C. J. The question presented by this appeal turns upon the proper construction of a deed executed on the 8th of February, 1858, by Robert Parker, the grandfather of the plaintiff, to Jasper P. Parker, whereby the land in controversy, in consideration of the sum of $800, was conveyed to the latter upon certain trusts declared in said deed, in the following words: "This conveyance is made to the said J. P. Parker for the sole use and behoof as trustee for Nancy Hawkins, my daughter, the trustee accounting to my estate out of the share that my daughter Nancy Hawkins would be entitled to the sum of eight hundred dollars as above stated. And said tract of land to be kept for her use and the heirs of her body in trust to my son Jasper P. Parker during her life, and then to her heirs, and not subject to the debts and contracts of Andrew C. Hawkins, or any future husband she may have." It is admitted that Nancy Hawkins, during her lifetime, and after birth of issue, the present plaintiff, conveyed the land to her sister Tamantha A Robinson in fee simple, who immediately reconveyed the same in fee to the said Nancy Hawkins. This was done, probably upon the theory that said Nancy Hawkins took an estate in fee conditional under the deed from her father, with a view to vest the fee in her, so that she might dispose of the same by will. At all events, soon after this transaction thesaid Nancy Hawkinsmade her will, whereby she gave to the defendant R. B. A. Robinson "the use, income, and possession of her land for the year 1893, except certain patches which she willed to the defendant John C. Pruitt, " and in the ninth clause of her will devised the land in controversy to her nephew the defendant Robert Parker Robinson, the son of her said sister Tamantha Robinson. On the ——day of April, 1893, Nancy Hawkins died, leaving her only child as her sole heir at law, the plaintiff herein, and, her will having been duly admitted to probate, the defendants took possession of the land; and this action has been brought by the plaintiff to recover possession of the same, as well as damages for the use and occupation of the premises. The defendant John C. Pruitt did not answer, and the trustee, Jasper P. Parker, filed a formal answer admitting the allegations of the complaint, and disclaiming any personal interest in the land. The other two defendants demurred upon the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The circuit judge, after setting out the clause of the deed from Robert Parker to Jasper P. Parker, above copied, sustained the demurrer upon the ground that the plaintiff "did not take a vested remainder under the said deed." The plaintiff appeals upon the several grounds set out in the record, which need not be repeated here, as the whole case turns upon the Inquiry, what estate Nancy Hawkins took under the deed from her father. To determine this question it is necessary to examine carefully the terms of this very inartistic deed, with a view to ascertain, if possible, what was the intention of the grantor, which, when ascertained, must be carried into effect, unless in conflict with some settled rule of law. In pursuing this inquiry it is necessary that the whole instrument should be considered, and effect must, if practicable, be given to every clause and word in it Again, the language of the instrument must be interpreted in its natural and ordinary sense, and where technical words are used they must receive their technical signification, unless the context requires that some other interpretation should be given to such words. These principles of interpretation and construction are too well settled to need the citation of any authority to support them, and...