Shaw v. State
| Decision Date | 08 April 1901 |
| Citation | 79 Miss. 21,30 So. 42 |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
| Parties | WAFER SHAW v. THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI |
FROM the circuit court of Oktibbeha county. HON. EUGENE O. SYKES Judge.
Shaw the appellant, was indicted, tried and convicted of a homicide, and appealed to the supreme court.
The opinion states the case.
Reversed and remanded.
Carroll & Magruder, for appellant.
What does the constitution mean when it says that the accused shall be heard by himself or counsel, or both? Const. 1890 § 26. Manifestly these serious words, crystallized by long use into their present large significance, are not mere "sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal," but mean that the accused, both in person and by counsel, shall have a right to do all things necessary and incident to his fair legal and constitutional defense. In favor of life, the constitution should be most liberally construed to prevent any injustice to the citizen. That the accused should not have been denied the right to confer with his witnesses, although they were under the rule, is practically settled by the case of White v. State, 52 Miss. 216. See also Allen v. State, 61 Miss. 627.
The testimony of the witness, Measles, was wholly incompetent but very damaging to the defendant, and seems to have been injected into the case only because of the persistent determination of the district attorney. When offered, defendant objected because the alleged threats were too remote in point of time (some eight or nine months), and because the evidence without conflict showed intervening friendly relations, and because the alleged threats were directed at the brother of the dead man, and in no way affected the deceased or threw light upon the origin of the difficulty. The objection was sustained by the court. The question was revamped and again asked, and again objected to for same reason, the court finally yielding to the pressure and letting the evidence go in for what it might be worth. It cannot be told to what extent the defendant may have been damaged and prejudiced by this incompetent testimony. That it indicated malice, which was negatived by the verdict of the jury, does not meet the objection that it also tended to show that Shaw commenced the difficulty.
The modification of charge No. 11 for the defendant by the insertion of the words, "as to a material fact," was not correct, and qualifies the law of reasonable doubt in an unwarranted manner. If the modification means that the reasonable doubt must arise out of a material fact, this is certainly not the law, for it may arise out of the lack of evidence, or in any other manner. Hale v. State, 72 Miss. 140. If, however, the modification means that the reasonable doubt that demands a verdict of not guilty must be a doubt of "a material fact" in the evidence or in the case, this would be equally pernicious. The reasonable doubt contemplated by the law is reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, and not of some isolated fact in the case. It might well be so that jurors could not select any isolated material fact upon which they entertained reasonable doubt; but they might still be deeply impressed with the reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt upon the general survey and consideration which the law requires of all the evidence and all the facts in the case taken as a whole.
Monroe McClurg, attorney-general, and J. W. Barron, district attorney, for appellee.
1. The length of time and intermediate evidences of friendship between the threat and the act, are matters for the consideration of the jury, but do not, of themselves, render the testimony of the witness Measles as to the threat incompetent. The court let this testimony go to the jury "for what it was worth." It at least tended to show the state of mind of the accused toward the deceased. The instruction held it in its proper sphere.
2. When the "rule" has been invoked, it rests in the sound discretion of the court as to the extent of its application. It is a mistaken idea to believe that reasonable limitations may not be placed upon the defendant's communication with his witnesses during the progress of the trial. There was no limitation upon counsel. The gist of their complaint is that the...
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...to be of evidential value and against a party who had not been the object of the alleged assault on the part of the Gurleys. Shaw v. State, 79 Miss. 21, 30 So. 42; Walker State, 140 Miss. 238, 105 So. 497. It is also contended that the court erred in proceeding with the trial without same b......
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...constitutes a reversible error as held in the following cases: White v. State, 52 Miss. 216; Allen v. State, 61 Miss. 627; Shaw v. State, 79 Miss. 21, 30 So. 42. Bear mind that the only witnesses that could be called, either by the state or the defendant that could possibly throw any light ......
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