Shaw v. State
| Decision Date | 01 April 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 21423,21423 |
| Citation | 277 S.E.2d 140,276 S.C. 190 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Joseph Carl SHAW, Appellant, v. STATE of South Carolina, James C. Anders and Daniel R. McLeod, Respondents. |
Kenneth M. Suggs, John D. Delgado, and Richard Burr, Columbia, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen. Brian P. Gibbes, Asst. Atty. Gen. William K. Moore and Staff Atty. Donald J. Zelenka, Columbia, for respondents.
This case was previously before the Court by way of direct appeal. See State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799. Therein we meticulously considered the allegations of error regarding appellant's guilty plea and his subsequent sentence of death pursuant to Section 16-3-10, et seq., South Carolina Code of Laws, 1976. The appellant has since filed a petition for Post Conviction Relief under the provisions of Section 17- 27-10, et seq. His petition was denied. We affirm.
We note at the outset the all-encompassing review of this Court of the appellant's previous direct appeal and the redundancy of certain allegations alleged to warrant post conviction relief. As a result, we need not reach some of the assignments of error presently pursued by the appellant.
At the start of his post conviction hearing, the appellant filed a motion alleging the hearing judge had a personal bias in the case which required his recusal. His motion was denied, and he now argues that he is entitled to remand for a new post conviction hearing because the hearing judge erred in failing to disqualify himself from presiding over his post conviction proceedings. We disagree that he is entitled to relief.
Evidence submitted by the appellant's lawyers indicated that certain criminal defense lawyers were present in the hearing judge's chambers at a time prior to sentencing of the appellant to death by another judge. At that time, the hearing judge in these proceedings, which are currently before the Court, allegedly said that he and another judge had already discussed the matter concerning the appellant with the sentencing judge and that if the appellant was not sentenced to death, the sentencing judge would be holding court in some remote part of the State. The statement was made in the judge's chambers to public defenders who were well-known to the judge. They additionally indicated that the statement was made in an "off-hand and joking manner by Judge Peeples" (the hearing judge).
Supreme Court Rule 33 contains our Code of Judicial Conduct. It provides, in relevant part:
(C) Disqualification
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party....
Our Court has apparently not specifically considered the authority of a judge to resolve a motion for disqualification of which he is the subject. After much consideration of the authorities, we conclude that as a general rule the judge, in determining whether to proceed, must accept as true the factual allegations of a motion to disqualify. However, this does not prevent the judge from exercising his right to consider the legal sufficiency of those facts. See Berger v. U.S., 255 U.S. 22, 41 S.Ct. 230, 65 L.Ed. 481; U.S. v. Hoffa (6th Cir.), 382 F.2d 856, cert. den. 390 U.S. 924, 88 S.Ct. 854, 19 L.Ed.2d 984. Additionally, the fair meaning of any remark must be interpreted in the light of the context in which it is uttered in determining whether the remarks show personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge sufficient to require that he be disqualified. U.S. v. Birrell, (D.C.), 276 F.Supp. 798. With these premises in mind, we consider the record.
Assuming the truth of the factual allegations, we think the only reasonable view of the facts alleged are that they indicate an attempt at levity to ease the tensions created by the magnitude of the case concerning Mr. Shaw, rather than any actual personal bias on the part of the judge. Neither of the judges who allegedly discussed the sentencing judge's assignments has any authority or ability to affect a judge's assignment. Under our State's Constitution, this authority rests exclusively with the Chief Justice. The attorneys to whom the statements were made were well-known to the judge as public defenders who are dedicating all of their talents and energies to the defense of others. It is totally unreasonable to conclude that a judge would make such a statement and thereby reveal actual improper conduct to the public defenders, if such actions had actually occurred. In fact, the affidavits belie the conclusion of actual personal bias or improper conduct. They indicate that the comments, if made, were made in a joking manner. The fact that a more reflective manner might have been used to ease the obviously sobering discussion is insufficient under the facts of this case, to require the judge's disqualification.
Our conclusion is further supported by the denial of the hearing judge that he made the statement attributed to him, his denial of any personal bias or prejudice in this matter, and his affirmance that he could conduct a fair and impartial hearing. The fair and impartial manner in which the proceedings were conducted evidences a...
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Shaw v. Martin
...6, 1980, and on February 7, 1980 denied relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed with formal opinion in Shaw v. State, 276 S.C. 190, 277 S.E.2d 140 (1981), and on April 24 set a new execution date of May 22, 1981. On the application of Shaw for a writ of mandamus directing the dist......
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Brown v. State
...The trial judge has the right to consider the legal sufficiency of facts alleged to require his disqualification. Shaw v. State, 276 S.C. 190, 277 S.E.2d 140, 141 (1981), and see Story v. State, 788 P.2d at 621. We have held that the bias which is the grounds for disqualification must be pe......
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State v. Kornahrens, 22618
...specific instance to support his allegation. We have reviewed the entire record, and find this argument specious. See, Shaw v. State, 276 S.C. 190, 277 S.E.2d 140 (1981). The trial judge took meticulous care to preserve the integrity and fairness of the proceeding. There is absolutely no ev......
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Mallett v. Mallett
...reasonably be questioned when his factual findings are not supported by the record." Id. at 285, 433 S.E.2d at 857. In Shaw v. State, 276 S.C. 190, 277 S.E.2d 140 (1981) our Supreme Court addressed the authority of a trial judge to resolve a motion for disqualification where he is the subje......