Shaw v. Victoria Coach Line, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 June 1943
• Citation: 50 N.E.2d 27,314 Mass. 262
• Parties: SHAW v. VICTORIA COACH LINE, Inc.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

314 Mass. 262
50 N.E.2d 27

SHAW
v.
VICTORIA COACH LINE, Inc.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 29, 1943.

Exceptions from Superior, Suffolk County; Brown, Judge.

Action by Elizabeth W. Shaw against Victoria Coach Line, Incorporated, to recover for damages sustained in an automobile accident. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant excepts.

Exceptions sustained.

[50 N.E.2d 28]

Before FIELD, C. J., and DONAHUE, QUA, DOLAN, and RONAN, JJ.

C. C. Steadman, of Boston, for plaintiff.

J. G. Ashe, of Boston, for defendant.

RONAN, Justice.

The plaintiff, a school teacher sixty-three years of age, was travelling on January 2, 1937, as a passenger on the front seat of an automobile bus on a trip from Boston to Hartford when the automobile skidded along a highway in Stafford Springs, Connecticut, and ran against an embankment, throwing the plaintiff forward and bringing her head in contact with the windshield with such force as to break the windshield; she was then precipitated to the floor of the automobile. She was so stunned by the accident that she did not apprehend her surroundings for a few seconds. She waited at Stafford Springs for three and one half hours before another automobile arrived and took her and the other passengers to Hartford. While at Stafford Springs, she knew when someone spoke to her but she could not think normally and at times experienced hallucinations. She had someone telephone to her husband and she gave a passenger the name of a person, and gave her the money for a telephone call to Boston, and the plaintiff talked with that person. She was stupid when she arrived at the defendant's terminal and did not go into the station with the other passengers. The operator of the automobile said he would assist her and she consented to go in. She was ushered into a room and met a man who she thought was the defendant's manager. He was an insurance adjuster. She was too dazed to remember what he said to her but she recalled that she said something about the broken umbrella that she had in her hands. She told him her umbrella was broken. He handed her a check for $20 and asked her if that was all right. She stated that the umbrella cost only $10. He said, ‘That is all right, sign this receipt.’ She told him she could not use her hand, and he put his pen in her hand and signed the paper. This was done so quickly she did not have a chance to think. She was too dazed to realize what was going on and did not read the paper. This paper was a general release. The draft that was then given to her contained this printed statement on its face: ‘When properly endorsed on the back hereof, this draft becomes and constitutes a release in full for the payment of: (Describe fully nature of payment and whether for damages or loss medical or expense),’ and there was written after this statement: ‘Claim for damages due to personal injuries.’ There was a legend on the back of this draft which read: ‘Endorsement by payee or deposit in bank for account of payee is acknowledgment by payee of acceptance of this draft in full settlement of items as stated on face hereof.’ The plaintiff, some time between January 2, 1937, and January 6, 1937, indorsed the draft immediately under this legend. The draft was deposited by her husband and she received the money. We have now recited some of the material facts which the jury could find from the testimony. There was other testimony tending to show that the plaintiff knew that a settlement for her injuries was being made at the time the release was executed and the draft accepted. The jury had the right to disbelieve this testimony. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The case is here on exceptions to the denial of a motion for a directed verdict and to that part of the charge in which the jury were told that the draft was not a release.

The accident and the alleged release of the cause of action occurred in Connecticut and were governed by the law of that State, but the action was tried in our Superior Court in accordance with our

[50 N.E.2d 29]

own common law and there was no contention made there or in the argument before this court that there was any material difference between the common law of that State and our own. No question is raised but that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that the defendant was negligent and that the plaintiff was free from contributory negligence. All that is open for decision is whether the plaintiff had released her cause of action and whether there...