Shaw v. Young

• Decision Date: 04 March 1895
• Citation: 87 Me. 271,32 A. 897
• Parties: SHAW et al. v. YOUNG et al. GETCHELL et al. v. SAME.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

32 A. 897

87 Me. 271

SHAW et al.

v. YOUNG et al.

GETCHELL et al.

v. SAME.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 4, 1895.

(Official.)

Report from supreme Judicial court, Penobscot county.

These were two actions by Edwin P. Shaw and another against Edgar E. Young and others and Windsor Hotel, and by George W. Getchell and another against same, to enforce lien claims upon the Windsor Hotel, in Bangor, and were tried together. The law court was to render such judgment, upon so much of the evidence as was admissible and competent, as the legal rights of the parties required. Judgment for plaintiffs.

T. W. Vose, for plaintiffs.

Jasper Hutchings, for defendant devisees of Brown. C. P. Stetson, for defendant Chase.

EMERY, J. The property in Bangor known as the "Windsor Hotel" consists of a lot of land and buildings thereon constructed and fitted for the hotel business. It has been used exclusively for that business for many years. The owners all lived in Bangor at the beginning of the repairs which are the subject-matter of these suits. Horace W. Chase owned one-half of the property, and seems to have been the managing owner. He leased the property to Asa R. Pickard for the term of seven years from December 1, 1887. In the lease it was provided that the lessor should make the necessary outside repairs, and the lessee the necessary inside repairs.

Ricker and Brown, owning three-tenths of the property, leased their interest to Chase for the term of five years from March 31, 1891. In this lease it was provided that Chase should make all the repairs at his own cost. No other lease of any part of the property is in evidence.

Pickard assigned his lease to Mr. Young, July 3, 1891, with the consent of Mr. Chase. At this time the hotel building needed repairs Inside and out,—repairs necessary for the preservation of the building, and repairs necessary to keep up its earning powers as a hotel, and keep it up to the essential modem conditions. The matter of these repairs was talked over between Chase and Young at the time of the transfer of the lease, and it was understood that Young was to have the necessary repairs made inside and out Mr. Young at once set about the repairs, and employed, among others, these plaintiffs to furnish labor and materials therefor.

During part of the time while these repairs were being made, and the labor and materials therefor were being furnished by these plaintiffs, Mr. Chase and Mr. Brown were boarding at the hotel, and saw much of what was being done. They made inquiries, and advised more or less with the workmen about the work. They made no objection to anything. The other owners (Chase and Brown owning seven-tenths) do not appear to have seen or known of the repairs, except so far as can be inferred from their residence in Bangor. That the repairs, so far as these plaintiffs made them, were reasonably necessary for the buildings and the business is not questioned.

Mr. Young becoming insolvent, these plaintiffs naturally claim liens on the property for their labor and materials furnished as above. The owners of the fee appear, and make two contentions: (1) That the liens, if any, do not attach to the fee, but only to the estate of Mr. Young, the tenant in possession; (2) that the "consent" of such owners does not appear. If either contention is sustained, the owners of the fee escape the liens.

In determining the proper interpretation of lien statutes at this time, courts need not feel hampered by the earlier decisions. These statutes were such an innovation upon the common law of real property that for some time the courts construed them most strictly. To this day there are no such statutes in England. In this country, however, they are now general and familiar, and their equity and beneficence are conceded even by landowners. Courts will now construe them liberally, to further their equity and efficacy, when it is clear that the lien has been honestly earned, and the lien claimant is within the statute.

1. Our statute Rev. St. c. 91, § 30) expressly declares that the lien is on the building, and on the land on which it stands, and on any interest which the owner of tie building has in the land. Nothing is said of the owner's interest in the building. The building itself is declared to be the basis of the lien. In this case the owners of the building are the owners in fee of the land, so that the building and the land are united in ownership.

We think it was the intent to attach the lien to the building, and to the land united to the building,—to the res, rather than to any particular estate in the building. Assuming that the legislature intended to make the lien effectual when earned, this...