Shawnee Life Ins. Co. v. Watkins

Citation156 P. 181,53 Okla. 188,1916 OK 281
Decision Date07 March 1916
Docket Number5878.
PartiesSHAWNEE LIFE INS. CO. v. WATKINS.
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma

Syllabus by the Court.

In an application for life insurance to the question, "Have you ever applied to any agent or company for insurance or for restoration of a lapsed policy without having received a policy of the exact kind and amount applied for?" applicant answered, "No," and to the question "Has any company or association ever declined or postponed your application for insurance or offered you a policy different to the one applied for?" "When?" "What company?" he answered "No." Previous thereto he had applied for a second certificate in the Endowment Rank of the Knights of Pythias and his application had been rejected. Held, that the answers given were not false and did not avoid the policy.

Where the meaning of language in a policy of life insurance or in the application therefor is ambiguous or susceptible to two different constructions, the same will be strictly construed against the insurer and that construction adopted which is most favorable to the insured.

Where a case is tried to the court without a jury and the court makes no special findings of fact, a general finding in favor of plaintiff includes a finding upon every fact necessary to support the judgment.

The question as to whether certain answers given to questions in an application for insurance are false, and the intent of the applicant in making them, is a question of fact for the jury or for the court sitting as a jury.

Error from Superior Court, Muskogee County; Farrar L. McCain, Judge.

Action by Ophelia A. Watkins against the Shawnee Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

B. B. Blakeney and J. H. Maxey, both of Muskogee, and Edw. Howell, of Shawnee, for plaintiff in error.

Geo. S. Ramsey, Edgar A. de Meules, Malcolm E. Rosser, and Sol H. Kauffman, all of Muskogee, for defendant in error.

HARDY J.

Defendant in error, plaintiff below, commenced this action in the superior court of Muskogee county, against plaintiff in error, defendant below, to recover upon a certain policy of life insurance, issued upon the life of Isom E. Watkins, deceased, husband of plaintiff.

The only issue presented is the effect to be given to certain questions and answers in the application for said insurance. In the application this question was asked: "Have you ever applied to any agent or company for insurance or for restoration of a lapsed policy without having received a policy of the exact kind and amount applied for (state fully, and when)?" To which deceased answered "No." And also the following question: "Has any company or association ever declined or postponed your application for insurance or offered you a policy different from the one applied for, when, what company?" To which deceased answered, "No." It appears that previous to making this application deceased had made two applications for insurance in the Endowment Rank, Knights of Pythias, and one of which under date of October 31, 1910, had been rejected, by that order; and it is urged that by reason of the false answers so made the policy was avoided.

Section 3402, Rev. Laws 1910, being under chapter 38, art. 1, entitled, "Insurance," is in part as follows:

"In this article, unless the context otherwise requires, 'company' or 'insurance company,' shall include all corporations, associations, partnerships or individuals engaged as principals in the insurance business, except fraternal and benevolent orders and societies."

Section 3486, article 3, of said chapter 38, defines "fraternal beneficiary associations" as follows:

"A fraternal beneficiary association is a corporation, society or voluntary association, formed or organized and carried on for the sole benefit of its members, and their beneficiaries, and not for profit. Each association shall have a lodge system with ritualistic form of work, a representative form of government, and shall make provision for the payment of benefits in case of death, and may make provision for the payment of benefits in case of sickness. * * *"

Section 3505 of the same article excludes from the operation thereof all corporations, societies, or associations carrying on the business of life, health, casualty, or accident insurance for profit or gain, and limits its application to fraternal beneficiary associations, as defined in section 3486, supra, and expressly provides:

"This article shall not affect or apply to any grand or subordinate lodge of the Ancient Order of Free and Accepted Masons, Independent Order of Odd Fellows, Improved Order of Red Men, or Knights of Pythias, as they now exist, nor to similar orders or secret societies, nor to any association not working on the lodge system, or
which limits its certificate holders to a particular class or to the employés of a particular town or city, designated firm, business house or corporation."

Section 3402 is a definition of the meaning to be given to the terms "company" and "insurance company," and a declaration of what shall be included within the meaning thereof, excluding therefrom fraternal and benevolent orders and societies; while section 3486 specifically defines "fraternal beneficiary associations," intended to be regulated by said article 3, specifically excluding from the operation thereof the Knights of Pythias and kindred orders. These questions must be considered and construed together, and when this is done it cannot be said that it is clear it was the intention of the defendant in propounding said inquiry to elicit information as to an application for a certificate in such an order as the Knights of Pythias, which by the provisions of the statute regulating the business of life insurance is expressly excluded from the operation thereof. Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n v. Miller, 92 F. 63, 34 C. C. A. 211. It is a well-settled rule, supported by the great weight of authority, in the construction of insurance policies of the character here involved, to construe all language used to limit the liability of the company strictly against the company. It is a fact recognized by the courts that policies and applications are drawn by legal advisors of the companies, who study with care the decisions of the courts, and with this in mind seek to limit as narrowly as possible the liability assumed by the company which issues the policy. This being true, it is a rule deemed fair by the courts to resolve all doubt and ambiguity in favor of the insured and against the insurer, for the reason that where applications and contracts are drawn with great nicety by men skilled in the law of insurance, for the purpose of eliciting full information of all circumstances which would aid the company in determining the desirability of a proposed risk, and limiting the liability of the company, we must assume the company to be cognizant of the fact that many persons have applied for certificates in secret orders or societies such as are referred to in section 3505, where they are excluded from the operation of laws regulating insurance companies and fraternal beneficiary associations writing life insurance as defined in said chapter 38, and that, had the company desired this specific information, it would have been an easy matter to frame a question free from doubt or ambiguity; and, where an insurance company or association seeks to avoid a policy on the ground of falsity in answers to a material question, the court will construe the question and answer strictly against the company, and, if any construction can reasonably be put on the question and answer such as will avoid a forfeiture of the policy on the ground of falsity in the answer, that construction will be adopted and the policy sustained. Union Acc. Co. v. Willis, 44 Okl. 578, 145 P. 812, 5 L. R. A. 1915D, 358; Okla. Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Norton, 44 Okl. 783, 145 P. 1138, L. R. A. 1915E, 695; Capital Fire Ins. Co. v. Carrol, 26 Okl. 286, 109 P. 535; Newton v. Southwestern Mut. Life Ass'n, 116 Iowa, 311, 90 N.W. 73; Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n v. Miller, 92 F. 63, 34 C. C. A. 211; Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bank, 72 F. 413, 19 C. C. A. 286, 38 L. R. A. 33, 70; 3 Cooley's Briefs, Inc., 2079.

In fact, it has been said by some courts that such fraternal societies and mutual benefit associations are not engaged in the business of "insurance" as that term is generally accepted....

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