Shawnee Nat. Bank v. United States

• Decision Date: 04 March 1918
• Docket Number: 5000.
• Citation: 249 F. 583
• Parties: SHAWNEE NAT. BANK v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

249 F. 583

SHAWNEE NAT. BANK v. UNITED STATES.

No. 5000.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

March 4, 1918

Joe M Adams and W. L. Chapman, both of Shawnee, Okl., for plaintiff in error.

John A Fain, U.S. Atty., of Lawton, Okl., and F. E. Ransdell, Asst U.S. Atty., of Oklahoma City, Okl.

Before SANBORN, CARLAND, and STONE, Circuit Judges.

CARLAND Circuit Judge.

Under the provisions of section 2140, Revised Statutes of United States, as amended by Act March 1, 1907, c. 2285, 34 Stat 1017 (Comp. St. 1916, Sec. 4142), on August 22, 1916, a special agent of the Indian Bureau for suppression of the liquor traffic among Indians, being informed that two white persons by the names of Frank Cole and Rufus H. London, had introduced or were about to introduce spirituous liquors into the Indian country, to wit, the Shawnee Indian allotment of one Irene Whitehead, situated in the state of Oklahoma, searched an automobile then in the possession of said Cole and London, and found therein spirituous liquor which had been introduced into said Indian country by said Cole and London by means of said automobile. The automobile was thereupon seized and proceeded against by libel in the court below, and, no owner appearing to claim the same, a judgment of forfeiture was entered. Prior to the judgment of forfeiture, however, plaintiff in error, hereafter called the bank, by leave of court interpleaded in the forfeiture proceedings and alleged that it was the owner of a chattel mortgage on said automobile, given by said Cole April 11, 1916, to secure the payment of a promissory note for the sum of $636, due October 11, 1916; that said chattel mortgage provided that Cole should remain in possession of the automobile until default should be made in the payment of the note, provided, always, that if, at any time, the bank should deem itself insecure, the debt and interest should become due, and the bank should have the right to take possession of the automobile and sell the same at public auction in order to satisfy the amount of the debt. It was also alleged that the mortgage was duly recorded in the proper office on April 13, 1916. The bank prayed that the automobile be delivered to it under the terms of the mortgage for the purpose of foreclosure and sale. The judgment of forfeiture reserved a decision as to the claim of the bank, the proceeds arising from the sale of the automobile in the forfeiture proceedings; amounting to the sum of $551, being ordered paid into court to await a decision on said claim.

Subsequently the court decided that the bank had a valid lien by virtue of its mortgage on the automobile to the amount of its debt at the time the same was seized, but that said lien was inferior to the claim of the United States under the forfeiture proceedings. The bank was therefore denied any relief, and the proceeds arising from the sale of the automobile, less costs, were ordered distributed, one-half to the United States and one-half to the informer.

In view of the proceedings in the court below, it is proper to state that, the seizure in this case being on land and not within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, the action in the court below was properly an action at law, in which the parties were entitled to such rights and remedies as are incident to such an action in the federal courts, including the right to trial by jury. The Sarah, 8 Wheat. 391, 5 L.Ed. 644; Morris's Cotton, 8 Wall. 507, 19 L.Ed. 481; Confiscation Cases, 20 Wall. 92, 22 L.Ed. 320; Armstrong's Foundry, 6 Wall. 766, 18 L.Ed. 882; Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454, 19 L.Ed. 196; Henderson's Distilled Spirits, 14 Wall. 44, 20 L.Ed. 815. There seems, however, to have been no disputed question of fact in issue at the trial, and, as no objection was made to the form of the proceeding or the manner of trial, nothing more need be said.

Section 2140, under which the automobile was forfeited, reads as follows:

'If any * * * has reason to suspect or is informed that any white person or Indian is about to introduce or has introduced any spirituous liquor or wine into the Indian country in violation of law, * * * may cause the boats, stores, packages, wagons, sleds, and places of deposit of such person to be searched; and if any such liquor is found therein, the same, together with the boats, teams, wagons, and sleds used in conveying the same, and also the goods, packages, and peltries of such person, shall be seized and delivered to the proper officer, and shall be proceeded against by libel in the proper court, and forfeited, one-half to the informer and the other half to the use of the United States. ' Comp. St. 1916, Sec. 4141.

It is claimed by counsel for the United States that the above statute treats the automobile in this case as the offender, without any regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner thereof, and therefore, as the automobile was found guilty, forfeiture followed as a matter of course, regardless of the rights of the bank under its mortgage, and that, if this position is not correct, still, as the trial court forfeited the automobile and the evidence is not in the record, we must presume that there was evidence that the bank knew or had good reason to know the use to which the automobile was being put. This last contention, of course, is inadmissible, for the reason that the court found that the bank had a valid lien upon the automobile, and, if we indulge in any presumption as to the connection of the bank with the introduction of the liquor into the Indian country, we must presume, in the absence of any evidence or finding to the contrary, that the bank had nothing to do with it.

Counsel for the bank claim that the statute above quoted simply forfeits the interest of the introducer of the spirituous liquor in the automobile; therefore, it not appearing that the bank had anything to do with the introduction of the liquor, its interest could not be forfeited. The United States District Court for the District of Montana in the case of United States v. Two Gallons of Whisky et al., 213 F. 986, decided that the above statute could not be held to forfeit property which had been borrowed by the person who introduced the liquor into the Indian country; the owner of the property not having any knowledge or information as to the use to...