Shea v. Estey
| Decision Date | 21 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL DIVISION CV-2019-27 |
| Parties | THOMAS G. SHEA Plaintiff, v. BERNARD A. ESTEY, JR., Defendant. |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
Before the Court is Defendant Bernard Estey's (hereinafter referred to as "Estey") Motion to Dismiss all counts of Plaintiff s Complaint pursuant to M.R. Civ. P 12(b)(6). On February 5, 2019, Plaintiff Thomas G. Shea filed a Complaint against Estey alleging the following four counts Count I (Wrongful Use of Civil Proceeding); Count II (Abuse of Process); Count III (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress); and Count IV (Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress). After consideration of the pleadings and legal memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court finds as follows.
Shea alleges the following facts in his Complaint. During all times relevant to this matter, Shea resided in Mapleton and Presque Isle, Maine, with his significant other, Ashley Caron Estey (hereinafter referred to as "Ms, Caron"), and her two children, Logan Caron and Brooke Estey. Estey is the father of Brooke Estey. Estey and Ms. Caron are divorced, and Ms. Caron was awarded primary residence of Brooke Estey in a Divorce Judgment.
On or about August 8, 2018, Estey filed a complaint for protection from abuse on behalf of his daughter, Brooke Estey, seeking an ex parte temporary and permanent order for protection from abuse against Shea. Estey's complaint was based on alleged statements and disclosures made to Estey by Logan Caron and Brooke Estey. According to Estey, the children allegedly observed Shea use alcohol in a way that made him become verbally and physically abusive toward Ms. Caron. Estey alleged that these actions by Shea placed Brooke Estey in fear of physical harm and injury. The Court issued an ex parte temporary protection from abuse order on August 8, 2018, and set the matter for hearing on August 22, 2018. On August 15, 2018, Shea, through counsel, filed a motion to dissolve the ex parte temporary protection from abuse order with a supporting affidavit as required under the applicable statutes.
On August 22, 2018, the hearing of the matter was continued and the ex parte temporary order for protection from abuse was terminated and dissolved pursuant to an agreement between Estey and Shea, There was also a tentative and temporary agreement between Estey and Ms. Caron regarding the rights of contact between Estey and Brooke Estey in connection with a separate, post-judgment family matter between Estey and Ms. Caron.
On September 5, 2018, Estey, through counsel, filed a motion to reinstate the terminated and dissolved temporary order for protection from abuse after a dispute arose between Estey and Ms. Caron regarding the visitation rights of Estey. Two days later, Shea objected to the motion to reinstate on the grounds that there was no legal or factual basis for reinstating a terminated and dissolved temporary order for protection from abuse. By order, dated September 12, 2018, the Court denied Estey's motion to reinstate on the grounds pled by Shea.
The Court conducted a hearing on Estey's complaint for protection from abuse over two days on October 24 and December 20, 2018, at which Estey presented the testimony of Logan Caron, Brooke Estey, Ashley Caron Estey, and himself. After Estey rested his case, Shea moved for a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 50(d). The Court allowed Estey to be fully heard on the motion; took a recess to consider the motion and review the record of trial; and issued a decision from the bench granting Shea's motion and dismissing Estey's complaint for protection from abuse, dated December 20, 2018.
Before filing his complaint for protection from abuse against Shea, Estey had filed a complaint for protection from abuse against Ms. Caron on July 31, 2018, in which Estey made similar allegations of abuse against Shea. At that time, Estey sought an ex parte temporary and permanent order for protection from abuse against Ms. Caron, and sole parental rights and responsibilities of Brooke Estey. The Court denied Estey's request for an ex parte temporary order for protection from abuse; and scheduled the matter for hearing on August 9, 2018. On August 8, 2018, Estey voluntarily dismissed his complaint against Ms, Caron and failed to give her notice of the dismissal. Without notice of the dismissal, Ms. Caron, Ms. Caron's attorney, Shea, and Shea's attorney all prepared for trial and appeared on August 9, 2018.
While Estey's complaint for protection from abuse against Shea was pending, Shea was forced to move with Ms. Caron and her two children from his residence in Mapleton to a new resident in Presque Isle because Estey and some of Estey's family members were engaging in stalking and harassing actions at the Mapleton residence.
While Estey's complaint for protection from abuse against Shea was pending, Estey, and/or Estey's counsel acting on Estey's behalf, made statements about the effect of a temporary and/or a permanent order for protection from abuse on Shea's license to practice as a surgical assistant in the State of Maine, which statements Shea took to be serious threats against his license and livelihood.
Shea has incurred substantial damages, including but not limited to, legal fees and costs, lost wages and employment benefits, extreme stress and anxiety, and significant emotional distress because of Estey's actions in pursuing the complaint for protection from abuse, the motion to reinstate the terminated and dissolved temporary order for protection from abuse, and the complaint for protection from abuse against Ms. Caron.
When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the complaint is viewed "in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory." Ramsey v. Baxter Title Co., 2012 ME 113, ¶ 6, 54 A.3d 710. The court "consider[s] the facts in the complaint as if they were admitted." Bonney v. Stephens Mem. Hosp., 2011 ME 46, ¶ 16, 17 A.3d 123, 127.[1] However, the court "is not bound to accept the complaint's legal conclusions." Bowen v. Eastman, 645 A.2d 5, 6 (Me. 1994) (citation omitted). Dismissal is warranted only when the court is satisfied that it is "beyond doubt that [the] plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts that might be proven in support of the claim." Dragomir v. Spring Harbor Hosp., 2009 ME 51, ¶ 15, 970 A.2d 310 (citation omitted).
Estey moves to dismiss Count I on the grounds that "Plaintiff has plead an unbelievably vague and ambiguous allegation that does not conform with the law." (Mot. Dismiss, ¶ 33.) Estey argues that "[i]t is abundantly clear from the Plaintiffs Complaint that he has not, nor can he, satisfy either of [t]he first two prongs [of Wrongful Use of Civil Proceeding] ...." (Id. ¶ 38.)
To make out a claim for wrongful use of civil proceeding, Shea must allege facts sufficient to show the following, "(1) one initiates, continues, or procures civil proceedings without probable cause, (2) with a primary purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim upon which the proceedings are based, and (3) the proceedings have terminated in favor of the person against whom they are brought." Pepperell Trust Co. v. Mountain Heir Fin. Corp., 1998 ME 46, ¶ 17, 708 A.2d 651 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674), Here, the Court finds that Shea's Complaint, viewed most favorably to him, asserts facts that set out a cause of action for wrongful use of civil proceeding.
First, Shea alleges that Estey did not have probable cause or reasonable grounds to bring Estey's action, (Pl.'s Comp. ¶ 24). In wrongful use of civil proceedings cases, "'probable' cause' or 'reasonable grounds' for the action has been viewed as information sufficient to justify a person who is calm, and not governed by passion, prejudice, or lack or ordinary caution and care, in believing that there is a factual and legal basis for the action." Saunders v. Tisher, 2006 MR 94, ¶ 29, 902 A.2d 830. According to Shea, at the hearing held on December 20, 2018, the testimony of Estey's only witnesses, Logan Caron, Brooke Estey, and Ms. Caron did not credibly corroborate any of the allegations stated in Estey's complaint for protection from abuse, but instead evidenced several instances in which Estey engaged in abuse directed at Brooke Estey, Logan Caron, Ashley Caron Estey, and Shea, (Id. ¶ 13.)
Shea's Complaint further alleges that on August 22, 2018, the temporary order for protection from abuse was terminated and dissolved pursuant to an agreement between Estey and Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 9.) However, on September 5, 2018, Estey filed a motion to reinstate the terminated and dissolved temporary order for protection from abuse, after a dispute arose between Estey and Ms. Caron regarding visitation. (Id. ¶ 10.)
The Court finds that these allegations, viewed in Shea's favor, could show that Estey was not calm and was instead governed by passion or prejudice in believing he had a factual and legal basis to file a complaint for a temporary and permanent protection from abuse against Shea and in filing the motion to reinstate. Therefore, the Court finds that Shea has alleged facts as to element one of Count I.
Second Shea also alleges that "Defendant proceeded with the civil proceeding against Shea with a primary purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim or claims upon which the proceedings were based." (Id. ¶ 25.) Here, the facts alleged in the Complaint, viewed...
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