Shea v. Massachusetts Ben. Ass'n

• Decision Date: 03 January 1894
• Citation: 35 N.E. 855,160 Mass. 289
• Parties: SHEA v. MASSACHUSETTS BEN. ASS'N.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

160 Mass. 289

35 N.E. 855

SHEA v. MASSACHUSETTS BEN. ASS'N.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

January 3, 1894

COUNSEL

James B. Carroll, for plaintiff.

Edward Avery and F.E. Litchfield, for defendant.

OPINION

ALLEN J.

The defendant contends that the action should have been brought in the name of Margaret B. Shea, the beneficiary. She was the daughter-in-law of John Shea, and, as both parties contend was not within the classes of persons who may be beneficiaries. The designation of her as beneficiary was therefore invalid, and she could not maintain an action. St.1882, c. 195, § 1. Such invalid designation, however, does not destroy the contract, which provides that, if Margaret should not be living at John Shea's death, then the payment should be made to his heirs at law. The executrix may maintain the action for their benefit. Rindge v. Society, 146 Mass. 286, 15 N.E. 628; Burns v. Grand Lodge, 153 Mass. 173, 26 N.E. 443. It is, however, further contended that Margaret had no insurable interest in the life of John Shea; that all the premiums were paid by her, and that the contract was void as a wagering contract. This ground of defense was not open, not being set up in the answer. Forbes v. Insurance Co., 15 Gray, 249. But, apart from that, the facts stated were far from showing conclusively that a mere wager was intended, and the presiding justice rightly refused so to rule. The relationship in which Margaret stood to John, and the matters disclosed in her testimony, tended strongly to show that the policy or certificate of membership was obtained in good faith, and not for the mere purpose of speculating on the hazard of a life in which she had no interest; and, if so the contract was valid if made with him, though made for her benefit, and though the premiums were paid by her. Campbell v. Insurance Co., 98 Mass. 381; Loomis v. Insurance Co., 6 Gray, 396; Forbes v. Insurance Co., 15 Gray, 249; Cunningham v. Smith, 70 Pa.St. 450; Insurance Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457; Insurance Co. v. France, Id. 561. See, also, Insurance Co. v. Allen, 138 Mass. 24. Moreover, it is to be observed that her testimony does not show that it was understood that she alone was to pay the premiums. She said that John Shea promised assistance in paying them, if necessary. The fact that she paid them, under the circumstances, was immaterial. Insurance Co. v. France, 94 U.S. 561.

The ruling that the burden was on the defendant to show that mortuary call No. 71 was properly and legally made was right. The defendant, in its answer, set up that on March 31, 1892, a duly-authorized assessment was called by said association, a notice of which was mailed to John Shea on said date, payable in 30 days thereafter; that said assessment was not paid within said 30 days, and thereupon the policy or certificate lapsed, and became void. In order to establish a forfeiture of his membership, the first step was to show a duly-authorized assessment; and the second, to show that it was not duly paid. The facts relating to the validity of the assessment were peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge. Unless, therefore, the plaintiff was in some way debarred from questioning the validity of the assessment, the burden of establishing its validity clearly rested in the defendant; and upon Litchfield's testimony as to the mode of issuing mortuary calls, it is not apparent how the call in question conformed to the rules annexed to Shea's policy or certificate of membership, which provided that he should not be liable for any further sum in each year, beyond the annual assessment of five dollars, except that upon the death of any member he should pay, if required, an additional assessment of $7.50. It is not, however, necessary to dwell upon this, because the question was left to the jury, with instructions which were sufficiently favorable to the defendant. The defendant, however, asked a ruling that by making payment of the assessment all parties in interest are estopped to deny that the assessment was legally made. This view would perhaps be reasonable, provided the defendant had accepted the payment without question. But the defendant undertook to impose a condition that the payment should be null and void unless John Shea was at the time in good health, and now contends that the payment was no payment, because he was not in good health. The position of the defendant is that the payment was sufficient to operate as a waiver by the assured of the invalidity of the assessment, but not sufficient to keep the policy in force. The payment would create no estoppel to deny the validity of the assessment, unless it was accepted as a valid payment. If repudiated, the assured would be as much at liberty to question the validity of the assessment as if no attempt to pay had been made. No estoppel would arise from a repudiated offer to pay, because the defendant did not act on the offer, or change its position, and therefore it was not at liberty to set up an estoppel. No other ground of estoppel was urged or ruled on, except merely the effect of the payment, under the circumstances stated, and our decision is limited to that ground.

The defendant further contends that the policy lapsed by reason of the failure to pay the assessment in due time, that the subsequent receipt of the money was only conditional, and that the forfeiture of the policy was not thereby waived. One of the defendant's officers testified that the money for call No. 71 was received April 8th, which was too late; and that a receipt was thereupon mailed to Shea's address expressing that the payment was received upon the condition hereinbefore mentioned, and not otherwise. There was some evidence tending to show that this receipt failed to reach Shea, or any one acting in his behalf. It thus became material to consider the rights of the parties, provided such a receipt was posted by the defendant, but failed to reach its proper destination; and the defendant asked a ruling that, if such a receipt was mailed, and Shea was not in good health, the plaintiff could not recover. The court declined so to rule, and instructed the jury that the defendant must satisfy the jury that the receipt actually...