Shea v. Peters

• Decision Date: 23 May 1918
• Citation: 230 Mass. 197
• Parties: MARY E. SHEA v. HENRY C. PETERS, AGNES M. PETERS, intervening petitioner.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

230 Mass. 197

MARY E. SHEA v. HENRY C. PETERS, AGNES M. PETERS, intervening petitioner.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 23, 1918

March 27 1918.

Present: RUGG, C J., BRALEY, DE COURCY, CROSBY, & CARROLL, JJ.

Attachment Dissolution, Special. Statute, Construction. Constitutional Law, Trial by jury. Jury.

Both R.L.c. 167 Section 110, providing a defendant, whose property has been attached on mesne process, with a remedy, upon a petition, by reduction or dissolution of an excessive or unreasonable attachment, and

St. 1909, c.

190, amending that statute by extending its benefits to a

"person whose property has been attached," are remedial in their nature and designed to afford relief against conduct in its nature resembling abuse of the process of attachment; and their words should be construed in accordance with their manifest purpose in order to afford adequate redress for the evil against which they appear to be aimed.

An attachment, upon a writ of original summons and attachment in an action at law, described by the attaching officer in his return as an attachment "specially" of "all the right, title and interest the" defendant had "in and to" certain real estate, which he described by metes and bounds, "the record title to which stands in the name of" a person other than the defendant, is an attachment made "on mesne process" within the provisions of the statutes above described.

A wife, whose real estate, purchased by her with her own money, owned by her and standing of record in her own name, has been specially attached on mesne process in an action at law against her husband only, is "a person whose property has been attached" and as such is entitled to relief by dissolution of the attachment under the statutes above described. The right to acquire a lien by special attachment under R.L.c. 167,

Sections 38, 63, is a creature of statute, a right in its nature preliminary or subsidiary to the main question of liability involved in the action, and is not a natural right.

R.L.c. 167, Section 110, amended by St. 1909, c. 190, does not violate the right to trial by jury secured by the Constitution.

CONTRACT OR TORT. Writ dated April 17, 1917. The officer's return stated that he had "attached specially all the right, title and interest the" defendant had "in and to the following described piece or parcel of real estate the record title to which stands in the name of Agnes M. Peters," and described the parcel by metes and bounds.

On December 6, 1917, Agnes M. Peters filed a petition, which as afterwards amended, alleged that she was the wife of the defendant, that the plaintiff had made an unreasonable attachment of her property, asserting that property standing in her name was in reality the property of her husband, that such property had been purchased with her own money and was owned by her and that the defendant had no attachable interest therein. The prayer was that the special attachment should be discharged and for such other relief as should seem proper.

The petition was heard by Wait, J., who ruled that the petitioner's remedy was "after judgment under the statute providing for special attachments," dismissed the petition as a matter of law and reported the case for determination by this court.

E. H. Savary, for the intervening petitioner Agnes M.

Peters.

No counsel appeared for the plaintiff.

RUGG, C. J. The plaintiff in this action against Henry C. Peters made special attachments of real estate, claiming that it belongs to him but stands fraudulently in the name of Agnes M. Peters. R.L.c. 167, Sections 38, 63, c. 178, Section 1. Agnes M Peters filed a petition alleging the attachments to be unreasonable, setting forth that she is the absolute owner of said real estate as the purchaser, having paid therefor with her own money, and that the defendant has no attachable interest therein, and praying that the attachments be discharged and for other relief. The judge of the Superior Court ruled that the exclusive relief of the intervening petitioner is after judgment under the statute providing for special attachments, ordered the petition dismissed, and reported the matter.

The questions here presented expressly were left undecided in Sederquist v. Brown, 225 Mass. 217 , 220. The decision depends upon the interpretation of R.L.c. 167, Section 110, as amended by St. 1909, c. 190, under which this petition is framed. The plain terms of the pertinent section of the Revised Laws confined the right to petition for the reduction or discharge of excessive or unreasonable attachments to defendants. But the amending act expressly put any "person whose property has been attached" on the same footing with the defendant in this particular. As amended, the statutory words here relevant are, "If an excessive or unreasonable attachment is made on mesne process, the defendant or person whose property has been attached, may apply in writing . . . to a justice of the court to which such process is returnable, for a reduction of the amount of the attachment or for its discharge. . . . If, upon a summary hearing of the parties, it is found that the attachment is excessive or unreasonable, the justice shall reduce or dissolve the attachment or order a part of the goods or estate to be released."

Both the original and the amendatory statutes are remedial in their nature designed to afford relief against conduct in its results resembling abuse of the...