Shea v. St. Paul City Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 July 1892
• Citation: 50 Minn. 395,52 N.W. 902
• Parties: SHEA v ST. PAUL CITY RY. CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

50 Minn. 395

52 N.W. 902

SHEAvST. PAUL CITY RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 7, 1892.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Evidence held to justify the verdict.

2. The degree of care required at the crossing of a highway and an ordinary steam railroad is not the test of care required in crossing the track of a street railroad on a public street. Hence the rule in the former case that one approaching the crossing must look up and down the track before attempting to cross is not necessarily applicable to the latter. The failure to do so is not, as a matter of law, negligence.

Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; BRILL, Judge.

Action by John C. Shea against the St. Paul City Railway Company to recover for injuries. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Henry J. Horn, for appellant.

D. F. Peebles and Erwin & Wellington, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

Action to recover damages for injuries caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff was driving a hack along Eighth street, in the city of St. Paul, going east. As he approached the intersection of Eighth and Jackson streets, (which cross at right angles,) an electric street car of defendant was approaching the same point from the north, running down Jackson street. As plaintiff was crossing the railway track on the intersection of the two streets, the car collided with the hack, causing the injuries complained of. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant was negligent in running the car at an unusual and dangerous rate of speed, and in not giving timely signals of its approach to the street crossing. The defendant denied these allegations of negligence on its part, and alleged that the injuries were caused by plaintiff's own negligence, especially in driving upon the track without looking for approaching cars. Most of defendant's assignments of error, as well as of his argument, is to the point that the verdict was not justified by the evidence. An examination of the record, however, satisfies us that upon the questions both of defendant's negligence and of plaintiff's contributory negligence the evidence made a case for the jury. There was evidence reasonably tending to prove that the car was being run at an unusually rapid rate of speed, (from 15 to 20 miles an hour according to several witnesses;) that the speed was unchecked until after the collision occurred; that it was running on quite a heavy down grade, where it is more difficult to check the speed; that no signal of its approach was given until it was within 40 to 60 feet of the crossing; that this was in a populous part of the city, and the streets in question, which are rather narrow, much used thoroughfares of travel; and that buildings on the corners necessarily obstruct the view from one street up and down the other, until a person is within a comparatively short distance of the crossing. It is hardly necessary to say that upon such a state of facts, if found to be true, the jury would be justified in finding that the defendant was negligent. Defendant's main contention, however, is that the evidence conclusively shows that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. There was evidence tending to show that he was driving down Eighth street at a slow trot, say five miles an hour; that he heard no signals of the approach of cars; that on reaching the crossing he looked south, down Jackson street, and saw no cars; that he then turned his head to look the other way, (by this time his horses' heads were just about over the nearest rail of the car track,) and saw a car some 60 feet distant, coming down; that he immediately attempted to stop his horses, but finding that he was unable to do so, owing to their restiveness, he struck them with the whip, and attempted to urge them rapidly across the track, but before he succeeded...