Shearer v. Shearer, 21666
| Decision Date | 26 August 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 21666,21666 |
| Citation | 448 S.E.2d 165,191 W.Va. 734 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Susan Argabrite SHEARER, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Dan L. SHEARER, IV, Defendant Below, Appellee. |
Rehearing Denied Aug. 26, 1994.
Syllabus by the Court
1. "With reference to the custody of very young children, the law presumes that it is in the best interests of such children to be placed in the custody of their primary caretaker, if he or she is fit." Syllabus point 2, Garska v. McCoy, 167 W.Va. 59, 278 S.E.2d 357 (1981).
2. "The primary caretaker is that natural or adoptive parent who, until the initiation of divorce proceedings, has been primarily responsible for the caring and nurturing of the child." Syllabus point 3, Garska v. McCoy, 167 W.Va. 59, 278 S.E.2d 357 (1981).
Richard A. Bush, Bush & Trippel, Parkersburg, for appellant.
Robin Jean Davis, Segal & Davis, Charleston, and William J. Leon, Gianola, Leon & Barnum, Morgantown, for appellee.
This is an appeal by Susan A. Shearer from an order of the Circuit Court of Monongalia County awarding custody of her three-year-old child to the child's father, Dan L. Shearer, IV. The award of custody was made in conjunction with a divorce proceeding. On appeal, the appellant contends that the award of custody was improper and prays that this Court reverse the decision of the circuit court. After reviewing the questions presented and the documents filed, this Court agrees. Accordingly, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Monongalia County is reversed, and this case is remanded with directions that the circuit court award the appellant custody of the parties' child.
On September 1, 1989, the appellant and Dan L. Shearer, IV, were married in Monongalia County, West Virginia. Approximately six months prior to the marriage, the parties had had the infant child whose custody is in issue in the present proceeding.
Following their marriage, the parties lived together in Morgantown, West Virginia, with the infant child.
In January, 1992, the appellant filed a complaint for divorce in the Circuit Court of Monongalia County. In the complaint she alleged that irreconcilable differences had arisen between herself and Dan L. Shearer, IV, or, in the alternative, that Dan L. Shearer, IV, had been guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment. She sought custody of the parties' infant child, an award of child support, an award of alimony, and equitable distribution of the marital assets of the parties. In support of her claim for custody of the infant child, she alleged that she had been the primary caretaker of the child, who was then three years old.
Dan L. Shearer, IV, filed an answer in which he admitted that irreconcilable differences had developed between the parties. He, however, denied that the appellant had been the primary caretaker of the infant child, and he demanded custody of the infant child, an award of child support, and distribution of marital assets of the parties in conformity of the terms of an existing prenuptial agreement.
Following the filing of the complaint, a preliminary hearing was conducted in the matter on February 11, 1992. At the conclusion of that hearing, the family law master who conducted it equally divided the temporary care, custody, and control of the infant child between the parties. He scheduled a final hearing in the matter for March 30, 1992, and he awarded the appellant custody of the child for half of the intervening time, with weekend visitation to Dan L. Shearer, IV, and he awarded Dan L. Shearer, IV, custody for the remaining half of the intervening period of time, with weekend visitation to the appellant. The family law master also required each custodial parent to permit the noncustodial parent the first option of babysitting in lieu of daycare or third-party babysitting.
Final hearings in the matter proceeded as scheduled. The first session was conducted on March 30, 1992. Two later sessions were conducted on May 11 and May 15, 1992.
During the final hearings, both parties admitted that the other was involved to a considerable degree in the care of the infant child. Differences arose over the relative extent or degree of that involvement.
At the conclusion of the final hearings, the family law master found that both parties were fit parents and also found that during their marriage both parties were actively involved in the rearing of the infant child and that, therefore, neither party had established that he or she was entitled to the benefit of the primary caretaker presumption for the purposes of determining custody of the child. The family law master went on to state:
After further inquiry into the relative degrees of parental competence, the Law Master finds that it is in the best interest of the child of the parties that custody be awarded to the Defendant. In this regard, the Law Master finds that the Defendant is a life long resident of Morgantown; has completed his graduate school education and is now gainfully employed in Morgantown, West Virginia; that the Defendant has both paternal and maternal relatives living in the Morgantown area; and that between the Plaintiff and Defendant, Defendant is better able to financially support the child. The Law Master finds that Plaintiff has not yet completed her graduate school education; that her future employment and living arrangements are uncertain at present. For these and such other reasons as appear on the record, the Law Master finds that it is in the best interest of the child that custody be awarded to the Defendant.
It appears that at the conclusion of the hearings in the case, the appellant, through her counsel, sought to present rebuttal evidence. Without objection from Dan L. Shearer, IV, the family law master refused to hear such rebuttal evidence and declared the case submitted.
Since the appellant was denied the opportunity to present rebuttal evidence at the final hearing, through counsel she sought an alternative procedure to place her rebuttal evidence before the circuit court which had responsibility for making the final decision in the case. She, accordingly, served notice of the taking of her own deposition, and despite objections from Dan L. Shearer, IV, the deposition was taken on June 3, 1992.
Both parties filed petitions for review of the recommended order of the family law master, and in conjunction with her appeal, the appellant attempted to submit the deposition.
After reviewing the questions raised on appeal, the circuit court found that both parties appear to have shared equally in the raising of their son, and, in view of this finding, the court concluded that it was appropriate for the master to find that neither party was entitled to the primary caretaker presumption. The court also found that the family law master's finding that Dan L. Shearer, IV, was better suited to care for the parties' child could not be viewed as being the result of an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court, in effect, adopted the family law master's findings.
In the present proceeding, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in confirming the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the family law master to the effect that neither party was entitled to the primary caretaker presumption and that the best interest of the child would be served by an award of custody to the child's father, Dan L. Shearer, IV. She claims that this was especially so when the family law master refused to permit her to offer rebuttal evidence and the court refused to consider her post-hearing deposition offered in lieu of rebuttal evidence.
The appellant also argues that the evidence of the case was overwhelming that she was the primary caretaker of the infant child and the overwhelming weight of the evidence showed that the best interest of the child would have been promoted by an award of custody to her.
In Garska v. McCoy, 167 W.Va. 59, 278 S.E.2d 357 (1981), this Court discussed at some length the award of custody of a child of tender years. Under the principles set forth in Garska, the three-year-old child of the parties in the present case would clearly qualify as a child of tender years.
The fundamental rule set forth in Garska for the award of custody of a child of tender years is summarized in syllabus point 2, as follows:
With reference to the custody of very young children, the law presumes that it is in the best interests of such children to be placed in the custody of their primary caretaker, if he or she is fit.
In syllabus point 3 of Garska v. McCoy, the Court defined the primary caretaker as follows:
The primary caretaker is that natural or adoptive parent who, until the initiation of divorce proceedings, has been primarily responsible for the caring and nurturing of the child.
In David M. v. Margaret M., 182 W.Va. 57, 385 S.E.2d 912 (1989), the Court, following Garska v. McCoy, outlined the criteria to be used in determining which parent has been the primary caretaker of a child of tender years. The Court stated that the primary caretaker was the parent who:
... has taken primary responsibility for, inter alia, the performance of the following caring and nurturing duties of a parent: (1) preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and dressing; (3) purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes; (4) medical care, including nursing and trips to physicians; (5) arranging for social interaction among peers after school, i.e. transporting to friends' houses or, for example, to girl or boy scout meetings; (6) arranging alternative care, i.e. babysitting, day-care, etc.; (7) putting child to bed at night, attending to child in the middle of the night, waking child in the morning; (8) disciplining, i.e. teaching general manners and toilet training; (9) educating, i.e. religious, cultural, social, etc.; and, (10) teaching...
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