Shedlock v. Connelie

• Decision Date: 01 March 1979
• Citation: 66 A.D.2d 433,414 N.Y.S.2d 55
• Parties: In the Matter of Carl J. SHEDLOCK, Respondent, v. William G. CONNELIE, as Superintendent, New York State Police, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 55

414 N.Y.S.2d 55

66 A.D.2d 433

In the Matter of Carl J. SHEDLOCK, Respondent, v. William G. CONNELIE, as Superintendent, New York State Police, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

March 1, 1979.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., Albany (John Q. Driscoll and Ruth Kessler Toch, Albany, of counsel), for appellant.

Harrington & Bookhout, Oneonta (Richard J. Bookhout, Oneonta, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MAHONEY, P. J., and GREENBLOTT, SWEENEY, STALEY and MIKOLL, JJ.

OPINION FOR REVERSAL

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, a police officer for the City of Oneonta Police Department since April, 1974, passed both written and physical tests for appointment to the State Police. He was placed on the eligible list for such appointment established in June, 1976, at number 581. After a background investigation, he was informed by letter dated January 31, 1978 from the State Police that: "It has been determined that you fail to meet all of the eligibility requirements and therefore, no further action can be taken on your application." His number had been reached for a training class commencing February 20, 1978. The petitioner, in oral interviews during the investigation of his background, had been afforded an opportunity to respond to the allegations made against him.

Special Term, on petitioner's application, annulled the disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he was not afforded a due process hearing prior to his disqualification. Appellant Superintendent contends on this appeal that he is not required to afford petitioner a due process hearing before disqualifying him as a candidate for lack of fitness or good moral character. We agree. Although appointments to the uniformed force of the State Police are governed by section 6 of article 5 of the New York State Constitution and by applicable provisions of the Civil Service Law, sole authority for the examination, qualification and appointment of members is vested in the Superintendent of State Police by virtue of the Executive Law and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. Subdivision 3 of section 215 of the Executive Law requires that any person appointed as a State Trooper be possessed of fitness and good moral character and directs that the Superintendent of State Police make rules and regulations for the examination and qualifications of applicants. Part 475 of title 9 of the Rules and Regulations of the Division of State Police insofar as pertinent reads:

An applicant must * * * be of good moral character * * * and meet such other standards as are set by the Superintendent.

Thus, the Superintendent had the power and authority to determine, as a matter of discretion, the "fitness and good moral character" of the petitioner as a qualification of such appointment. The exercise of this discretion, as long as it is rational, is not prohibited by the constitutional provisions relating to Civil Service (Matter of Cassidy v. Municipal Civ. Serv. Comm. of City of New Rochelle, 37 N.Y.2d 526, 375 N.Y.S.2d 300, 337 N.E.2d 752; Matter of Cacchioli v. Hoberman, 31 N.Y.2d 287, 292, 338 N.Y.S.2d 865, 868, 291 N.E.2d 117, 119; People ex rel. Balcom v. Mosher, 163 N.Y. 32, 40-41, 57 N.E. 88, 90-91; People ex rel. Sweet v. Lyman, 157 N.Y. 368, 381-382, 52 N.E. 132, 136-137). We note that it has long been recognized that, due to the nature of the police function in society, higher standards of fitness and character pertain to police officers than to ordinary civil service employees (Matter of Cacchioli v. Hoberman, supra, concurring opinion by Jasen, J., p. 294, 338 N.Y.S.2d p. 870, 291 N.E.2d p. 120; Matter of Vegas v. Schechter, 13 Misc.2d 265, 266-267, 178 N.Y.S.2d 67, 68-69. See also, Foley v. Connelie, 419 F.Supp. 889, 895-897).

The act of disqualifying one eligible for an appointment like the act of discharging a probationary governmental employee is an administrative function, and no hearing or notice need be given unless specifically enjoined by statute (Matter of Albury v. New York City Civil Serv. Comm., 32 A.D.2d 895, 302 N.Y.S.2d 3, affd. 27 N.Y.2d 694, 314 N.Y.S.2d 13, 262 N.E.2d 219; Kosherack v. Schmeller, 363 F.Supp. 932). Significantly, petitioner has pointed to no statute or rule granting him the right to such hearing or...