Sheehan v. Superintendent of Concord Reformatory

• Decision Date: 07 January 1926
• Parties: SHEEHAN v. SUPERINTENDENT OF CONCORD REFORMATORY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

254 Mass. 342

150 N.E. 231

SHEEHAN

v.SUPERINTENDENT OF CONCORD REFORMATORY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Jan. 7, 1926.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County.

Petition for habeas corpus by James Sheehan, per prochein ami, against the Superintendent of the Concord Reformatory. Case reported by single justice for determination of the full court. Petition dismissed.S. A. Dearborn, of Boston, for petitioner.

Jay R. Benton, Atty. Gen., and Alfred R. Shrigley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

RUGG, C. J.

This is a petition for habeas corpus brought by a minor by his next friend. The petitioner, on his plea of guilty to a complaint charging him with breaking and entering a building and committing larceny therein, was duly committed to the Industrial School for Boys at Shirley ‘during his minority or until he be discharged according to law.’ No question is raised as to the regularity of those proceedings. G. L. c. 119, §§ 73, 76, 77; Sylvester v. Commonwealth, 253 Mass. 244, 148 N. E. 449.

While at the Shirley school, the petitioner, contrary to its rules and regulations, made one ineffectual attempt to escape, and actually escaped on two occasions, on each of which, during an absence of several days, he committed crimes and depredations until his apprehension and return. Thereafter he was transferred to the Massachusetts Reformatory at Concord because he had proved unmanageable and an improper person to remain at the Shirley school. This transfer was made by the trustees of the Massachusetts training schools, the board having charge of the Shirley school, pursuant to the alleged authority conferred by G. L. c. 120, § 16, which is in these words:

‘The trustees may transfer any personcommitted or transferred to the Industrial School for Boys or to the Lyman School for Boys, still in the custody of said trustees, who has proved unmanageable or an improper person to remain in either of the said institutions, to the Massachusetts Reformatory. * * *’

The contention of the petitioner is that such transfer constituted a change of punishment, was an attempt to infringe upon the judicial by the legislative department of government, was an interference with a sentence imposed by the court, was a delegation of judicial functions to an administrative board, and was an imposition of a greater, additional or substituted sentence for that prescribed by the court. The constitutionality of the statute, which in terms authorizes such transfer, is assailed on all these grounds.

It was said in Opinion of Justices, 13 Gray, 618, that a general statute authorizing the reduction of a sentence to imprisonment by a fixed scale based on good behavior by the prisoner during his incarceration and the consequent shortening of the term of imprisonment from that imposed by the court, was constitutional. Murphy v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 264, 266, 52 N. E. 505, 43 L. R. A. 154, 70 Am. St. Rep. 266. A statute requiring an indeterminate sentence between a stated maximum and a fixed minimum, the precise time of release to be decided by an executive or administrative board, has been held constitutional. Commonwealth v. Brown, 167 Mass. 144, 146, 45 N. E. 1;G. L. c. 278, § 24; Oliver v. Oliver, 169 Mass. 592, 48 N. E. 843;State v. Page, 60 Kan. 664, 57 P. 514;In re Marlow, 75 N. J. Law, 400, 68 A. 171. The parole statute, authorizing a public board to permit a prisoner to be at liberty upon conditions during an unexpired remainder of his (G. L. c. 127, § 135), has been referred to incidentally although its constitutionality has not been passed upon. Conlon's Case, 148 Mass. 168, 19 N. E. 164;Kozlowsky, Petitioner, 238 Mass. 532, 131 N. E. 188. Authorities in other jurisdictions uphold the constitutionality of parole statutes. State v. Duff, 144 Iowa, 142, 122 N. W. 829,24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 625, 138 Am. St. Rep. 269;People v. Joyce, 246 Ill. 124, 132-137, 92 N. E. 607,20 Ann. Cas. 472;State v. Peters, 43 Ohio St. 629, 4 N. E. 81;Woods v. State, 130 Tenn. 100, 169 S. W. 558, L. R. A. 1915F, 531. As to suspended sentences, see Mariano v. Judge of District Court, 243 Mass. 90, 137 N. E. 369.

[1][2][3] These decisions go far toward settling the question here at issue. The principle on which they rest is that existing pertinent statutes are read into and made a part of the sentence imposed by the court. The definition of crimes and the establishment of penalties therefor, so far as not left to the common law, belong to the Legislature. The trial of those charged with crime and the imposition of sentences upon those convicted are a part of the functions of courts. The execution of sentences according to standing laws is an attribute of the executive department of government. This is in conformity to the sharp and strict separation of the legislative, the executive and the judicial departments of government in article 30 of our Declaration of Rights.

[4][5] The proceeding under which the petitioner was sentenced to the industrial school at Shirley is wholly prescribed by statute. It is a prosecution for crime; yet is designed in no small part to reform the minor, to wean him from criminal tendencies and to enable him to become a useful citizen. It would frustrate this general humanitarian scheme for the administration of the Industrial School for Boys if those not responsive to the reformative methods of the school must continue there is association with other boys yielding to its influences. Manifestly it would be within the power of the Legislature to provide for the segregation of such refractory inmates. There hardly could be question that in appropriate buildings more rigorous treatment and closer confinement might be provided for such inmates as a part of the regular course of the school. No substantial reason is perceived why such segregation may not be accomplished also by transfer to another state institution adapted to the needs of such inmates. There is no constitutional prohibition against reasonable enactments by the Legislature correlating the reformatory and penal institutions of the commonwealth so as to render them to a certain extent a unified system and to prevent unnecessary duplication of buildings or administration. The Legislature may also, in the exercise of the police power and to promote the general welfare, enact reasonable laws for the transfer of those confined for crime from one of its institutions to another. This power has been exercised without question for many years. St. 1866, c. 198, § 6; St. 1879, c. 294, §§ 3, 4, 5; St. 1884, c. 255; St. 1885, c. 35; G. L. c. 127, §§ 97 to 120, both inclusive.

As penalty for the crime to which the petitioner pleaded guilty he might have...