Sheehan v. Tobin
| Citation | 326 Mass. 185,93 N.E.2d 524 |
| Parties | SHEEHAN v. TOBIN. D'AMBROSIO v. TOBIN. |
| Decision Date | 30 June 1950 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
Argued April 4 1950.
A Brogna, Boston, P. E. Troy, Boston, for plaintiffs.
F. P. Garland Boston, for defendnt.
Before QUA, C. J and LUMMUS, WILKINS, WILLIAMS and COUNIHAN, JJ.
These are actions of tort for libel arising out of an article in 'The International Teamster,' the official magazine of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs Warehousemen and Helpers of America, a labor union, hereinafter referred to as the Brotherhood, of which the defendant was the general president and of whose magazine he was the editor. The plaintiffs were members of Local 25, a subordinate union of the Brotherhood. They complain of this artice which was published in the magazine for March, 1946, part of which we quote: . (Emphasis supplied.) They allege that the words in italics were libellous as to them. The defendant's answers set up truth, want of malice, and privilege. The publication of the article and the responsibility of the defendant for it were admitted.
The actions were tried to a jury who returned a verdict for the plaintiff in each case. The actions are here on similar exceptions of the defendant in each case: (1) to the denial of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict; (2) to the denial of the defendant's motion to enter verdict for the defendant under leave reserved; (3) to the exclusion of certain evidence offered by the defendant; (4) to the denial of a request for instruction by the defendant; and (5) to the charge of the judge to the jury.
The words complained of were in a report to the members of the minutes of a meeting of the general executive board of the Brotherhood, hereinafter referred to as the board, held in Florida from January 28, 1946, to February 7, 1946. The entire report covered sixteen columns on eight pages of the magazine, which was published monthly under the direction of the general president in accordance with the constitution of the Brotherhood. There was evidence that there was no other method by which the membership was informed of the proceedings of the board.
The material events leading up to this publication were as follows: The plaintiffs were both members in good standing of Local 25 on October 17, 1945. On that day the plaintiff Sheehan filed a written complaint to Local 25 against its officers, including one Francis J. Halloran, one of its business agents. On the morning of October 18, 1945, both plaintiffs visited the office of Local 25 in Boston and an altercation there took place between the plaintiffs and Halloran during which blows were struck and Halloran received injuries for which he was treated at the Boston City Hospital and on account of which he was confined to bed at his home for several days. On October 19, 1945, Halloran and one O'Donnell, an officer of Local 25 filed written charges against both plaintiffs particularly on account of the alleged assault by them on Halloran. The defendant as general president of the Brotherhood took personal jurisdiction of these charges as he had a right to do under the constitution of the Brotherhood. He duly appointed a hearing officer who held a hearing in Boston at which Halloran and others testified. Each plaintiff made a statement and was examined by the hearing officer. A stenographer was present at this hearing and a transcript of what took place was sent to the defendant by the hearing officer together with his report. On December 24, 1945, the defendant, after an examination of the material evidence in the transcript and consideration of the written report of the hearing officer, made a decision adverse to the plaintiffs and imposed a penalty on them. Both plaintiffs thereupon duly appealed to the board and a hearing was held before it at which the plaintiffs appeared and were heard. A summary of what happened at this hearing appears in the record, together with the decision of the board, which unanimously denied the appeals of the plaintiffs, and with slight modification as to the penalties affirmed the decision of the general president. It appears from this summary that, although the defendant gave his reasons for his decision to the board, he was not present and took no part in the executive session at which the board arrived at its decision. On February 23, 1946, the plaintiffs duly appealed to the general convention of the Brotherhood. These appeals were received and acknowledged by the Btotherhood on February 26, 1946. Before any such convention was held, the magazine with the alleged words was published. There was no evidence that the defendant had knowledge of the appeals when the magazine went to press on or about February 20, 1946.
On the defence of truth pleaded by the defendant there was conflicting evidence at the trial. The defendant testified by deposition that he based his original decision on the transcript of the evidence before the hearing officer in which there was ample evidence to justify the belief he had that the assault on Halloran was a brutal one. He further testified that he had never seen either of the plaintiffs prior to the hearing before the board and bore neither of them any personal enmity. There was evidence at the trial that Halloran was forty-seven years old, Sheehan was thirty-one years old, and D'Ambrosio was thirty-four years old when the altercation took place. The defendant testified that when he wrote the ariticle complained of, he believed Halloran was between fifty and fifty-five years old and old enough to be the father of both plaintiffs.
We first consider the defendant's exceptions to the denial of directed verdicts for him and to the denial of entry of verdicts for him under leave reserved.
At the outset we believe that attention ought to be directed to the difference in the principles of law applicable to what is generally termed privileged comment or criticism and that which is termed a conditional or qualified privilege which arises from the circumstances or the occasion on which alleged defamatory statements are made. The question of what is privileged comment or criticism frequently arises out of publication of words alleged to be libellous in reports in newspapers of actions of public officials. Fair comment in the absence of actual malice is a good defence but false statements of fact are not privileged as comment whether accompanied by actual malice or not. Bander v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 337, 345, 47 N.E. 595. This principle is well illustrated by what was said in Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 242, 28 N.E. 1, 4, 13 L.R.A. 97. '* * * what is pivileged * * * is criticism, not statement; and however it might be if a person merely quoted or referred to a statement as made by others, and gave it no new sanction, if he takes upon himself in his own person to allege facts otherwise libellous, he will not be privileged if those facts are not true.'
But different considerations arise in dealing with alleged defamatory statements made under what is called a privileged occasion or a conditional or qualified privilege. In these circumstances the truth or falsehood of such statements is not material if there is no abuse of the privilege or, as has been repeatedly said, if no actual malice is shown. Restatement: Torts, § 599, comment a. Doane v. Grew, 220 Mass. 171, 176, 107 N.E. 620, L.R.A.1915C, 774, Ann.Cas.1917A, 338; Childs v. Erhard, 226 Mass. 454, 457, 115 N.E. 924.
This principle of immunity arising out of the occasion under which alleged defamatory statements are made has been recognized for many years in our Commonwealth. Gassett v. Gilbert, 6 Gray, 94, 97; Barrows v. Bell, 7 Gary 301, 66 Am.Dec. 479; Brow v. Hathaway, 13 Allen, 239, 242; Atwill v. Mackintosh, 120 Mass. 177.
This defence of conditional or qualified privilege is applied usually in cases where information is sought from an employer as to the qualifications or character of a former employee. Statements made to one contemplating the employment of the person inquired about, in the absence of abuse of the privilege, are protected. Doane v. Grew, 220 Mass. 171, 176, 107 N.E. 620, L.R.A.1915C, 774, Ann.Cas.1917A, 338; Childs v. Erhard, 226 Mass. 454, 115 N.E. 924.
It is now a generally recognized doctrine that the occasion is privileged 'where the publisher and the recipient have a common interest, and the communication is of a kind reasonably calculated to protect or further it.' And this privilege has been extended to labor unions. Prosser on Torts, pages 837, 838; Restatement: Torts, § 596, comment d. Emde v. San Joaquin County Central Labor Council, 23 Cal.2d 146, 154, 143 P.2d 28, 150 A.L.R. 916.
No case in Massachusetts has been brought to our attention, and we have discovered none, in which a conditional or qualified privilege was established by the occasion of disseminating information of...
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