Sheeran v. Blyth Shipholding S.A.

• Decision Date: 16 December 2015
• Docket Number: Civil No. 14-5482 (JBS/AMD)
• Parties: STEVEN SHEERAN and KELLY SHEERAN, Plaintiffs, v. BLYTH SHIPHOLDING S.A., et al. Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

STEVEN SHEERAN and KELLY SHEERAN, Plaintiffs, v. BLYTH SHIPHOLDING S.A., et al. Defendants.

Civil No. 14-5482 (JBS/AMD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

December 16, 2015

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

Brian D. Kent, Esq.

LAFFEY BUCCI & KENT LLP

1435 Walnut Street, 7th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19102

-and-

Bruce David Zeidman, Esq.

COSKY & ZEIDMAN, Attorneys at Law

209 Haddon Ave.

Haddonfield, NJ 08033

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Patrick M. Northen, Esq.

Francis P. Maneri, Esq.

Jordan M. Rand, Esq.

DILWORTH PAXSON, LLP

457 Haddonfield Road, Suite 700

Cherry Hill, NJ 08002

Attorneys for Defendant Holt Logistics Corp.

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Steven Sheeran filed this action under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), after he was injured while working aboard the M/V Swan Chacabucco in the Port of Gloucester, New Jersey. His Complaint names a number of different defendants and alleges that all defendants were negligent by collectively breaching two dozen different duties.

Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and a motion for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c) by Holt Logistics Corp. [Docket Items 36 & 53.] Defendant argues that the Complaint must be dismissed because it fails to place Defendant on notice of the particular claims against it, and that sanctions are warranted because the claims against Holt Logistics are entirely groundless. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendant's motion to dismiss but will deny Defendant's motion for sanctions.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs' Complaint (Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") [Docket Item 15]) is short and straightforward.¹ On January 13, 2012, Steven Sheeran was working in the hold of the vessel M/V Swan Chacabucco ("the Swan Chacabucco" or "the Ship"), which was berthed in the Port of Gloucester, when his leg was crushed underneath a crane-controlled tray, causing permanent and severe injuries. (SAC ¶¶ 18-19; 22.) He subsequently brought this action,² which named eight business entities as defendants in the Second Amended Complaint, including Holt Logistics Corp. ("Holt Logistics").³

Before Holt Logistics Corp. filed the instant motions, the parties had agreed to dismiss three of the entities from the case. (See Mar. 11, 2015 Stip. [Docket Item 30] ¶ 4). A fourth has since been dismissed (see June 29, 2015 Stip. [Docket Item 46]), leaving only Blyth Shipholding S.A. ("Blyth Shipholding"), Inchape Shipping Services ("Inchape Shipping"), NYK Cool a/k/a Cool Carriers AB ("NYK Cool"), and Holt Logistics as the named defendants.

The Complaint does not allege the specific roles and duties of each Defendant in the action. Rather, it pleads generally that all Defendants "owned, leased, operated, managed, possessed and/or controlled" the Swan Chacabucco. (SAC ¶ 9.) It also alleges that "all Defendants owned, leased, operated, occupied, maintained, managed and/or otherwise controlled the Ship and/or the Port and specifically maintained, managed, oversaw, directed, controlled, contracted for and/or participated in the operation of stevedoring and/or longshoring services on the Ship and/or at the Port." (Id. ¶ 11.)

Holt Logistics is identified as a "business entity with a registered place of business" in Gloucester City, New Jersey. The Complaint alleges that Holt Logistics and Inchape Shipping "were responsible for training, screening, certifying, hiring and/or providing crane operators and/or other persons involved in stevedoring and/or longshoring operations at the Port." (SAC ¶ 10.)

The Complaint contains three causes of action. Count One alleges negligence. Without identifying each individual defendant's negligent conduct, Count One enumerates 24 duties allegedly violated by all Defendants, including but not limited to: violating OSHA regulations; failing to properly train employees; failing to warn of dangerous and unsafe conditions; failing to "comply with federal and state statutes, local ordinances, and all other rules, enactments, or regulations applicable"; failing to properly supervise; failing to provide adequate safety protection; failing to evaluate the work performed for potential hazards; and negligently controlling the work performed on premises. (Id. ¶ 20.)

Count Two is a personal injury claim brought against all Defendants "in their capacity as 'owner' or 'owner pro hac vice' of the aforementioned Ship" under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). (Id. ¶¶ 18-24.) Section 905(b) provides an injured longshoreman with a cause of action against a ship owner for negligence, and Plaintiffs allege that Defendants "owned, operated, managed, possessed and/or controlled the Ship which it operated in the navigable waters of the United States." (Id. ¶ 24.) Finally, Count Three is an action by Sheeran's spouse, Kelly Sheeran, for loss of consortium. (Id. ¶¶ 29-31.)⁴

III. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS WILL BE GRANTED

Holt Logistics filed this motion to dismiss, arguing that in lumping all of the defendants together and accusing them all of the same general negligent conduct, the Complaint fails to put Holt Logistics on notice of the claims against them, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(a). (Mot. to Dismiss [Docket Item 36-1] at 8-10.) Defendant also contends that Count Two must be dismissed because the Complaint does not contain any factual basis for its allegations that Holt Logistics is the "ship owner" or "owner pro hac vice" of the Swan Chacabuco for purposes of an LHWCA claim. (Id. at 10-11.)

The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to plead the liability of Holt Logistics with the requisite specificity and must be dismissed.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." A to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) may be granted if a court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to set forth fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests that make such a claim plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

Although a complaint does not require detailed factual allegations, it must contain enough well-pleaded facts to show that the claim is facially plausible. This "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff must plead enough facts to "raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Although all well-pleaded factual allegations must be accepted as true, the court may disregard any legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Id.; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). If the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not "show[n]" - "that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to separate out the liability for each defendant. Instead, it lumps Defendants together as a group and asserts general common factual allegations against all of them. Count One, for example, contains 24 different allegations of negligence that vary widely, from violation of OSHA regulations to failure to provide a safe work place to failure to properly train employees to failure to supervise to negligent hiring. Rather than specify which Defendants were responsible for which duties, the Complaint merely states that all Defendants were negligent in the enumerated ways. Without any additional guidance as to the Defendants themselves and what functions they performed, it is impossible to untangle Plaintiffs' specific theory of liability against each individual Defendant.

Courts in this district generally agree that this type of "group pleading" does not satisfy Rule 8, because it does not place Defendants on notice of the claims against each of them. See, e.g., Ingris v. Borough of Caldwell, No. 14-855, 2015 WL 3613499, at *5 (D.N.J. June 9, 2015) ("[T]o the extent Plaintiff seeks to lump several defendants together without setting forth what each particular defendant is alleged to have done, he has engaged in impermissibly vague group pleading."); Shaw v. Housing Auth. of Camden, No. 11-4291, 2012 WL 3283402, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2012) (dismissing complaint because it failed to contain allegations showing how each defendant was liable and noting that "[e]ven under the most liberal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a), a plaintiff must differentiate between defendants." (citing Pietrangelo v. NUI Corp., No. 04-3223, 2005 WL 1703200 (D.N.J. July 20, 2005))); see also H2O Plus, LLC v. Arch Personal Care Prods., L.P., 2011 WL 2038775, at *2 (D.N.J. May 22, 2011) (holding that complaint did not violate Rule 8 because while plaintiff "did lump the Arch Defendants together in the description of facts, looking to the Complaint and the attached exhibits as a whole clearly shows which claims are made against Arch PCP and which against Arch Chemicals.")

Had the Complaint described the nature of each entity Defendant and precisely what they were responsible for on the Ship, the Court might have been able to infer the theory of liability for each Defendant by comparing the specific role each played on the Swan Chacabucco with the list of duties allegedly breached.⁵ But the Complaint does not do even that. Holt Logistics, like the other named Defendants in the case, is identified only as a "business entity" with a registered place of business; the Complaint describes neither its line of work nor its function on the ship. Instead, eight named Defendants are collectively alleged to have "owned, leased, operated,...