Sheffield v. Barry
| Decision Date | 11 June 1943 |
| Citation | 153 Fla. 144,14 So.2d 417 |
| Parties | SHEFFIELD v. BARRY. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied July 22, 1943.
Baxter & Clayton, of Gainesville, for petitioner.
Jordan Lazonby & Dell and Fielding & Duncan, all of Gainesville, for respondent.
The principal question involved in this controversy is the right of the respondent, Cora Wittstock Barry, to benefit from the estate of Alexander Edward Wittstock and it is presented by petition for certiorari to review an order denying a motion to dismiss her amended bill of complaint. We will determine this matter first and then proceed to a discussion of two allied questions, namely, the propriety of orders striking a paragraph of the answer and denying a motion for better particulars.
Plaintiff in the chancery court brought her suit against the administrator of the estate and against Cora C. Wittstock, whom Alexander E Wittstock had married shortly before his death. In order fully to understand the issues, it is well to review the history of the relationship between the plaintiff on one hand and Alexander Edward Wittstock and his first wife, Sarah Wittstock, on the other, as it is detailed in the bill. In 1892, when the plaintiff was only three months of age, Sarah Wittstock requested that she and her husband be permitted to adopt the child as their own. The Wittstocks had no children and the mother was impecunious. Parenthetically, the identity of the father does not appear in the pleadings. In these circumstances, the 'mother consented to permit the adoption' and the Wittstocks 'promised and agreed with [the mother] * * * to adopt [the child] in consideration of the complete surrender by [the mother] to them.' Relying upon this promise the mother delivered the child to the Wittstocks with the understanding that she was to be their child; that they would adopt her 'as their own'; and that the mother was 'forever to surrender any and all parental rights' or control over the infant. In furtherance of this agreement the Wittstocks took the plaintiff into their home and gave her the name of Cora Wittstock. She became a member of the family and was at all times a dutiful, loving and well behaved daughter, rendering to her foster parents the same service which one would give to natural parents. When she was sixteen years of age she married in the home of the Wittstocks in the presence of guests who received written invitations from them to attend the 'marriage of their daughter Cora Mabel.' The plaintiff was 'treated and considered by her adoptive parents throughout their lives as their daughter and was by them represented to the community in which she lived as being [their] lawfully adopted daughter * * *'. Also throughout their lives she was told by them that she bore this status and she believed that the adoption had been legalized until shortly after the death of Alexander Edward Wittstock when she learned that no proceedings had ever been instituted to that end.
In 1934 the adoptive mother died and in 1942 the father died intestate.
The plaintiff expressly alleged that the contract between her natural mother and her foster parents was fully performed by the former and by her. It was her prayer that the court decree specific performance and adjudge her entitled to such rights in the estate of Alexander Edward Wittstock, deceased, as she would have gained had the adoption been perfected in pursuance of the contract made in her infancy.
As a preliminary to the discussion of the controlling law we may observe that the amended bill of complaint was sufficient in its allegations to establish a valid contract between the foster parents and the natural mother and to show full performance by the latter and the child. According to the averments the foster parents partially performed the agreement, but failed in their promise to effectuate the adoption by statutory proceedings. There were in existence in 1892 (Sections 1536 et seq., The Revised Statutes of the State of Florida) and are now (Section 72.01, et seq., Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A. § 72.01 et seq.) laws governing adoption, so that, to quote the section defining the effect of the final order of the court, an infant could be 'declared the child and heir at law of the person applying for his adoption.' This phraseology has remained unchanged for at least fifty years.
Besides the performance on the part of the natural mother and the child and the partial failure on the part of the foster parents, an important feature of the facts outlined in the bill of complaint is the intestacy of the foster father, for had he left a will this suit would be purposeless. It was the evident theory of the plaintiff that the court of chancery should invoke in her behalf the equitable maxim: equity regards that as done which ought to have been done. Frankly, at the inception of our consideration of this case we found little sympathy for the contention; however, as our study of the record and the authorities progressed we became more impressed with its soundness. The petitioners, who were defendants in the court below, have cited some authorities in refutation of the doctrine as applied to the circumstances of this case, notably St. Vincent's Infant Asylum v. Central Wisconsin Trust Co., 189 Wis. 483, 206 N.W. 921. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the mixim was not pertinent to such a situation because adoption proceedings were wholly statutory, were unknown to the common law--this status has been recognized by this court, In re: Adoption of Carol Palmer, 129 Fla. 630, 176 So. 537, and, therefore, that equitable principles did not obtain. That suit was one 'to establish an adoption' [189 Wis. 483, 206 N.W. 922] and it was decided that the court in chancery had no power to declare an adoption; no power to regard a statutory proceeding to have been taken when, in fact, it had not been.
We are convinced that this decision is at variance with other cases dealing with the same or...
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Besche v. Murphy
... ... (Cheney v. Coffey, 131 Tex. 212, 113 S.W.2d 162; ... Jones v. Guy, 135 Tex. 398, 143 S.W.2d 906, 142 ... A.L.R. 77), Florida (Sheffield v. Barry, 153 Fla ... 144, 14 So.2d 417), Montana (Gravelin v. Porier, 77 ... Mont. 260, 250 P. 823), Oklahoma (Eggstaff v ... Phelps, 99 Okl ... ...
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Estate of Riggs
...283 Ala. 257, 215 So.2d 585; Matter of Lamfrom, 90 Ariz. 363, 368 P.2d 318; Chavez v. Shea, 185 Colo. 400, 525 P.2d 1148; Sheffield v. Barry, 153 Fla. 144, 14 So.2d 417; Baker v. Henderson, 208 Ga. 698, 69 S.E.2d 278; Monahan v. Monahan, 14 Ill.2d 449, 153 N.E.2d 1; Matter of Van Cleave, 61......
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Adoption of A Child by N.E.Y., Matter of
...parent acted in reliance, and the child was treated as the child of the decedent, but there is no legal adoption. Sheffield v. Barry, 153 Fla. 144, 14 So.2d, 417 (1943). This doctrine is applied in an intestate estate to give effect to the intent of the decedent to adopt and provide for the......
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...in order to allow recovery of certain social security benefits. The State, on the other hand, invokes cases such as Sheffield v. Barry, 153 Fla. 144, 14 So.2d 417 (1943), and Collins v. Griffin, 93 Ga.App. 282, 91 S.E.2d 369 (1956), which tend to limit the doctrine to intestacy or, at the m......
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Virtual adoption: contractual estoppel of parental rights and responsibilities.
...importance. Specific Enforcement in Probate Florida's leading case accepting the doctrine of virtual adoption is Sheffield v. Barry, 14 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1943). In Sheffield, the plaintiff, Cora Wittstock Barry's biological mother, executed an adoption contract with Mrs. Wittstock when Cora ......