Sheffield v. Franklin
| Decision Date | 13 June 1907 |
| Citation | 44 So. 373,151 Ala. 492 |
| Parties | SHEFFIELD ET AL. v. FRANKLIN. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Clair County; John Pelham, Judge.
Ejectment by Elizah Sheffield and others against R. B. Franklin. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
Inzer & Montgomery, for appellants.
Goodhue & Blackwood, for appellee.
This is a statutory action of ejectment by appellants against appellee. The affirmative charge was given for the defendant appellee. The plaintiffs asserted their right to a recovery to be as heirs at law of Edna Franklin, deceased, and the defendant maintained his contention as grantee of John Franklin, not a natural heir at law of intestate, but who was, it is alleged, adopted by the said Edna in 1896; he being then 26 years of age.
The pivotal question in the case is: Was the adoption of the grantor of defendant by the intestate a valid act to effect the inheritance by John Franklin of the land and estate of Edna Franklin, deceased? The decision of the question depends upon the construction of section 2367 of the Code of 1886, in force at the time the adoption was undertaken. Appellants insist that the adoption was abortive, because the subject, John Franklin, was not an infant, in legal parlance, but an adult, at that time. The appellee contends that the section under consideration uses the word "child" as a term of relation, and not as indicative of age.
The section to be construed relates to a subject purely statutory, unknown to the common law--that of adoption of children; and to render a proper construction of the statute an understanding of the legal meaning and effect of such adoption will greatly aid. In the case of Russell v. Russell, 84 Ala. 51, 3 So. 900, it is said: (Italics supplied.) Reading the statute under the influence of these approved definitions, to draw its purpose in enactment, it necessarily results that the act of adoption fixes a status, to accomplish which minority is not essential, unless so limited by the terms thereof. In short, it is apparent that the intent of the section at hand was to provide a means "by which a person appoints as his heir the child of another" (Abney v. De Loach, 84 Ala. 398, 4 So. 757); and the result of the act to that end erected a status from which the rights of an inheritance naturally flow. Thus far there can be no dispute.
But here the controverted question arises: Do the terms of the statute limit the act to a person who is a child at the time of the attempted adoption? The word "child" has two generally understood meanings--one, that of relationship; and the other, minority. The inquiry here narrows to this: Does the word, as used in the statute, have reference to the former as a relational status, or to the age of the subject of the adoption? If the latter meaning be attributed to the word, it is a consequence that some line of demarcation between childhood and youth, two periods in life, must be drawn. Youth is specified by Webster to be the "part of life that succeeds childhood." The same author defines childhood, the state of being a child, as "the condition or time from infancy to puberty." So we may here say that the period of 21 years, fixed by law as the time when full legal powers and responsibilities attach, has no bearing in this instance. And, further, if the word is taken to declare the period of life of the subject of the adoption and to prohibit an adoption of one not within that period at the time thereof, it is readily conceivable that the greatest uncertainty would attend the very serious relation, and its accompanying rights and privileges, attempted to be created by the act of adoption. The issue would often be, especially where considerable property...
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Adoption of Swanson, In re
...although proper in that case, had no effect on the validity of the adoption. Id. at 519. A similar result obtained in Sheffield v. Franklin, 151 Ala. 492, 44 So. 373 (1907). The court concluded that the law placed no limit on the age of the person to be adopted even if it altered inheritanc......
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Doby v. Carroll
...estate of the declarant, and of changing its name to the one stated in the declaration; * * *.' However, in Sheffield v. Franklin, 151 Ala. 492, 44 So. 373, 12 L.R.A., N.S., 884, the question was squarely presented to this court and four Justices disagreed with the dicta in Abney and held t......
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State v. Flath
...are not children." Wilman v. State, 63 Tex. Cr. Rep. 623. "Childhood is the condition or time from infancy to puberty." Sheffield v. Franklin, 151 Ala. 492, 44 So. 373; Blackburn v. State, 22 Ohio St. 102; 11 C.J. see note. The term "child" means one of tender years, not a minor or under th......
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State v. Flath
...was not determined by puberty but was a matter of age. Appellant cites the case of Sheffield v. Franklin, 151 Ala. 492, 44 So. 373, 374, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 884, 125 Am. St. Rep. 37, 15 Ann. Cas. 90. This case, however, was a matter of adoption, and it was held there that the word “child” w......