Adoption of Swanson, In re

• Decision Date: 20 April 1993
• Citation: 623 A.2d 1095
• Parties: In re The ADOPTION OF James A. SWANSON, an adult. . Submitted:
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 1095

623 A.2d 1095

In re The ADOPTION OF James A. SWANSON, an adult.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: April 20, 1993.

Decided: April 27, 1993.

On appeal from the Family Court. REVERSED.

Robert E. Schlusser (argued), Joanna Reiver, Charles J. Veith, Schlusser, Reiver, Hughes & Sisk, Wilmington, for appellant.

Brenda L. Sammons (argued), Lisa M. Fitzgerald, Peter S. Feliceangeli, Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, for the State.

Before MOORE, WALSH and HOLLAND, JJ.

MOORE, Justice.

Richard Sorrels appeals the denial of his petition in the Family Court to adopt James A. Swanson, ¹ a consenting adult. ² We confront an issue of first impression: Is a pre-existing parent-child relationship required under our adult adoption statutes, 13 Del.C. §§ 951-56, in order for one adult to adopt another? Although the statutes do not contain that requirement, the Family Court implied such a condition in our law, and denied the adoption petition. Based on principles of statutory construction, and in the absence of any countervailing public policy, we conclude that it was an error of law to have appended the foregoing condition to an adult adoption. Accordingly, we reverse.

I

When Richard Sorrels sought to adopt James Swanson, his companion of 17 years, they were, respectively, 66 and 51 years of age. The adoption had two purposes--to formalize the close emotional relationship that had existed between them for many years and to facilitate their estate planning. Apparently, they sought to prevent collateral claims on their respective estates from remote family members, and to obtain the reduced inheritance tax rate which natural and adopted children enjoy under Delaware law. Admittedly, there was no pre-existing parent-child relationship between them, and on that basis the Family Court denied the petition.

II

Adult adoptions in Delaware are governed by our Domestic Relations Law, 13 Del.C. §§ 951 through 956. Section 953 provides that "[i]f the petition complies with the requirements of §§ 951 and 952 of this title, and if the person or persons to be adopted appear in court and consent to the adoption, the Family Court may render a decree ordering the issuance of a certificate of adoption to the petitioner." ³ 13 Del.C. § 953 (emphasis added). Although the statute mentions no other requirements beyond those listed in Sections 951-952, the Family Court sua sponte concluded that approval of an adult adoption was contingent upon a pre-existing family relationship:

Indisputably, the legislature, by providing for adoption of minors, intended to allow for the creation and formalization of parent-child relationships between nonrelated adults and children. It is reasonable to infer that the legislature, by providing for adult adoptions, sought to extend this principle to those situations where no adoption occurred before the age of majority or where the parent-child relationship developed during adulthood. It is reasonable to infer that the legislature, by providing for adult adoptions, intended to allow for the formalization of the parent-child relationship where there is an existing parent-child relationship between nonrelated individuals.... It is simply illogical that the legislature enacted the adult adoption statute to make familial inheritance rights available to all. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the legislature intended to extend adoption to all other kinds of relationships, including friendships and sexual relationships. Petitioner's interpretation of the statute would lead to these results.

In re the Adoption of [James A. Swanson], Del.Fam.Ct., No. 91-09-02-A, Robinson, J., slip op. at 5, 1992 WL 361416 (October 5, 1992). Thus, the Family Court implied a new requirement into the adult adoption process. As a result, we are faced with a simple question of statutory construction--did the Family Court err as a matter of law in formulating or applying legal principles when it interpreted Section 953 to require a preexisting parent-child relationship? Hercules, Inc. v. Leu Trust and Banking, Del.Supr., 611 A.2d 476, 480 (1992).

We begin with the basic rule of statutory construction that requires a court to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd., Del.Supr., 492 A.2d 1242, 1246 (1985). If the statute as a whole is unambiguous and there is no reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the words used, the court's role is limited to an application of the literal meaning of those words. Id. at 1244. However, where, as here, the Court is faced with a novel question of statutory construction, it must seek to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the General Assembly as expressed by the statute itself. Kofron v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., Del.Supr., 441 A.2d 226, 230 (1982); Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., Del.Supr., 449 A.2d 232, 238 (1982).

There is no reference in Section 953 to any condition of a pre-existing parent-child relationship. Instead, the statute only compels a person seeking an adult adoption to sign and file a petition containing certain basic personal data. 13 Del.C. § 952. If, after having done so, the adoptee appears in court and consents to the adoption, the Family Court may grant the petition for adoption. 13 Del.C. § 953. ⁴

When statutory language is clear, unambiguous, and consistent with other provisions of the same legislation, the court must give effect to its intent. Seth v. State, Del.Supr., 592 A.2d 436, 440 (1991). Moreover, 13 Del.C. § 953, the relevant adult adoption statute, has existed in equivalent form since 1915, without any material change by the General Assembly. That is indicative of legislative satisfaction with the provisions of the statute. Watson v. Burgan, Del.Supr., 610 A.2d 1364, 1368 (1992).

Regardless of one's views as to the wisdom of the statute, our role as judges is limited to applying the statute objectively and not revising it. In re Panousseris' Will, 52 Del. 21, 151 A.2d 518, 523 (1959). A court may not engraft upon a statute language which has been clearly excluded therefrom. Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 238. Thus, where, as here, provisions are expressly included in one part of a statute, but omitted from another, it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature was aware of the omission and intended it. Id. As a result, the omission from the adult adoption procedure for investigation and supervision of prospective placements, found in the requirements for adopting minors, persuades us that it was not the result of an accident. If anything, it is the best evidence of a legislative policy against imposing unnecessary conditions upon the adult adoption process.

III

Many jurisdictions limit inquiry into the motives or purposes of an adult adoption. However, most recognize that adult adoptions for the purpose of creating inheritance rights are valid. K.M. Potraker, Annotation, Adoption of Adult, 21 A.L.R.3d 1012, 1029-1030 (1968). In one of the earliest cases, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld an adoption of three adults, aged 43, 39 and 25 respectively, by a 70 year old person who intended the adoption to operate in lieu of a will. Collamore v. Learned, Mass.Supr., 171 Mass. 99, 50 N.E. 518 (1898). The court ruled that motive, although proper in that case, had no effect on the validity of the adoption. Id. at 519.

A similar result obtained in Sheffield v. Franklin, 151 Ala. 492, 44 So. 373 (1907). The court concluded that the law placed no limit on the age of the person to be adopted even if it altered inheritance rights. Likewise, in Ex parte Libertini, 244 Md. 542, 224 A.2d 443 (1966), the Maryland Court of Appeals permitted the adoption of an unmarried thirty-five year old woman by an unmarried fifty-six year old woman, initiated for reasons of inheritance and maternal feelings. The court rejected outright the lower court's conclusion that granting the adoption would pervert the entire adoptive process. Libertini, 224 A.2d at 444. The court noted that an adoption for the purpose of inheritance does not change the social or domestic relationship of the parties. Rather, its purpose and effect bestows on the adoptee the right of a natural heir to inherit property. Id. at 444. ⁵ This motive was not improper, the court concluded, and therefore had no bearing on a determination of the adoption's propriety. Id.

Cases upholding adoptions for the purpose of improving the adoptee's inheritance rights continue to grow. In Berston v. Minnesota Dept. of Public Welfare, 296 Minn. 24, 206 N.W.2d 28 (1973), the trial court denied the adoption of an adult woman by her natural son on the public policy ground that the purpose of the adoption--to make the petitioner's mother his heir in order to bring her into the terms of a trust established by the petitioner's father after he divorced the mother--would thwart the intent of the settlor of the trust. Id., 206 N.W.2d at 29. The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the broad language of the adult adoption statute unequivocally foreclosed any limiting construction. ⁶ Thus, considerations of public policy were matters for reappraisal by legislative amendment. Id. at 30 (emphasis added). See also Harper v. Martin, Ky.App., 552 S.W.2d 690 (1977) (approving of the adoption of a forty-seven year old male by a terminally ill petitioner for the express purpose of making him the heir at law of a third person); Matter of Fortney's Estate, 5 Kan.App.2d 14, 611 P.2d 599, 604-05 (1980) (upholding an adult adoption originally effectuated for purposes of inheritance); but see Matter of Griswold's Estate, 140 N.J.Super. 35, 354 A.2d 717 (1976) (ruling that an adoption to make an adoptee a beneficiary of a trust was an abuse of the adoption process). If anything, Griswold's Estate is contrary to well established Delaware law. See Haskell v. Wilmington Trust Co., Del.Supr., 304 A.2d 53, 54-5 (1973); Riggs Nat. Bank v. Zimmer, Del.Ch., 304 A.2d 69, 74, aff'd sub...