Sheffield v. Futch

• Decision Date: 20 February 2020
• Docket Number: A19A1686,A19A1685,A19A1687
• Citation: 839 S.E.2d 294,354 Ga.App. 661
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Parties: SHEFFIELD v. FUTCH et al.; Futch et al. v. Sheffield; Futch et al. v. Sheffield.

354 Ga.App. 661

839 S.E.2d 294

SHEFFIELD

v.FUTCH et al.;

Futch et al.

v.Sheffield;

Futch et al.

v.Sheffield.

A19A1685

A19A1686

A19A1687

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

February 20, 2020

Certoriari Denied October 5, 2020

Jon Alexander Levis, Swainsboro, for Appellant in A19A1685.

Charles B. Marsh, Myrece Rebecca Johnson,Sara Alexandre Alexandre, Atlanta, for Appellee in A19A1685.

Charles B. Marsh, Myrece Rebecca Johnson, Sara Alexandre Alexandre, Atlanta, for Appellant in A19A1686, A19A1687.

Jon Alexander Levis, Swainsboro, for Appellee in A19A1686, A19A1687.

McMillian, Presiding Judge.

In December 2014, Kim Sheffield filed suit against Covered Wagon Trailers, LLC ("Covered Wagon"), Gerald Pryor, and Jim Futch (collectively "the Defendants"), asserting multiple claims after his arrest and incarceration arising from the Defendants’ efforts to recoup a business debt. The Defendants moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted in part and denied in part. In Case No. A19A1685, Sheffield appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on his claim for false arrest. In Case Nos. A19A1686 and A19A1687, the Defendants cross-appeal the trial court's denial of summary judgment on Sheffield's claims for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and punitive damages.¹ For the reasons that follow, we find no error and affirm in all respects.

We begin by noting that summary judgment is proper

if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). Thus, "the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact so that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Citations and punctuation omitted.)

Cowart v. Widener , 287 Ga. 622, 623 (1) (a), 697 S.E.2d 779 (2010). "A defendant may do this by either presenting evidence negating an essential element of the plaintiff's claims or establishing from the record an absence of evidence to support such claims." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. In our de novo review of the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, "we must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Johnson St. Properties, LLC v. Clure , 302 Ga. 51, 52 (1), 805 S.E.2d 60 (2017).

With these principles in mind, the record shows that Sheffield was the owner of Xtra Tuff Trailers, LLC ("Xtra Tuff"), a company that sold pull-behind trailers.² In 2010, Pryor formed Covered Wagon and began selling both stock and custom enclosed trailers to Xtra Tuff on an open account.³ Although the parties did not have a written sales agreement, they developed a course of business in which Xtra Tuff wrote a check to Covered Wagon each time it took possession of a trailer and included the VIN for that specific trailer on the memo line. Covered Wagon would deposit the check when payment came due in 90 days. Covered Wagon required cash on delivery for its other clients, but allowed this arrangement to accommodate Xtra Tuff, its largest client. When payment was due on a particular trailer, Covered Wagon would typically notify Xtra Tuff before it deposited the corresponding check.

In April 2011, Futch became the general manager of Covered Wagon and the payment terms were eventually changed from 90 days to 30 days, but Covered Wagon continued to coordinate with Xtra Tuff before depositing the checks it held. A Covered Wagon employee maintained a chart of the trailers sold to Xtra Tuff, along with the payment date for each, and sent the updated chart to Xtra Tuff several times each week. In September 2011, Xtra Tuff became delinquent on its account in excess of $100,000. Because it was dissatisfied with Covered Wagon, Xtra Tuff paid its account in full and ceased its business relationship with Covered Wagon. Some time later, Covered Wagon contacted Xtra Tuff, and the parties agreed to resume their prior business arrangement, again with no written contract. Covered Wagon continued to maintain a chart of all trailers sold with a 30-day payment term and to coordinate with Xtra Tuff when particular checks would be deposited.⁴

In August 2012, Xtra Tuff again became delinquent on its account and asked Covered Wagon to temporarily hold the checks longer than 30 days due to a cash flow problem. By October 2012, Xtra Tuff owed $93,000 and was unable to pay the account in full. The parties continued to communicate by email regarding payment, with Xtra Tuff maintaining that it was "working on a solution." On October 25, 2012, Futch and other Covered Wagon employees drove to Xtra Tuff and, after finding it closed, entered the property through a hole in the fence and took possession of six or seven trailers that Covered Wagon had sold to Xtra Tuff.⁵ That same day, without coordinating with Xtra Tuff and knowing that there were insufficient funds in Xtra Tuff's account, Covered Wagon deposited 55 checks in its possession, all of which were returned due to insufficient funds.⁶ Sixteen checks represented trailers that had been delivered less than 30 days prior, with four additional checks exactly 30 days old. After the checks were returned, Pryor instructed Futch to go to a magistrate judge to see how they could get paid.

Futch first went to the Dodge County Magistrate Court and told someone there that Covered Wagon had "checks that were worthless" and asked what he could do. That person directed Futch to the Ben Hill County Magistrate Court. Futch then spoke to the assistant district attorney in Ben Hill County, but did not learn anything "of any substance." Futch told Pryor of his lack of progress, and they "just decided to go on over to the magistrate's office and see what [they] need to do to get paid." Futch obtained a 10-day "bad check" form letter and purportedly mailed a version to Sheffield on November 1, 2012 via certified mail.⁷

On November 25, Futch met with the magistrate judge in Ben Hill County, presented the returned checks, and was told to return the following day. Futch does not recall whether he informed the judge that Covered Wagon provided invoices to Xtra Tuff for the purchase of the trailers on an open account or that the payment terms were 30 days. When he returned the next day, he received 55 warrants consisting of 37 felony and 18 misdemeanor deposit account fraud charges. Futch read only one of the warrants before signing all 55 warrants so that Covered Wagon would "get paid." He did not ask the magistrate judge to explain any of the language in the warrant, but he understood that the warrants would be sent to law enforcement officials.

On November 29, Sheffield was arrested and remained in custody for 72 days.⁸ On behalf of Covered Wagon, Futch submitted a Georgia crime victim impact statement claiming that Sheffield stole 55 trailers. Pryor, acting on behalf of Covered Wagon, also instituted a civil suit against Xtra Tuff in December 2012, seeking to recover on the "open account."⁹ In December 2013, the district attorney's office dismissed all of the warrants issued against Sheffield. Sheffield filed the underlying suit in June 2014 against Covered Wagon, Futch, and Pryor, asserting claims of fraud, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and punitive damages.¹⁰ The Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted their motion only as to Sheffield's claims for fraud and false arrest. These appeals followed.

Case No. A19A1685

1. In his sole enumeration of error, Sheffield asserts that the trial court erred in

granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on his claim for false arrest.¹¹ In its order, the trial court found that Sheffield's claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution are mutually exclusive and reasoned that because Sheffield was at some point brought before a judge after being arrested, he cannot, as a matter of law, also bring a claim for false arrest.

To resolve the question of whether Sheffield may proceed with his claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution, we must first distinguish these types of claims. Georgia law recognizes

three different related torts in this area, although the distinctions among the three are not always clear in our case law: (1) false imprisonment, which is unlawful detention without judicial process, or without the involvement of a judge at any point; (2) false or malicious arrest, which is detention under process of law; and (3) malicious prosecution, which is detention with judicial process followed by prosecution.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) McClendon v. Harper , 349 Ga. App. 581, 585 (1), 826 S.E.2d 412 (2019). "The efficacy of each depends upon the particular facts of a situation and who is being sued. Only one, if any, will lie as to a particular defendant in particular circumstances." Reese v. Clayton County , 185 Ga. App. 207, 207, 363 S.E.2d 618 (1987).

OCGA § 51-7-1 defines false arrest as "[a]n arrest under process of law, without probable cause, when made maliciously[.]" An arrest made pursuant to a warrant is an arrest "under process of law." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP , 330 Ga. App. 340, 343 (1), 765 S.E.2d 518 (2014). Thus, "[t]he key distinction between false arrest and false imprisonment is whether the person was detained using a warrant or not." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.

Georgia law further distinguishes between false arrest and malicious prosecution.¹² "If after the arrest the warrant is dismissed or not followed up, the remedy is for [false] arrest. But if the action is carried on to a prosecution, an action for malicious prosecution is the exclusive remedy, and an action for [false] arrest will not lie." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Garner v....