Sheffield v. Mullin
| Decision Date | 02 September 1881 |
| Parties | Sumner A. Sheffield v. John Mullin, Administrator |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the district court for Rice county, Buckham, J., presiding, denying a motion to recommit the cause to the referee by whom it had been tried, for a rehearing of the testimony of M. B. Sheffield, one of the plaintiff's witnesses, and a correction of the report of the referee in the matter of the amount received by M. B Sheffield as salary. The motion was made after judgment had been entered, and had been affirmed on appeal by this court and the cause remitted to the district court. The nature of the suit and the questions made on the referee's report on the appeal from the judgment appear in the report of that appeal. 27 Minn. 374.
Order affirmed.
Gordon E. Cole, for appellant.
John H Case, for respondent.
The plaintiff appeals from an order denying an application for the re-examination of one item in an accounting of a partnership business, on the ground of a mistake by a witness called by the plaintiff in giving his testimony. The cause was tried before a referee, who took the account and made his report upon all the issues, and judgment was entered thereon on the 20th day of September, 1880. A statement of the evidence given on the trial with respect to the above-mentioned item having been made, settled, and annexed to the judgment-roll, an appeal was taken by the plaintiff to this court from so much of the judgment as charged him with this item, and the judgment was affirmed on such appeal. This application was made, upon affidavits, in January, 1881, after such affirmance, and was denied by the court below, on the ground of want of authority in the court to grant a reinvestigation, or new trial, after the judgment had been entered and affirmed by this court on appeal.
So far as relates to the mode in which relief was sought, viz., by motion, we think the practice adopted by the plaintiff was correct. A motion for a new trial, on the ground of the mistake of a witness in giving his testimony, though not common and not to be encouraged, is allowed in a clear case, free from suspicion and negligence, in the discretion of the court, and is governed in most respects by the same rules which are applied to motions for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence. Indeed, as the result is the introduction into the case of new or different evidence, the ground of the relief may be said, with some propriety, to be newly-discovered evidence. As it seems to be considered that the question of practice raised is not entirely settled by the decisions of this court, we shall be at liberty to adopt the rule which shall appear to be most in accordance with the provisions and spirit of the Code of Practice, and most convenient and useful. By the English chancery practice, relief on the ground of newly-discovered evidence or newly-discovered matter was obtained, after the decree was signed and enrolled, by bill of review; after decree, but before it was signed and enrolled, by supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review; and after publication passed, but before the hearing, by supplemental bill. Relief by bill of review on the ground of newly-discovered evidence was obtainable after the decree had been affirmed on appeal. Story's Eq. Pl. § 418; Singleton v. Singleton, 47 Ky. 340, 8 B. Mon. 340, 367.
These methods of relief in chancery cases, though well adapted to promote correct results, were cumbrous and onerous, and relief on similar grounds, after a judgment at law, was obtained only by methods similarly burdensome. The policy of the Code of Practice is to simplify the proceedings through which the ends of justice may be reached, and the remedy by motion in the original suit has been, within certain limits, substituted for the old methods.
Under Gen. St. 1878, c. 66, § 125, relief on various grounds against judgments may be had within one year after notice thereof, by motion, which, under the old practice, would only have been obtainable by an original or ancillary proceeding; and, although an application for a new trial for causes discovered after the entry of the judgment is not specifically provided for, it is sufficiently embraced in the general language of the section; and we think that the spirit and analogies of the Code of Practice will be more nearly observed, and the ends of justice more readily and conveniently attained, by allowing relief of the character here sought to be obtained, by motion, within the limitation of time fixed in the section above cited. The fact that the judgment has been affirmed on appeal is not an obstacle to the granting of the relief, if the judgment be entered in the district court, and is important only as it may bear in the particular case upon the question of diligence. The mistake of the witness, or new matter, may not have been discovered until after such affirmance. These views will, we think, find support in the following cases: Tucker v. White, 27 How. Pr. 97; S. C. 28 How. Pr. 78; Blydenburg v. Johnson, 9 Abb. Pr. (N.S.) 459; Tracey v. Altmyer, 46 N.Y. 598; Spanagel v. Dellinger, 38 Cal. 278; Johnston v. Paul, 23 Minn. 46.
But notwithstanding the mode of relief sought was the proper one, we are forced to the conclusion that, under the circumstances disclosed by the affidavits with respect to the matter of diligence, the granting of the application at this stage of the case...
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