Sheffield v. Reece
| Decision Date | 13 January 1947 |
| Docket Number | 36212. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
| Parties | SHEFFIELD v. REECE, Sheriff. |
C. R. Bolton, of Tupelo, and J. H. Brown, of Oxford, for appellant.
Fred B. Smith, of Ripley, and A. T. Cleveland, of Fulton, for appellee.
This is a suit against a sheriff for the alleged false imprisonment of the plaintiff.
Recovery was sought at the trial under four different counts of the declaration, but the appeal is presented here solely upon the refusal of the court to grant seven instructions requested on behalf of the plaintiff under the theory of the third count of the declaration, and also upon an alleged error in the granting of an instruction on behalf of the defendant in regard thereto. These instructions pertain to the question of whether or not the sheriff should have permitted the plaintiff to furnish a bail bond, to be approved by the said officer, instead of being held as a prisoner in jail after an arrest made by the sheriff without a warrant for a misdemeanor committed in his presence.
The accused was arrested on Saturday afternoon, between 3 and 4 o'clock, for being drunk in a public place in the presence of two or more persons. He remained drunk for several hours, and of course he should not have been released while drunk, since it would likely have become the duty of the sheriff to re-arrest him before he would leave town. There is some conflict in the evidence as to whether or not the sheriff could have safely released him on bond during the early part of the night, and allowed him to be carried home by his father and other sureties who then offered to sign the bond.
It is conceded, however, that on Sunday morning the accused had entirely regained his sobriety, and he was, of course entitled to be released on bail if the sheriff was authorized by law to accept the good and sufficient bond then tendered for his release. His offer to make the bond on Sunday morning was rejected by the deputy, in the absence of the sheriff under an alleged rule of the sheriff's office, to the effect that any one who was placed in jail on Saturday afternoon or night for a bailable offence should be detained without bail until Monday morning, or until such time as he could be taken before the mayor or the proper justice of the peace for an examination into his case. At any rate, the accused was detained in jail until Monday morning, and it was a question of fact for the jury, if indeed it made any difference, as to whether or not he was thus detained because of the said rule of the sheriff, or whether he was detained on the theory that the sheriff was without authority to fix and approve the bail bond when tendered him, where the arrest had been made without a warrant for an offence committed in the presence of such officer.
Section 2473, Code 1942, provides that, 'Every person making an arrest shall take the offender before the proper officer without unnecessary delay for examination of his case,' and it is conceded that this statute contemplates that an accused shall be taken without unnecessary delay before such officer for a trial of his case. And, of course, neither the mayor of the town of Fulton, where he was arrested, nor the justice of the peace of the district in which the offence was committed, was required to hold court to hear the merits of a criminal prosecution on Sunday.
It will be noted that this statute is not merely supplemental to section 2470, Code of 1942, which authorizes an officer or private person to arrest without warrant for an indictable offense committed in his presence, but the said section 2473 quoted in the next preceding paragraph hereof, is a general statute as to what shall be done when arrests are made, and the words, 'without warrant' are omitted therefrom.
We are of the opinion that the requirement that an offender shall be taken before the proper officer without unnecessary delay for examination of his case, is in furtherance of the legislative purpose to insure 'A speedy and public trial,' as guaranteed by section 26, Constitution of 1890, and that the further intent and purpose of the said section 2473 is to prevent an arresting officer or private person from detaining a person for an unreasonable length of time, whether arrested with or without a warrant, for any indictable offense committed in his presence, or where the arrest is made on probable cause or suspicion that the accused has committed a felony, without affording him an opportunity to have a hearing on the merits of the accusation against him. One thus arrested may, in some instances, be unable to execute a bail bond, but he is nevertheless entitled, in such event, to have his case examined into without unnecessary delay.
However, the precise question here involved is primarily whether or not a sheriff who arrests a person without a warrant for a bailable offense committed in his presence has any statutory authority, either express or implied, for accepting a sufficient bail bond for his appearance at the proper time and place, for a hearing of his case, since it is conceded that under the decision in Jacquemine v. State, 48 Miss. 280, such officer had no authority at common law to fix and approve bail bonds.
The question here involved has not been dealt with in any previous decision of this Court throughout the entire history of our criminal jurisdiction, and this is conceded to be true in the briefs of counsel.
However, section 29, Constitution of 1890, expressly provides, among other things, that, 'All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or presumption great.'
Section 167, Constitution of 1890, provides that, 'All civil officers shall be conservators of the peace, and shall be, by law, vested with ample power as such.' A sheriff of a county is a civil officer. It is true that the words, 'Any conservator of the peace,' found in section 2569, Code of 1942, are limited to the officials designated as conservators of the peace in section 2568 thereof, to wit, judges of the Supreme, Circuit and Chancery Courts, and justices of the peace, as held in the case of Martin v. State, 190 Miss. 32, 199 So. 98, 101. The reason for thus limiting the words 'Any conservator of the peace,' as aforesaid, is due to the fact that under the said section 2569, an examination is to be held by the conservator of the peace in the cases referred to therein, to determine whether or not the particular case wherein he has issued a warrant, is bailable, that is to say, a judicial hearing. Manifestly, a sheriff is, therefore, not a conservator of the peace within the purview of this statute, although as a civil officer he is declared to be one in the general sense by section 167, Constitution of 1890.
Section 2492, Code 1942, provides that: 'All justices of the peace and all other conservators of the peace are authorized whenever a person is brought before them charged with an offense not capital, for which bail is allowed by law, to take the recognizance or bond of such person, with sufficient sureties, in such penalty as the justice or conservator of the place may require, for his appearance before such justice or conservator for an examination of his case at some future day.' This s...
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Anderson v. Nosser
...Dunning v. State, 1965, 251 Miss. 766, 171 So.2d 315, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 993, 87 S.Ct. 1310, 18 L.Ed.2d 339; Sheffield v. Reece, 1947, 201 Miss. 133, 28 So.2d 745; Anderson v. Beck, 1886, 64 Miss. 113, 8 So. 167. By statute "every person making an arrest shall take the offender before t......
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Moya v. Garcia
...been detained too long without an opportunity for bail. Id . In interpreting Mississippi law, the court pointed to Sheffield v. Reece , 201 Miss. 133, 28 So.2d 745, 748 (1947), which had required sheriffs to prevent detention " ‘for an unreasonable length of time.’ " Jauch , 874 F.3d at 437......
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Ravenstein v. Ravenstein
...so that “an unwise purpose will not be imputed to the legislature when a reasonable construction is possible.” Sheffield v. Reece, 201 Miss. 133, 28 So.2d 745, 749 (1947). To avoid an unconstitutional and discriminatory result, this Court should interpret Sections 93–5–23 and 93–11–65(8) as......
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Moya v. Garcia
...been detained too long without an opportunity for bail. Id . In interpreting Mississippi law, the court pointed to Sheffield v. Reece , 201 Miss. 133, 28 So.2d 745, 748 (1947), which had required sheriffs to prevent detention " 'for an unreasonable length of time.' " Jauch , 874 F.3d at 437......