Sheffield v. State
Decision Date | 25 August 2006 |
Docket Number | No. CR-05-1234.,CR-05-1234. |
Citation | 959 So.2d 692 |
Parties | Tommy Ray SHEFFIELD v. STATE of Alabama. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Tommy Ray Sheffield, pro se.
Troy King, atty. gen., and Nancy M. Kirby, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
Tommy Ray Sheffield appeals from the circuit court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P., in which he attacked his July 1992 guilty-plea conviction for first-degree theft and his resulting sentence as an habitual felony offender to life imprisonment. No direct appeal was taken from this conviction.
On December 12, 2005, Sheffield filed the instant Rule 32 petition. He alleged in his petition that the trial court was without jurisdiction to render judgment or to impose sentence because, he said, (1) his conviction was "not based upon an information or an indictment and was time-barred . . . because the statute of limitation had [expired]"; (2) "the indictment was multiplicitous"; and (3) "the guilty plea on one count acted as an acquittal on the other counts." Without requiring an answer from the State, the trial court denied Sheffield's petition on February 24, 2006. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Sheffield reasserts the claims presented in his petition to the trial court.
Sheffield first contends that the trial court was without jurisdiction to render judgment or to impose sentence because, he said, his conviction was "not based upon an information or an indictment" and, further that he could not be convicted of first-degree theft because the statutory limitations period for that offense had expired.
The record indicates that in June 1988, an Etowah County grand jury returned a three-count indictment against Sheffield. Count one charged him with third-degree burglary, count two charged him with first-degree theft, and count three charged him with first-degree receiving and/or concealing stolen property. All three offenses arose out of the same course of conduct against Gregory Dale Lumpkin.
On December 1, 1988, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Sheffield pleaded guilty to third-degree burglary and was sentenced, pursuant to the Habitual Felony Offender Act, to 20 years' imprisonment. Before accepting Sheffield's guilty plea, the court went over the terms of the plea agreement with Sheffield.1 Pursuant to the plea agreement, the receiving-stolen-property charge was dismissed; however, the theft charge was withdrawn and filed, with the understanding that that charge would be reinstated if Sheffield "got into trouble" at any point during his imprisonment and parole for the burglary conviction. The court further advised Sheffield that because he already had more than three prior felony convictions, the minimum sentence for his theft conviction would be life imprisonment. Sheffield indicated that he understood the terms of his plea agreement. The trial court accepted Sheffield's guilty plea and sentenced him accordingly.
Sheffield served a portion of his 20-year sentence and was paroled. In 1992, while on parole, Sheffield was charged with possession of a controlled substance, thereby triggering the reinstatement of the 1988 charge for first-degree theft. On July 8, 1992, Sheffield pleaded guilty to first-degree theft and was sentenced to life imprisonment, with that sentence to run concurrently with the 20-year sentence imposed in 1988. (C. 36-49.) As a part of his plea agreement, Sheffield waived his right to appeal his theft conviction.
Sheffield's claim that his conviction and sentence were not based upon an information or an indictment is without merit. Indeed, our examination of the record indicates that his conviction and sentence were based upon the June 1988 indictment. Likewise, Sheffield's claim that his conviction and sentence were time-barred because more than three years had passed after the matter was withdrawn and filed is without merit. As this Court has previously stated:
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