Sheffield v. United States

• Decision Date: 12 March 2015
• Docket Number: 12–CO–40.,11–CF–1284,11–CF–1644,Nos. 11–CF–1145,s. 11–CF–1145
• Citation: 111 A.3d 611
• Parties: Tawanda SHEFFIELD, Steven D. Lewis, and Allen Butler, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

111 A.3d 611

Tawanda SHEFFIELD, Steven D. Lewis, and Allen Butler, Appellants

v.UNITED STATES, Appellee.

Nos. 11–CF–1145

11–CF–1284

11–CF–1644

12–CO–40.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued June 5, 2014.

Decided March 12, 2015.

Michael L. Spekter, Washington, DC, for appellant Tawanda Sheffield.

Sydney J. Hoffmann, for appellant Steven D. Lewis.

Thomas T. Heslep, Washington, DC, for appellant Allen Butler.

David P. Saybolt, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Ronald C. Machen Jr., United States Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Elizabeth H. Danello, and Kevin Flynn, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before WASHINGTON, Chief Judge, THOMPSON, Associate Judge, and NEBEKER, Senior Judge.

Opinion

NEBEKER, Senior Judge:

In this consolidated appeal, appellants Allen Butler and Steven D. Lewis appeal from their convictions for the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder while armed (D.C.Code § 22–2403, –4502 ) and various accompanying weapon convictions. Appellant Tawanda Sheffield also appeals her convictions for two counts of obstruction of justice (D.C.Code § 22–722(a)(6) ) and one count of perjury (D.C.Code § 22–2402(a)(1) ). Appellants raise ten issues on appeal, asserting violations of their Fourth Amendment rights, Miranda rights, and confrontation rights, and also asserting, among other claims, Brady violations, improper rebuttal testimony, a prejudicial jury demonstration, and insufficient evidence to support the various convictions. We have limited our consideration to the stronger issues presented, and any arguments not directly addressed are deemed to not warrant such treatment, especially not reversal of any convictions on this record on appeal. For the reasons stated below, we affirm in part and remand for vacatur of one of Sheffield's obstruction of justice convictions and adjustment of Sheffield's sentence as may be necessary.

I. Factual Overview

A. The Murder and Bloody Pants Evidence

On December 11, 2008, around 8:00 a.m., in the District of Columbia, Butler and Lewis forcefully entered the home of Franklin Johnson, a known drug dealer, in an attempted robbery. The home, a short drive away from Prince George's County Hospital, was occupied by Johnson; the sister of Johnson's girlfriend, Donna Galloway; Johnson's one-year-old child; and two other children, J.B. (age five), and L.B. (age six). Butler and Lewis, wearing black masks covering all but their eyes, forced their way into the home. Once inside, the men began shooting, killing Johnson and wounding J.B. Butler was also shot in his leg during the encounter. Forensic analysis revealed that Johnson was shot ten times at close range, and the bullets recovered were consistent with having been fired by two guns. Butler and Lewis fled the scene in a burgundy mini-van with Georgia tags.

At 8:37 a.m., Butler was admitted to Prince George's County Hospital for treatment of a gunshot wound to his leg. During the course of treatment, the Hospital staff removed his pants and placed them in a hospital biohazard bag by Butler's bed. Pursuant to Maryland law, see Md.Code Ann., Health–Gen. § 20–703, the Hospital staff contacted the Prince George's County Police Department (PGPD) to report the “walk-in shooting victim” and two PGPD detectives responded to the Hospital to investigate the shooting. During the investigation, Butler presented different accounts of how he had been shot, first claiming to be a victim of a robbery and then that he had been shot by his friend's boyfriend. As a result, the investigation was transferred back and forth between the first PGPD detectives to respond and the PGPD robbery suppression team.

PGPD investigators ultimately asked Butler to join them in canvassing the area of the alleged crime. While Butler was in the process of being discharged, PGPD Detective Gurry retrieved the bag of clothes by Butler's bed, walked to the car, and placed the bag in the trunk of the car. Detective Gurry then drove to the entrance of the Hospital and Detective Pettus came out pushing Butler in a wheelchair. Although Butler claims that he twice asked for his clothes back, the trial court did not credit this testimony.¹ For over one and one-half hours the detectives canvassed the area of Butler's alleged encounter, but Butler was not able to direct the detectives to the scene of the alleged shooting. Finally, the detectives drove Butler to the PGPD District III station, where he was picked up by Lavangela Smith, the woman who had rented the burgundy mini-van used in the get-away and with whom Butler lived and had an intimate relationship. PGPD detectives logged Butler's clothes into PGPD property, where they remained until the following day when they were released to the homicide detectives from the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) who were investigating the D.C. murder. On December 14, 2008, Butler was arrested, pursuant to a warrant, in connection with the murder of Johnson. Later, in 2009, DNA testing of Butler's pants revealed the presence of Butler's blood and Johnson's blood. On February 12, 2009, Lewis was also arrested.

B. Obstruction of Justice and Perjury Convictions

There was evidence that Butler had asked appellant Sheffield to provide an alibi. On December 11, at 12:45 a.m. there were two calls between Butler and Sheffield. Then, at 4:38 p.m. Sheffield texted appellant Butler's cousin, Tarik Butler, “I guess use me but its ok I'm a soldier.” Later that night there was a third call between appellant Butler and Sheffield. Additionally, Damon White, a government jail house informant, testified that Butler told him that he had spoken with two sisters, appellant Sheffield and Keisha Sheffield, who were going to testify before the grand jury on his behalf. Keisha Sheffield later testified before the grand jury that Butler had asked her and her sister to provide an alibi by testifying that they all were at a club together at the time of the murder.

On December 13, 2008, MPD detectives contacted appellant Sheffield and asked her to come to their headquarters for an interview. Sheffield voluntarily provided a videotaped statement in which she asserted that the night before the murder she had driven Butler to her home in Riverdale, Maryland around 11:45 p.m., and that Butler had remained with her until he left the next morning, around 9:30 a.m. On October 15, 2009, Sheffield repeated this assertion before a grand jury, maintaining this account despite being presented with evidence establishing that at 8:37 a.m. on December 11, 2008, Butler was at Prince George's County Hospital being treated for his gunshot wound.

C. Brady Disclosures and Young Rebuttal

At trial Butler introduced a stipulation explaining that on December 11, 2008, six-year-old L.B.—an eyewitness to Johnson's shooting—told police that he recognized one of the assailants as “Gangsta,” whom he had previously seen with the decedent in the Parkwood area, but that this information was not disclosed to the defense until April 8, 2011. The stipulation also stated that L.B.'s description of Gangsta was disclosed on April 21, 2011, and that L.B.'s videotaped statement was disclosed on April 28, 2011. On June 3, 2011, after trial had begun, the government notified the defense that police had discovered a man named Gary Young, Jr., who went by the nickname “Gangsta” and was an associate of Johnson at the time of his death. The government called Young and, with the court's permission, asked him to put on the black ski mask recovered from Lewis and stand next to a redacted photo of Lewis wearing the black mask, to show that the two men looked similar and that L.B. could easily have confused one man for the other.

II. Analysis

A. Butler's Motion to Suppress the Clothing, the DNA Results, and His Statements to Police

Butler argues that we should vacate his conviction for the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder while armed² and various accompanying weapon convictions because the trial court erred by failing to suppress (1) his seized clothing, (2) the forensic test results showing Johnson's blood on his pants, and (3) his statements to police. The trial court concluded that the “seizure [fell] within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,” but that it was reasonable under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement or, alternatively, that Butler consented to the search by falsely claiming to be a gunshot victim. Additionally, the trial court held that once the police lawfully had the pants in their possession, they had a right to transfer the pants to D.C. police and conduct forensic testing without a warrant. Finally, the trial court found that Butler's statements were a “voluntary” and “intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights” because Butler had “initiated statements to the officers and [ ] was not prompted in any way.”

Our review of “a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress tangible evidence requires that the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in favor of sustaining the trial court's ruling.” Holt v. United States, 675 A.2d 474, 478 (D.C.1996) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The trial court's determination of probable cause is a conclusion of law that we review de novo. Prince v. United States, 825 A.2d 928, 931 (D.C.2003). We review the trial court's finding that Butler initiated discussion with police for clear error. See Morris v. United States, 728 A.2d 1210, 1219 (D.C.1999).

1. The Seizure of Butler's Clothing

The facts surrounding this issue present two ways of resolving it. One is that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated due to the fact that the PGPD viewed Butler not as a criminal suspect, but a victim of a shooting. If the Amendment is not implicated, there is no occasion to deal with the Amendment's requirement that a warrant based on probable cause was necessary. The other way to resolve the issue is to hold or assume that the Amendment is implicated, and that a warrant was...