Shegda v. Hartford-conn. Trust Co.

• Decision Date: 13 July 1944
• Citation: 38 A.2d 668,131 Conn. 186
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: SHEGDA v. HARTFORD-CONNECTICUT TRUST CO.

131 Conn. 186

38 A.2d 668

SHEGDA

v.HARTFORD-CONNECTICUT TRUST CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 13, 1944.

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Quinlan, Judge.

Action by Melba Shegda against the Hartford-Connecticut Trust Company to recover damages for personal injuries, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Quinlan, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.

Error and new trial ordered.

James W. Carpenter, of Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Morton E. Cole, of Hartford (Cyril Cole, of Hartford, on the brief), for appellee (plaintiff).

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS, and DICKENSON, JJ.

MALTBIE, Chief Justice.

The defendant owned a two-family house which was divided vertically into two separate units or tenements. One of these was occupied by the plaintiff's mother under a month-to-month lease. Within the tenement was a flight of stairs leading to the second floor. While the plaintiff was descending the stairs, one of the treads broke, owing to its defective condition, causing her to fall and receive the injuries to recover for which she brought this action. The jury returned a verdict in her favor. The defendant has appealed from the denial of its motion to set the verdict aside, and also from the judgment.

The ground of claimed recovery most stressed by the plaintiff is that the defendant had reserved control of the premises for the purpose of making repairs and that it was, therefore, obligated reasonably to inspect them and to use reasonable care to remedy any defects which might endanger the safety of the tenants. The only evidence of such a reservation of control is to the effect that on two occasions, when rent was paid, the attention of employees of the defendant was called to the defective condition of the stairs and promises were made that they would be repaired, and that the defendant did in fact make repairs to the stairway and to certain other portions of the premises after the accident. We have held evidence of this nature to be admissible in an action against the owner of premises for personal injuries suffered by a defective condition in them as relevant to the issue whether he had retained control of the portion where the defect was located. Vinci v. O'Neill, 103 Conn. 647, 651, 131 A. 408; Farguet v. De Senti, 110 Conn. 367, 371, 148 A. 139; Killian v. Logan, 115 Conn. 437, 439, 162 A. 30; Aprile v. Colonial Trust Co., 118 Conn. 573, 580, 173 A. 237; Staples v. Bernabucci, 119 Conn. 443, 450, 177 A. 380. In all these cases the portion of the premises in question was not necessarily an integral part of the leasehold, but the question at issue was whether or not it was in fact a part of it. Even when such evidence is admissible for the purpose of showing control, it is subject to many of the same weaknesses which have led to the generally accepted rule that subsequent repairs are not admissible as evidence of prior negligence. Carrington v. Bobb, 121 Conn. 258, 262, 184 A. 594; 2 Wigmore, Evidence, 3d Ed., § 283.

The instant case presents a very different situation from that before us in the cases above cited, for the stairway in question was entirely within and an integral part of the leased premises. ‘Ordinarily a landowner, at least where he has made no agreement to repair, is not liable for injuries due to defective conditions arising upon the leased premises during the tenancy; he has surrendered possession and control of them to the tenant and has no right to enter to abate the conditions; and it is the tenant who is liable for injury arising from them.’ Hahn v. Musante, Berman & Steinberg & Co., Inc., 130 Conn. 441, 445, 35 A.2d 201, 202. We have held that a landlord may, with the acquiescence of the tenant, so retain control over portions of the premises within a tenement that he will be responsible for their proper care, Fogarty v. M. J. Beuchler & Son, Inc., 124 Conn. 325, 332, 199 A. 550; and see Williams v. Milner Hotels Co., 130 Conn. 507, 36 A.2d 20; but the reservation of dominion over such parts of leased premises as the stairway here in question certainly would not accord well with the ordinary incidents of the estate which the tenant acquires under his lease. Perkel v. Grayson, 119 Conn. 465, 468, 177 A. 534; Webel v. Yale University, 125 Conn. 515, 518, 7 A.2d 215, 123 A.L.R. 863. We have recently held that the making of repairs within a tenement does not furnish a basis for the implication of a covenant to repair, Palimas v. Aress Realty Co., 130 Conn. 687, 692, 37 A.2d 243, 245, and we said that the basic ground for that conclusion is that ‘the facts are open to too many explanations to justify an inference of the recognition’ of such a covenant. If it were to be implied, the landlord would be under no duty to make repairs unless he had actual notice of the need of them. Rumberg v. Cutler, 86 Conn. 8, 10, 84 A. 107; Miller v. Mutual Mortgage Co., 112 Conn. 303, 306, 152 A. 154; Chipman v. National Savings Bank, 128 Conn. 493, 498, 23 A.2d 922. The plaintiff in this case seeks to attribute to the making of repairs a greater effect than we held could be done in Palimas v. Aress Realty Co., supra; such control as the plaintiff claims the defendant retained in this case would necessarily imply a right to reasonable inspection, for the defendant would be chargeable with defects the existence of which such an inspection would have...