Shelby County v. Mississippi & T. R. Co.
| Decision Date | 05 June 1886 |
| Parties | SHELBY CO. v. MISSISSIPPI & T. R. Co. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Appeal from circuit court, Shelby county.
Heiskell & Heiskell, F. T. Edmondson, and R. D. Jordan, for plaintiff.
C. F Vance, for defendant.
On September 2, 1884, the trustee of Shelby county made an assessment of the property of the Mississippi & Tennessee Railroad Company, within the county, for the years 1866 to 1874, inclusive, for the purpose of collecting the taxes due the county for those years; the assessors of those years having omitted to make any assessment of the property for taxation, and no taxes having been paid thereon. The assessment was authorized by the act of 1883, c 181, which amended the act of 1879, c. 79. These acts provide that the owner of the property thus assessed, if he dispute the assessment, may have a revaluation before the judge or chairman of the county court at any time within one month; and, in such case, the judge or chairman may hear proof, and fix the assessment or valuation, and the same shall be final.
The railroad company did, within the 30 days, dispute the assessment of the trustee, and pray an appeal to the chairman of the county court of Shelby county, writing out its application on the paper containing the assessment. The trustee, being of the opinion that he was not authorized to grant an appeal, refused the application, and handed bills or statements of the several assessments, in the nature of distress warrants, to a constable for collection. The railroad company then carried the proceedings into the circuit court by writs of certiorari and supersedeas. On a final hearing that court quashed the assessment of the trustee, upon the ground that it was not made in conformity with the law. The county appealed, and the court reversed the judgment, being of opinion that the assessment was made according to law; but quashed the distress warrants, because the application of the company for an appeal to the chairman of the county court, although informal, was, in effect, a sufficient proceeding, under the statute, to entitle the company to a revaluation of its property before the chairman.
The judgment was final as to all the matters of litigation under the writ of certiorari, and no remand of the cause to the circuit court was necessary. But a remand, in the nature of a procedendo, to the chairman of the county court, to proceed and make the revaluation asked by the company, was proper. It is the judgment of the court as entered on its minutes, and not the opinion or memorandum of the judge who announces the result, which determines the rights of the parties, so long as it remains unaltered. Parkes v. Clift, 9 Lea, 524, 530. The memorandum in this case,--for it was only a memorandum of three or four lines,--directs the remand to be made to the county court, instead of the chairman of the county court. But the language used, when read by the light of the record shows that only a procedendo to the chairman of the county court was intended; and so it would, undoubtedly, have been ruled, if the company had moved to correct the entry in the minutes by the memorandum of the judge.
After this decision the parties appeared before the chairman of the county court, and the property was revalued by him, upon the proof offered, and the assessment made for the years mentioned. The company again brought the proceedings into the circuit court by the writs of certiorari and supersedeas. Upon final hearing on the merits, "and the court being satisfied as to the insufficiency of all the allegations, (of the company's petition,) rules against the introduction of evidence offered by defendant to sustain the same." From this part of the judgment the company appeals. But the court, being also of opinion that the right of the county to the back taxes claimed was barred by the three-years limitation of the act of 1885, c. 23, quashed the assessment; and from this part of the judgment the county appealed.
If the circuit court was right in holding that the claim of the county was barred, the case is at an end. The assessments in controversy were made by the county trustee in September, 1884, under the act of 1883, which expressly authorized them. "All collectors of taxes," says this act, brought into the New Code, § 663, "are hereby made assessors to assess all property which, by mistake of law or fact, has not been assessed, whether the omission be for the particular year for which the collector is acting, or for any previous year or years; and it is hereby made the duty of such collectors, in all cases where property has not been assessed, but in which taxes ought to be paid by law, to immediately assess the same, and proceed to collect the taxes." The legislature of 1885 undertook to limit the right of action for taxes. By the act of 1885, c. 24, it is provided that all taxes "that hereafter fall due" shall be barred, and any lien for such taxes be canceled and extinguished, unless the same are collected, or suits instituted for the collection, within six years from the first of January of the year for which such taxes accrued. By act 1885, c. 86, it is provided that all taxes for the collection of which no suits have been commenced, "shall be barred, and all liens for said taxes canceled, unless the same are collected, or suits for the collection be instituted-- First, in the case of taxes for the year 1878, and previous thereto, within one year from the passage of this act; second, in the case of taxes for the years 1879, and up to and inclusive of the year 1884, within six years from the time they fall due."
It is obvious that neither of these statutes applies to the case before us; for the first act only relates to taxes "that hereafter fall due," and, even if the revaluation before the chairman of the county court be treated as the commencement of the suit for the taxes in controversy, it was made on August 15, 1885, and therefore within one year from the passage of the last act, on March 31, 1885. But the same legislature also undertook, by the act of 1885, c 23, to amend the acts of 1879 and 1883, as brought into the New Code, §§ 663, 664. The first section of the act so amends section 663 as to limit the powers of tax collectors to assess omitted property to the period of the preceding three years. The second section of the act adds to section 664 the following proviso: "Provided, that no taxes on property for more than three years back shall be assessed and collected, where they have not been assessed and not paid in consequence of the errors and omissions of former collectors or assessors." A statute of limitations prescribes the time within which a person having a right or demand against another shall bring his action. The statute under consideration does not undertake to limit the time within which an action for taxes shall be brought. The first two acts above mentioned were directed to that end, and are statutes of limitations. The act in question merely withdraws from all tax collectors the power, given by the act of 1883, to assess omitted property for any number of years previous to the year of assessment, and restricts the assessment to three years. By its terms, and by a well-known rule of statutory construction, it is merely prospective. It does not repeal the acts of 1879 and 1883 expressly, or anything done under them. It repeals them by implication as to future assessments by tax collectors. There is not the least intimation in the language of the act of a legislative intent that it should operate retrospectively, and such an intent is negatived by the two statutes of limitations passed after it at...
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