Sheldon v. Colorado Dept. of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div., 85CA1287

• Decision Date: 16 April 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85CA1287,85CA1287
• Citation: 742 P.2d 968
• Parties: Phillip SHELDON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Defendant-Appellant. . I
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 968

742 P.2d 968

Phillip SHELDON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION Defendant-Appellant.

No. 85CA1287.

Colorado Court of Appeals Div. I.

April 16, 1987.

Rehearing Denied May 21, 1987.

Certiorari Denied (Sheldon) Sept. 8, 1987.

Thorburn, Sakol & Throne, Barre M. Sakol, Boulder, for plaintiff-appellee.

Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Anthony S. Trumbly, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant-appellant.

PIERCE, Judge.

The Department of Revenue appeals the district court judgment reversing the revocation of the driver's license of plaintiff, Phillip Sheldon. We reverse.

In October 1984, a D.U.I. (enforcement) police officer was called to the scene of a traffic stop by a fellow policeman. Upon arriving at the scene, the enforcement officer was informed by his fellow officer that plaintiff had been driving erratically. The enforcement officer then watched plaintiff exit the car from the driver's seat and requested him to submit to a roadside sobriety test. After failing that test, plaintiff was arrested by the enforcement officer. A blood test was administered and results showed plaintiff's blood alcohol content was above the statutory limit.

Subsequently, the enforcement officer filed a verified report of all information relevant to the enforcement action as required by 42-2-122.1(2)(a), C.R.S. (1984 Repl.Vol. 17). The officer's report included a statement of the grounds for believing that plaintiff had been driving while under the influence. These grounds were partially based upon the information provided by his fellow officer that plaintiff had been driving erratically.

At the revocation hearing, the hearing officer revoked plaintiff's license, finding that the policeman making the stop had reasonable grounds to believe plaintiff was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Plaintiff appealed that revocation to the district court.

I.

The district court reversed the revocation and reinstated plaintiff's driving privileges. It held that in order to verify a document, an officer must have some personal knowledge that the statements to which he is swearing are true. Therefore, it concluded that, because the arresting officer had no personal knowledge that plaintiff was driving erratically, the report was improperly verified. We disagree with the court's reasoning.

Section 42-2-122.1(2)(a), provides that:

"A law enforcement officer who arrests any person for a violation of section 42-4-1202(1.5) shall forward to the Department a verified report of all information relevant to the enforcement action, including information which adequately identifies the arrested person, [and] a statement of the officer's grounds for belief that the person violated section 42-4-1202(1.5)...."

Although the statute requires the forwarding of a verified report, there is nothing in the statute which requires the arresting officer to have personal knowledge of every fact stated within the report. The relevant part of the statute provides only that the verified report contain a statement of the officer's grounds for belief that the arrestee violated § 42-4-1202(1.5). Thus, as long as the verified report contains the information specified by the statute, the procedural requirements of § 42-2-122.1(2)(a) have been met. Therefore, we find no basis for the trial court's conclusion that the statute requires the arresting officer to have personal knowledge of all facts contained in the report itself.

In our view, the trial court's analysis pertains more to the separate question of whether the grounds for belief listed in the statement are legally sufficient to justify the revocation of the arrestee's license. As to this question, our holding in Renck v. Motor Vehicle Division, 636 P.2d 1294 (Colo.App.1981) is dispositive here.

In Renck v. Motor Vehicle Division, supra, plaintiff was stopped by police for speeding and was then detained until members of the D.U.I. squad arrived. An officer with the squad conducted roadside sobriety tests and subsequently arrested plaintiff for driving under the influence. The squad officer later notified the department by sworn report that he had reasonable grounds to believe plaintif...