Sheley v. Singletary, 90-5122

Decision Date17 March 1992
Docket NumberNo. 90-5122,90-5122
PartiesRobert P. SHELEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Prof. Alfredo Garcia, St. Thomas Univ. School of Law, Miami, Fla., for petitioner-appellant.

Angelica Zayas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, Fla., for respondent-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before COX, Circuit Judge, DYER and FRIEDMAN *, Senior Circuit Judges.

DYER, Senior Circuit Judge:

In this case the federal district court denied a petition for habeas corpus filed by a Florida state prisoner. The petition of Robert P. Sheley alleges his mental incapacity to enter a voluntary guilty plea, failure of the trial court to provide an adequate hearing to determine competency, and ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that there was no error and, accordingly, affirm the dismissal of Sheley's habeas corpus petition.

I. BACKGROUND

Sheley's medical history includes a two-month hospitalization in 1967 with prior indications of psychological problems. On February 16, 1973, Sheley was charged in Florida with robbery, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and kidnapping. He was held in custody awaiting trial. While in custody, Sheley was given psychotropic medication, prescribed for his mental condition. Sheley's counsel filed a notice on February 27, 1973 of intent to rely on the defense of insanity, based on the alleged facts of defendant's psychosis and schizophrenia. By order of the court, three mental health professionals examined Sheley in jail and prepared reports to evaluate his competency. Dr. Rothenburg, a psychologist, examined Sheley on March 5 and 10, 1973. He concluded that Sheley was incompetent both at the time of the alleged offenses and to stand trial. Dr. Mutter, a psychiatrist, examined Sheley on March 3, 1973. Dr. Reichenburg, a psychologist, examined Sheley on March 15, 1973. Their reports concluded that Sheley was competent.

Sheley and codefendant Richard Pearson were represented by the same counsel, Jack Nageley, who negotiated a plea agreement on behalf of both defendants. At the change of plea hearing on March 21, 1973, counsel abandoned the plea of insanity on behalf of Sheley.

The Assistant State Attorney expressed his concern to the court regarding Sheley's mental competency before presenting the plea agreement. One of the psychological reports in his file stated the opinion of Dr. Rothenburg as to Sheley's mental incompetence. The State had deposed Dr. Rothenburg and stipulated as to his statement. The court conducted an inquiry to reach a determination of Sheley's competence to enter a guilty plea.

Dr. Mutter and Dr. Reichenburg were brought before the court, as they were immediately available at the jail examining other prisoners. Each doctor testified that, in his opinion, Sheley was presently able to aid counsel in preparation of his defense and to stand trial, and was able to understand the nature and the consequences of his acts at the time of the alleged offenses. Dr. Mutter had listened to tape-recorded interviews between Dr. Rothenburg and Sheley. Dr. Mutter testified that the tape recording in no way altered his opinion of Sheley's competency. Sheley's counsel asked no questions of Dr. Reichenburg and one question of Dr. Mutter regarding his reasonable medical certainty, but offered no defense evidence. The judge found Sheley competent to stand trial.

The terms of the plea agreement were then presented to the court. The judge asked Sheley and Pearson to identify themselves, and each responded by giving his name. The following colloquy occurred:

THE COURT: Mr. Pearson and Mr. Sheley, before I accept your pleas of guilty, I am required to ask you certain questions. If you do not understand the questions, I want you to ask me to explain them to you, or you may feel free to request your attorney, Mr. Nageley, who is standing by your side, to explain them to you. It is extremely important that you fully understand the questions.

Do you understand the nature of the charges against you?

MR. PEARSON: Yes, sir.

MR. SHELEY: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: That is, you are charged with possession of firearm by a convicted felon, carrying a concealed weapon, robbery?

MR. NAGELEY: Your Honor, I wish you would direct your questions only to the guilty pleas rather than the concealed weapon.

THE COURT: Well, you are charged with robbery and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Do both of you understand that?

MR. PEARSON: Yes, sir.

MR. SHELEY: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you fully understand that if I accept your pleas, the maximum punishment to which you will be sentenced, according to the negotiations between your attorney and the State, are a life term on the robbery charge to run concurrent with any existing sentences, and five years on the possession of a firearm charge to run concurrent?

MR. PEARSON: Yes, sir.

MR. SHELEY: Yes, sir.

. . . . .

THE COURT: Do you fully understand these proceedings in which we are engaged in at this time?

MR. PEARSON: Yes, sir.

MR. SHELEY: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Both of you?

MR. PEARSON: Yes, sir.

MR. SHELEY: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you have any physical or mental defects which would in any way prevent you from fully understanding these proceedings or what we are doing at this time?

MR. PEARSON: No.

MR. SHELEY: No.

THE COURT: Do both of you understand that you are entering this plea of guilty freely and voluntarily because you are, in fact, guilty of these charges and for no other reason?

MR. PEARSON: Yes.

MR. SHELEY: Yes.

THE COURT: Has anyone at all, the police department, State Attorney's Office, anyone, threatened you or forced you to enter this plea?

MR. PEARSON: No.

MR. SHELEY: No.

THE COURT: Do you understand that by pleading guilty you waive your right to trial by jury?

MR. PEARSON: Yes, sir.

MR. SHELEY: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand that by pleading guilty you waive your right to be confronted by those that have accused you of these crimes?

MR. PEARSON: Yes.

MR. SHELEY: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And, do you understand that by pleading guilty you waive your privilege against self-incrimination?

MR. PEARSON: Yes, sir.

MR. SHELEY: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Have you had ample opportunity to discuss with your attorney, Mr. Nageley, any possible defenses that you may have to these charges?

MR. PEARSON: Yes, sir.

MR. SHELEY: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Are you fully and completely satisfied with the services of your attorney?

MR. PEARSON: Yes, sir.

MR. SHELEY: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do either of you have any fault to find with the manner in which he has handled your case and represented your interests in this case?

MR. PEARSON: No.

MR. SHELEY: No.

THE COURT: Are you satisfied that he has handled this case in your best interest?

MR. PEARSON: Yes.

MR. SHELEY: Yes.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Nageley, are you completely satisfied, after conferring with your clients, they understand the charges and consequences of their pleas?

MR. NAGELEY: Yes, sir, thoroughly.

The court entered an order adjudging Sheley competent. In accordance with the pleas, Sheley was adjudicated guilty of the two pending charges and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment for robbery and a concurrent term of five years for the firearm possession charge. The State had agreed to abandon the remaining charge.

In 1987, fourteen years after sentencing, Sheley pursued state post-conviction relief under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850. Relief was denied and affirmed on appeal. Exhaustion has been conceded by the State. The district court denied Sheley's petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, without a hearing, and denied his motion to vacate final judgment because "the petitioner has simply failed to present evidence that 'positively, unequivocally, and clearly generate[s]' a legitimate doubt that the medication given to him before he entered his plea had the effect of rendering his plea involuntary. ... [Petitioner has failed] to present proof substantiating his claim." The district court, in its original order denying the petition, upon an independent review of the record, adopted the magistrate's finding on the competency, medication and inadequacy of hearing claims as being without merit, and upon application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), adopted the finding that there was no indication of ineffective assistance of counsel.

II. CONTENTIONS

On appeal, Sheley contends that: (1) he was incompetent to stand trial when the plea was entered; (2) his plea was involuntary because of the level of psychotropic drugs; (3) there was no adequate competency hearing; (4) his counsel rendered ineffective assistance; and (5) the district court erred in denying habeas relief without a hearing.

The State contends that: (1) there was only a "bare allegation" of the level of drugs; (2) an adequate competency hearing was held; (3) under Strickland, counsel was not ineffective; (4) no evidentiary hearing on the issue of medication affecting competency was required as there is no bona fide doubt raised by petitioner.

III. DISCUSSION

The due process clause prohibits the trial or guilty plea conviction of a person who is mentally incompetent. Fallada v. Dugger, 819 F.2d 1564, 1568 (11th Cir.1987) (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam)). Sheley raises the issue of his actual competence to enter a voluntary guilty plea. Our task is to review the correctness of the judgment entered by the federal habeas judge who examined the state proceedings for constitutional error. See Oyola v. Bowers, 947 F.2d 928, 932 (11th Cir.1991).

In order to assess the adequacy of the procedures to protect defendant's rights, we are guided by the distinction noted in Fallada,...

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