Shell Oil Co. v. Pou, 44582

• Decision Date: 30 October 1967
• Docket Number: No. 44582,44582
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: SHELL OIL COMPANY, a corp. and Sidney M. Steverson v. Jimmy POU.

Page 155

204 So.2d 155

SHELL OIL COMPANY, a corp. and Sidney M. Steverson v. Jimmy POU.

No. 44582.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Oct. 30, 1967.

Wilbourn, Williams & Glover, Meridian, for appellants.

Laurel G. Weir, Philadelphia, for appellee.

SMITH, Justice:

This is an appeal by Shell Oil Company and Sidney M. Steverson from a judgment for $15,000 recovered against them by Jimmy Pou in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County as actual and punitive damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by him in a motor vehicle collision.

Among other grounds assigned for reversal, appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. Pou was a passenger in a Volkswagen which was involved in a collision with a tractor-trailer belonging to Shell and being operated by its employee, Steverson. We have concluded, however, from a careful review of the record, that, although a close question is presented by this assignment, there was sufficient evidence to warrant a finding by the jury, as the trier of the disputed facts, that negligence on the part of appellants was a proximate contributing cause of the collision, and that Pou sustained an injury as a result.

There is merit, however, in several of the other grounds assigned, and these will require a reversal of the case and a retrial both as to liability and damages.

The trial court refused the request of Shell and Steverson that the jury be peremptorily instructed that it might not award punitive damages against them. Moreover, the court granted an instruction at the request of Pou that such damages might be included in the verdict. This was error. As stated, this case was a close one on the issue of liability. Moreover, the testimony of Pou's doctor clearly indicated that Pou's injuries were slight and not of a permanent nature and required no treatment beyond a period of 'observation.' The prejudicial effect of the trial court's actions was compounded when Pou's counsel, in his closing argument to the jury, was permitted over objection, to state, after reading the instruction of the court authorizing the award of punitive damages, that the defendant was a corporation, had no soul, could neither go to heaven nor hell and that 'the way that the law punishes a corporation for not paying their debts in a case like this, if you find that they owe actual damage, is to require them to pay a punitive damage.'

There was no evidence capable of supporting a finding that appellants had been guilty of negligence so gross or reckless, or of such wanton conduct, as in the eyes of the law, amounted to wilful wrong, and it was error to permit the award of punitive damage. Fowler Butane Gas Co. v. Varner, 244 Miss. 130, 141 So.2d 226 (1962).

Also, the argument of counsel on this subject was of the same character as that condemned by this Court in Brush v. Laurendine, 168 Miss. 7, 150 So. 818 (1933).

The end result of these errors is reflected in the size of the verdict returned by the jury, for injuries that can only be characterized as slight, especially when viewed in the light of the testimony of Pou's own doctor.

The only legitimate purpose of the argument of counsel in a jury case is to assist the jurors in evaluating the evidence and in understanding the law and in applying it to the facts. Appeals to passion and prejudice are always improper and should never be allowed.

The speed of the respective vehicles was a relevant and material issue. The witness by whom Pou sought to establish the speed of the tractor-trailer was a woman who said she was...