Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Ward
Decision Date | 05 January 1939 |
Docket Number | No. 8794.,8794. |
Citation | 100 F.2d 778 |
Parties | SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION v. WARD et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
R. H. Whilden, of Houston, Tex., for appellant.
Chas. S. Pipkin and Oliver J. Todd, both of Beaumont, Tex., for appellees.
Before FOSTER, HUTCHESON, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
The suit was for the title and possession of 5.6 acres of land, occupied by a right of way for an irrigation canal. The claim was that though included within the metes and bounds, it had been excepted out, of a conveyance plaintiffs had made. The defense was that referred to in the deed as "taken up by the rights of way of the Neches Canal Company's lateral" it had been excepted not from the conveyance, but only from the warranties.
The District Judge took plaintiffs' view as to the construction and effect of the instruments in question, the right of way deed from the Wards to the Canal Company, and the deed of conveyance from the Wards to Gregory. He directed a verdict for plaintiffs. This appeal tests whether that construction was right. We do not think it was.
The deed under which appellant, the defendant below, holds was dated November 23, 1917. For a recited consideration of $4,692 it sold and conveyed to Gregory by metes and bounds, including within them the 5.6 acres in controversy, a tract of land described in the conveyance as "containing 162 acres of land."
It is a principal of universal application that grants are liberally, exceptions strictly, construed against the grantor. 8 R.C.L. 1094; 14 Tex.Jur. 926; Curdy v. Stafford, 88 Tex. 120, 30 S.W. 551; Barker v. Lashbrook, 128 Kan. 595, 279 P. 12; Bolton v. Dyck Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 114 S.W.2d 299; Jones v. Sun Oil Co., Tex. Civ.App., 110 S.W.2d 80; Higdon v. Nichols, 204 Ky. 56, 263 S.W. 665.
This principle is especially vigorous in operation, where, as here, a construction is contended for which would produce the unreasonable result of splitting into two pieces a tract of land, which existed as one tract, subject only to an easement, and which, in reason, must be considered to have been conveyed as such, and not to have been split into separate parts, with a thin wedge of land between.
In Paine v. Consumers' Forwarding & Storage Co., 6 Cir., 71 F. 626, it was said page 632: ...
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