Shelley v. Colo. State Univ.
Decision Date | 06 March 2015 |
Docket Number | A-14-CA-516 LY |
Parties | HERSHALL JOSEPH SHELLEY v. COLORADO STATE UNIV., et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Before the Court are Defendant Colorado State University's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 30); Defendant Dell Inc.'s Motion to Deny Joinder, or in the Alternative, to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Dkt. No. 31); and Defendant Colorado Board of Governors' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 37); and the various Response and Reply briefs.1
The District Court referred the above-motions to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 1(c) of Appendix C of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges.
While Plaintiff Hershall Joseph Shelley ("Shelley"), a Texas resident, was employed at Dell Inc. in Austin, Texas, he enrolled in an online and distance graduate Ph.D. program in theDepartment of Mechanical Engineering at Colorado State University ("CSU"), located in Fort Collins, Colorado. It appears that Shelley was also a fellow in the Alliances for Graduate Education and the Professoriate program ("AGEP") at CSU, a program run by the National Science Foundation to increase the number of minorities obtaining graduate degrees in science, technology, engineering and mathematics. After CSU did not confer a Ph.D. degree on Shelley, he filed this lawsuit pro se in the 200th Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas, alleging state law claims for breach of contract, age and race discrimination, and claims under the Texas Deceptive Consumer Protection Act and the Texas Business Code. See Shelley v. Colorado State University, No. D-1-GN-14-001245 (200th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Apr. 30, 2014).
On June 3, 2014, CSU removed the case on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Shortly thereafter, CSU filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that Shelley's lawsuit should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). In the alternative, CSU sought a more definite statement. On September 25, 2014, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that CSU's Motion to Dismiss be denied and that Shelley be permitted to file an amended complaint that "complies with Rule 8." See Dkt. No 15. On November 6, 2014, Judge Yeakel adopted in part and rejected in part the Report and Recommendation. Dkt. No. 24. He adopted the recommendation to permit Shelley to file an amended complaint, but altered the "denial" of the Motion to Dismiss to a dismissal without prejudice to refiling.
On November 21, 2014, Shelley filed his Amended Complaint and added the Colorado Board of Governors and Dell Inc. as defendants in this case. See Dkt. No. 25. Shelley's Amended Complaint continues to allege various state law causes of action including breach of contract, age and race discrimination, and claims under the Texas Deceptive Consumer Protection Act, the TexasHuman Resources Code, the Texas Business Code and the Texas Penal Code. Shelley's Amended Complaint does not allege any federal causes of action.2
After this case was removed to federal court, Shelley filed another lawsuit against the Colorado Board of Governors and Dell Inc. in state court alleging identical causes of action as the instant case. See Shelley v. Colorado Board of Governors and Dell Inc., No. D-1-GN-14-003625 (345th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Sept. 12, 2014). On December 18, 2014, the state district court granted Dell's Rule 91a Motion to Dismiss in its entirety. Dkt. # 34-1 at Exh. 3. On January 8, 2015, the state court dismissed all of Shelley's claims against the Board of Governors except "claims of discrimination based on age and race." Dkt. No. 39 at Exh. A-3.
CSU moves to dismiss Shelley's Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), for Shelley's failure to follow the Court's order in amending his complaint, for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and for lack of jurisdiction, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2).
If a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the jurisdictional attack under Rule 12(b)(1) before addressing any attack on the legal merits. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578 (1999) ( ); Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 960 (2002).
CSU argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over CSU because it is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment3 of the United States Constitution. The Court disagrees. The Eleventh Amendment states:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. Amend. XI. "Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its consent." Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S.Ct. 1632, 1638 (2011). Accordingly, absent a waiver or valid abrogation, "federal courts may not entertain a private person's suit against a State." Id. at 1638. It is well-established that sovereign immunity applies not only to actions where a state is actually named as a defendant, but also to "ceratin actions against state agents and state instrumentalities." Regents of the University of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997).
CSU and its Board of Governors are considered state entities under Colorado law. See Colo. Const. art. VIII, § 5 ( ); Colo. Rev. Stat. §24-18-104(9) ( ); Ruotsinoja v. Bd. of Governors of the Colorado State Univ. Sys., 2014 WL 2057773, *3 (D. Colo. May 19, 2014) ().4 Under this line of cases, CSU is entitled to assert sovereign immunity. The question is whether CSU waived its sovereign immunity by removing this case to federal court.
By voluntarily removing this case to federal court, CSU waived its immunity from suit in federal court. The Court finds CSU's attempts to distinguish Lapides from the instant case are unconvincing. CSU argues that Lapides should be interpreted narrowly and limited "to the case's unique facts where, 'in the context of state-law claims, the State has explicitly waived immunity from suit in state-court proceedings'" CSU's Motion to Dismiss at p. 16. The Fifth Circuit hasexplicitly rejected this narrow interpretation of Lapides. In Meyers v. Texas, 410 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2005), cert denied, 550 U.S. 917 (2007),5 the plaintiffs, relying on Lapides, argued that the state had waived its state sovereign immunity to its federal claims by removing the case to federal court. Texas argued that Lapides did not apply to it because its holding was limited to suits based on state law claims in respect to which the state had waived its immunity in its own courts. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument and held that in light of Lapides, a state waives its immunity from suit in federal court when it removes a private suit involving state or federal claims from state court to federal district court. Id. at 243-50. The Fifth Circuit explained its reasoning as follows:
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