Shelly v. Ala. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 02 November 2012
• Docket Number: CR–11–1618.
• Citation: 109 So.3d 1145
• Parties: Nathan SHELLY v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

109 So.3d 1145

Nathan SHELLY

v.ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.

CR–11–1618.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Nov. 2, 2012.

Nathan Shelly, pro se.

Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Scott L. Rouse, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

JOINER, Judge.

Nathan Shelly appeals the summary denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the calculation of his sentence by the Alabama Department of Corrections (“the Department”). For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.

In January 2009, Shelly was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment on a manslaughter conviction and placed in the custody of the Department. (C. 12.) As the Department recognized in its pleadings below, under § 14–9–41, Ala.Code 1975 (“the Act”), Shelly is generally “entitled to earn a deduction from the term of his sentence” because he is serving a term of imprisonment of 15 years or less, and because he has not been convicted of a Class A felony or a criminal sex offense involving a child. Prior to March 9, 2012, Shelly was classified as a “Class I prisoner” and earning a deduction—commonly referred to as “good time”—of 75 days for every 30 days he served. (C. 12.) See§ 14–9–41(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975. Effective March 9, 2012, however, the Department determined—based on a 1997 opinion of the Alabama Attorney General interpreting the good-time statute—that inmates convicted of manslaughter could be considered only “Class II prisoners” and, thus, could earn good time at a rate of no more than 40 days for every 30 days served. (Department's brief, pp. 5–6.) “Consequently, [those] inmates' good time balances and minimum release dates were recalculated by the Department Central Records Division.” (Department's brief, p. 6.) As a result of the Department's determination, Shelly's rate of earning good time was changed, his earned-good-time balance dropped, and his minimum-release date changed from April 2, 2012, to June 13, 2013. (C. 12–13.)

In May 2012, Shelly filed in the Limestone County Circuit Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (C. 7.) In his petition, Shelly argued that he had been deprived of his earned good time without due process and that the Department was incorrectly interpreting the good-time statute. (C. 8–10.) In response, the Department asserted that its newly implemented interpretation of the good-time statute was correct and consistent with the 1997 attorney general opinion; the Department also argued that Shelly had not been unlawfully deprived of his earned good time because, the Department argued, Shelly could hold no interest in deductions to which he was not lawfully entitled. The circuit court agreed with the Department and summarily dismissed Shelly's petition.

On appeal, Shelly argues, among other things, that

“[the Department] fail[ed] to demonstrate[ ] before the [circuit] court how Shelly was prohibited from earning good time credit in Class I earning status, how he was not entitled to the good time credit he had accumulated in Class I earning status, and how manslaughter is a violent attack which would constitute an assault.”(Shelly's brief, p. 13.) The Department argues, however, that “[t]he trial court correctly held that inmates convicted of manslaughter are ineligible to receive good time in Class I earning status and ... that [the] attorney general opinion ... is a correct interpretation of the [good-time statute].” (Department's brief, p. 9.) As the Department acknowledges in its brief, “[a]t issue in this case is the interpretation of a single sentence in the [good-time statute].” (Department's brief, p. 9.)

The issue before this Court is whether the Act prohibits prisoners like Shelly—who were convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to not more than 15 years—from being classified as a “Class I prisoner” for the purposes of earning good time. We hold that it does not.

This Court generally reviews the denial of a habeas petition under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Miller v. State, 668 So.2d 912, 917 (Ala.Crim.App.1995). See also Montgomery v. State, 967 So.2d 103 (Ala.Crim.App.2007); Ward v. State, 929 So.2d 1048 (Ala.Crim.App.2005). However,

“[b]ecause the issue presented here involves a review of the circuit court's conclusion of law and its application of the law to undisputed facts, this Court applies a de novo standard of review. Further, the interpretation of a statute presents a question of law and, thus, mandates de novo review.”

Johnson v. State, 89 So.3d 205, 206 (Ala.Crim.App.2011) (citations omitted).

As a threshold matter, we note that

“ ‘ “[t]he touchstone of legislative construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature as expressed in the statute.” Horn v. Citizens Hosp., 425 So.2d 1065, 1070 (Ala.1982) (emphasis added). This Court gives effect to the intent of the legislature as expressed in the plain, unambiguous language of the statute. Jefferson County Comm'n v. Edwards, 32 So.3d 572, 586 (Ala.2009).’

“Ex parte Catlin, 72 So.3d 606, 607–08 (Ala.2011) (Cobb, C.J., concurring specially).

“ ‘It is a well established principle of statutory interpretation that “[w]here the meaning of the plain language of the statute is clear, it must be construed according to its plain language.” Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So.2d 501, 504 (Ala.1993). “Principles of statutory construction instruct this Court to interpret the plain language of a statute to mean exactly what it says and to engage in judicial construction only if the language in the statute is ambiguous.” Ex parte Pratt, 815 So.2d 532, 535 (Ala.2001).

“ ‘....’

“Crawford v. State, 100 So.3d 610, 614 (Ala.Crim.App.2011).”

J.D.I. v. State, 77 So.3d 610, 616 (Ala.Crim.App.2011). In sum, this Court must determine whether the language of § 14–9–41, Ala.Code 1975, is plain or ambiguous. If the language of the statute is plain, this Court must apply the plain language to mean exactly what it says.

The relevant portions of § 14–9–41, Ala.Code 1975, states:

“(a) Each prisoner who shall hereafter be convicted of any offense against the laws of the State of Alabama and is confined, in execution of the judgment or sentence upon any conviction, in the penitentiary or at hard labor for the county or in any municipal jail for a definite or indeterminate term, other than for life, whose record of conduct shows that he has faithfully observed the rules for a period of time to be specified by this article may be entitled to earn a deduction from the term of his sentence as follows:

“(1) Seventy-five days for each 30 days actually served while the prisoner is classified as a Class I prisoner.

“....

“(e) Provided, however, no person may receive the benefits of correctional incentive time if he or she has been convicted of a Class A felony or has been sentenced to life, or death, or who has received a sentence for more than 15 years in the state penitentiary or in the county jail at hard labor or in any municipal jail. No person may receive the benefits of correctional incentive time if he or she has been convicted of a criminal sex offense involving a child as defined in Section 15–20–21(5). No person may be placed in Class I if he or she has been convicted of an assault where the victims of such assault suffered the permanent loss or use or permanent partial loss or use of any bodily organ or appendage. No person may be placed in Class I if he or she has been convicted of a crime involving the perpetration of sexual abuse upon the person of a child under the age of 17 years.”

(Emphasis added.)

It is undisputed that the only question is whether the above-underlined “assault” provision prohibits prisoners like Shelly—who were convicted of manslaughter and received a sentence of 15 years or less—from being classified as a “Class I prisoner” for the purpose of earning good time. In deciding in May 2012 that a prisoner convicted of manslaughter could not be classified as a Class I prisoner for the purpose of earning good time, the Department relied on a 1997 opinion from the attorney general. In the 1997 opinion, the Office of the Attorney General addressed whether the Department may “classify a defendant convicted of manslaughter as a Class I prisoner for the purposes of computing correctional incentive time under [§ 14–9–41, Ala.Code 1975].” (C. 23.) The attorney general concluded that a defendant convicted of manslaughter could not lawfully be classified as a Class I prisoner for the purpose of earning good time. (C. 25.) The analysis underpinning this conclusion is, in total, as follows:

“Any person convicted of manslaughter has caused the death of another person and, therefore, has committed an assault resulting in the permanent loss or use of the victim's bodily organs or appendages. A person convicted of manslaughter is not eligible for classification as a Class I prisoner for the purposes of § 14–9–41.”

(C. 25.)

Although the 1997 attorney general's opinion may constitute persuasive authority, it is advisory in nature, and this Court is not obligated to follow it. See State Dep't of Revenue v. Arnold, 909 So.2d 192, 194 (Ala.2005) (noting that “such opinions are not controlling, but merely advisory”); State v. Corley, 831 So.2d 59, 61 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) (“We recognize that ‘[w]hile an opinion of the attorney general is not binding, it can constitute persuasive authority.’ ” (quoting Alabama–Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 694 So.2d 1344, 1346 (Ala.1997))); Cantrell v. Walker Builders, Inc., 678 So.2d 169, 173 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) ( “Opinions of the attorney general are advisory in nature, and we are not obligated to follow them.”).

The Department contends on appeal that the term “assault” as used in § 14–9–41, Ala.Code 1975, “does not particularly reference ... any of the felonies specifically denominated as ‘assault’ in the Alabama Criminal Code” and that “the phrase ‘an assault’ is a generic reference to any criminaloffense in the nature of an assault.” (Department's brief, ...